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DISCUSSIONS IN THEOLOGY,

DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL.

BY
THE THEOLOGICAL FACULTY
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PREFATORY NOTE.

IT has been the custom of the Theological Faculty of Vanderbilt University, in addition to the regular work of the class room, to meet the students of the Biblical Department collectively once a week and deliver to them lectures on various subjects in theology, these lectures being delivered by the different members of the Faculty in rotation. They consist chiefly in current discussions of living topics in doctrinal and practical theology, such as may be of a more general and popular nature than those delivered in the lecture room. As many of the subjects here discussed are of general interest to the theological and religious public, the Faculty have thought it not unwise to give more permanent and public form to some of these lectures. This volume is, therefore, given to the public in the hope that it may meet a demand which we believe to exist in the Church for the discussion of such subjects and problems as are here presented.

Vanderbilt University, January 1, 1890.

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MATERIALISM.

It cannot be doubted by any one who has watched the signs of the times that the tendency of the present age is to materialism. This is not surprising when we consider the wonderful discoveries of the past fifty years in relation to the nature of physical forces and the successful applications of the same to the wants of man. These applications have extended to all industrial pursuits—to those of agriculture, of manufactures, and of art. They have well-nigh annihilated time and space through telegraphic and telephonic communication. Wonderful changes have thus come over the whole industrial world, whereby the attention of men has been directed to new avenues for the rapid accumulation of wealth and for enlarged gratification of physical wants and desires. Thus it is the public mind has been in a great measure shut out from the contemplation of the immaterial and spiritual, and unduly concentrated upon the material. And when we further consider that the ruin of the fall fell much more disastrously upon the spiritual than upon the intellectual nature of man, we are still less surprised at the materialistic tendency of this age.

The intellect as contradistinguished from the soul did not lose its powers of operation directed to objects of

sense—did not lose its capacity of observing and comparing the properties of bodies, of arranging them into classes and genera and species, of carrying on the investigations of physical science, so as to arrive at the knowledge of physical laws. The every-day business of life stimulates the activities of the intellect in this direction, the chief office of which is to combine means for the accomplishment of ends. So that the intellect may be likened to a plant indigenous to our soil—of the earth, earthly, of rapid and hardy growth—needing nothing but the stimulation of man's desires and wants and the culture of man's hand. On the other hand, the spiritual—that which distinguishes man from the brutes, that which allies him to heaven, and which constitutes him a moral and responsible being—may be likened to an exotic from a distant realm, of difficult and tender growth, requiring not only the culture of the hand of man, but of that hand from which it was originally derived and by which it was implanted in our nature, when man became a *living soul*.

I am not surprised, therefore, that cultivators of the material sciences who have limited their thoughts and studies to the outward and visible phenomena of nature, to the entire neglect of the inward and the invisible, should have become gross materialists and skeptics, teaching that matter has existed from all eternity un-created, in self-possession of the properties and forces it exhibits, and out of the operation of which, indefinitely prolonged, has come the cosmos we behold. They seek

for nothing back of this, and admit of no forces but those they attribute to matter. Starting out with these assumed inherent forces, acting uniformly in modes which are called laws of nature, they have disdained to inquire into the true *origin and nature* of these forces and laws. They have no need, say they, for any Creator other than nature. They thus attempt to hurl Jehovah from his throne of universal empire, and to set up as gods, in his stead, the supposed underived processes and laws of nature. They have gone so far as to hold that there is nothing but matter and its habitudes, that mind is not spiritual in the sense of opposition to matter, but is only an emanation of matter in its most highly organized and refined condition.

That I do not misstate the position of advanced materialists, let a few brief extracts from their published works show: Cabinis and Voght maintain that the "brain secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile." Moleschott declares that "thought is a motion of matter." Büchner says that "mental activity is a function of the cerebral substance emitted by the brain, as sounds are by the mouth, or as music is by the organ pipe." Spencer says the doctrine "that no idea or feeling arises, save as a result of physical force expended in producing it, is fast becoming a commonplace of science." Tyndall says: "Given the state of the brain, the corresponding thought or feeling might be inferred." Huxley says: "All vital action is the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it."

It is not difficult to see the ruinous tendency of such teachings as these ; it is to subvert the whole foundation upon which our religion rests, and to shake our faith in the truths of the Bible. A large share of the infidelity of the present day is due to the wide-spread acceptance of the dogmas of materialists.

I have therefore deemed it a useful service upon this occasion to show that these doctrines have no foundation in the light of principles universally accepted. If we were allowed to discuss materialism from the stand-point of divine revelation, we could make a short end of it. But its advocates refuse to hear arguments drawn from a divine source, and demand that the debate be conducted altogether in the light of science. To this I do not object. I take up the gauntlet, and shall at once proceed with an endeavor to refute all forms of materialism by considerations drawn from the true nature of matter and force.

In the outset I must come to an understanding with my audience in regard to the meaning of the word *cause*, upon which the changes have been so constantly rung by materialists and atheists. Ever since the publication of that immortal work, Kant's "Criticism of Pure Reason," the idea of causation—along with those of substance, space, and time—has been ranked among our *primitive intuitions*, and held to be an *a priori* conception of the mind, and not the result of experience. As such, it is a necessary and universal truth. By Cousin it is held to be logically prior, though chronologically subsequent to experience. As Sir William Hamilton holds it, it is co-

instantaneous with the first instance of causation arising in experience. Be this as it may, the proposition which I wish to establish is this: that the notion of causality always includes that of *efficiency in the cause* for the production of the *effect*. Unless there is between successive events an *efficient relation* perceived, the mind will not entertain the relation of causality.

While the notion of causation is intuitive and universal, the knowledge of causes themselves must be derived from experience. That no event can happen without an adequate cause is a *dictum* of universal acceptance; but what the cause really may be experience only can show. Most frequently the misapplications of the word "*cause*" consist in mistaking either (1) the *occasion* of an event for its efficient cause, or (2) in taking some *condition* in the operation of a cause for the cause itself, or (3) some *antecedent event* for a primary cause. Let me illustrate by a familiar example. If I hold in my hand a stone, it will not fall to the ground so long as I support it. The moment I relax my hold its fall occurs. One would greatly err if he should take the *relaxation* of the hand as the *cause* of the fall; and yet the relaxation is a *condition* necessary to the event. But in the mere relaxation of the hand there is no *potency* to change the place of the stone, no efficiency to cause it to fall. It only leaves the stone free to yield to a proper potency having a different source. So that a *condition*, necessary even to an event, is not the *cause*, albeit it is often mistaken for it. Take an illustration of an antecedent event reckoned improp-

erly as a cause. A nail is driven by a hammer. Many persons, on being asked for the cause, would state it to be the impact of the hammer. This, however, is a mere antecedent event, and cannot be the *ultimate* and *true cause*; for the potency of the hammer is derived from the muscular effort of the arm; nor will it do to put the ultimate cause in the muscles, for these act in obedience to the motor nerves; nor yet in the nerves, for these are put into activity by the volition of him who wields the hammer. The volition—an act of the *will*—is therein the source, the originating, the efficient cause of the action—the true primary and efficient cause. In *volition*, then, we have a real origin of a succession of events. For though the *will* is acted upon by motives, there is no true causality in motives, because there is no *necessary* relation between the motive and the volition; for if so, the will would not be *free*, not at liberty to determine between two alternatives, as is admitted to be the case. Then, in our example, the will is the sole *primary and efficient cause*, and it is a misnomer—or, I may say, a figure of speech—to call any one of the succeeding events the primary cause of those that follow, and yet how commonly is this done! With proper qualification the intermediate events may be called *secondary causes*, but not one of them can be regarded as the primary cause and the true source of efficiency. Furthermore, between true causes and their effects there is an *indissoluble* bond; so that if there be no hindering conditions, the one must always follow the other, the *cause* being the

antecedent and the *effect* the *consequent*. This invariability of succession in true causation has often led to the erroneous assumption that invariability of succession is a mark of causation. This, however, is wide of the truth, and is an error into which the celebrated Dr. Brown fell in writing his *Philosophy of the Human Mind*. Besides invariability of succession, there must be further a *causal relation*, without the perception of which the mind refuses to recognize the presence of a cause.

The seasons roll round in invariable succession, yet who says that winter is the cause of summer, or summer of winter? What succession can be more uniform and constant than that of day and night, yet who will say that night causes day, or day night? Invariable succession is not, therefore, a mark of causation. At most it can only create a suspicion of causal relation, which must be resolved by a subsequent investigation to determine whether or not the *relation of efficiency* subsists between the antecedent and the invariable consequent.

Having thus explained the true meaning of the word *cause*, I proceed to lay down a second proposition which is fundamental in this discussion—namely, that inorganic matter is absolutely adynamic, absolutely passive, having no activity inherent within itself, having in itself no power to affect its own state. This is the acknowledged basis of all systems of natural philosophy, and it has been derived from the universal experience of mankind. The doctrine of the inertia of inorganic matter is

older than science; and it implies an inability in matter to change in the least either its state or place by virtue of an inherent efficiency. It means that all changes in matter arise from an efficiency *outside* of and *independent* of it. It is from the absence of inherent efficiency that matter is, as we know it to be, entirely obedient to the forces that act on it. If a particle be acted on by a thousand forces, it obeys each as if the others did not exist. This is a principle of mechanics never questioned, and is possible only in consequence of the absolute passivity of matter.

Newton's three laws of motion, universally accepted as true, have no other foundation but the doctrine of inertia, and they have proved adequate to explain every phenomenon relating to the action of both molar and molecular forces. Nay, more! they have transformed the astronomer into the *prophet*. On the assumption that the matter composing the sun, moon, and planets is absolutely inert, and therefore without let or hindrance, entirely obedient to the external forces that act upon it, the astronomer calculates the positions and motions of those bodies with a precision wholly inconsistent with the existence in matter of any inherent efficiency whatsoever. He predicts celestial phenomena centuries before they occur. He can to-day direct the axis of his telescope to the point in the heavens at which Jupiter or any planet will arrive a hundred years hence; so that the observer at that remote period would have only to look along the axis of the undis-

turbed instrument to see the planet arrive at its calculated time and place. A theory which works out such marvelously precise results has all the marks of truth, and challenges the universal acceptance of mankind. Such is the theory of the inertia of inorganic matter, its entire deadness, so to speak, its total inability to affect itself. Upon this ground we plant our batteries against all the forms of materialism, with the assurance that no sophistry will be able to dislodge us from it.

This principle was never questioned until certain scientists arose, who, under the assumed properties of what they called protoplasm, claimed for matter an inherent activity, out of which, by development, have come all the beings and forms of the universe. This claim, in contradiction to the firmest established principle in science, has never been made good by experiment, and, until it is, will never be conceded by rational minds. Spencer and his school have adroitly but vainly endeavored to escape the logical consequences of the doctrine of inertia by accepting it as true of matter in mass, but denying it as to the constituent molecules of matter. Now we have a mechanics of *molecules* under the operation of molecular forces, as well as of *masses* under the operation of molar forces, based on Newton's three laws, by which all the phenomena of sound, heat, and light are as satisfactorily explained as those of mechanics, hydrostatics, and pneumatics. The mathematical deductions of these forces, molar and molecular, are alike accurate, and are founded alike upon the entire passivity of mat-

ter, whether in the molecular or molar state. It is absurd to claim inherent activity for every separate molecule, and yet deny it to their aggregated state. It would be just as rational to claim healthy action for every separate organ of the human body, and yet pronounce the body as a whole to be dead. You cannot budge a step in the investigation of either molar or molecular forces without a recognition of the absolute inertness of all forms of inorganic matter, and therefore without attributing all changes observed in it to the operation of exterior forces. This is the ground, I repeat, upon which we plant ourselves, from which it is impossible to drive us, and upon which, making our attack, we can scatter to the winds all the speculations and sophistries of materialists.

To go yet deeper into this discussion, I lay down another fundamental proposition : *that our only conception of force is derived from the energizing of the will.* This was the doctrine of Plato, of the Realists among the School-men, of Descartes, and is the one held by our soundest metaphysicians and our ablest writers on Force. I regard it as a corollary of the proposition relative to the inertia of matter. Mind and matter embrace all the objects of our cognition ; and if the latter be absolutely inert, it would seem absurd to look to it for the origination of efficient force, which is an active agent. It would be looking for the living among the dead. We must look for the origin of force in that which is *not matter*.

I have already shown that invariable sequence is no

proof of a causal relation. Hume and Mill have reasoned unanswerably to the conclusion that the idea of *cause*, in its true sense of *efficiency*, could never have arisen from the observation of outward phenomena. A good many years ago, when I began the investigation of these matters, having been educated in the school of Locke, I regretted that I could not pick a flaw in Hume's argument on this point. I am now glad that I cannot, and that I can claim the verdict of two such subtle intellects in behalf of the proposition I have just asserted. Then if it be true that our notion of force has not come to us from the observation of outward phenomena, we must have derived it from the consciousness of a *nusus* in the execution of our own volitions upon matter. The child of a few days old, when the images of moving objects are first painted upon the retina of the eye, could never have come to the notion of force as the cause of motion until, in the movements of his own limbs, in the tossings of his toys, he finds matter to be obedient to his will; when he experiences this power of his will over matter, he comes to the conception of *force*. In his earliest experience he comes into the possession of two great concepts: the one the *passivity of matter*, and the other the *force of the will*. This utterly demolishes the definition of force given by modern materialists—*i. e.*, that force is matter in motion. No one denies the energy of matter in motion—*i. e.*, capacity to do work. But the question in consideration is the source of the energy? It is a mere figure of speech, whereby we apply

the term *force* to any apparent energy not proceeding from the will. Let me illustrate. Here is a spiral of steel wire suspended from this ceiling. I take hold of its lower extremity, and by a conscious volition elongate it, say a foot. Herein is force, true force, originated force, arising in the will. Removing my hand, I next suspend a weight to the extremity of the coil of such magnitude that it elongates it to the same extent. Now because the weight does the same work my hand did, we call it, by a figure of speech, a force. This personification of the actions of bodies on each other is the tendency of the human mind pointing unmistakably to volitions as the origin of force.

Comte, in his "Positive Philosophy," marks the progress of human knowledge by three stages. The first is that of superstition, or, as he sneeringly calls it, *theological*, a stage in which mankind personified all physical causes. It was, indeed, a period of ignorance in both science and religion; for in the one no valuable deductions from facts had been made, and in the other the true idea of one Supreme Being had been lost. Nevertheless, in that personification there is a philosophy much deeper than Comte's. It is the unbiased testimony of mankind to the fact that matter cannot be the source of force; and hence every fountain and brook and river and forest and mountain was supplied with its personal deity to produce and preside over the outward phenomena. Each revolving planet had its imaginary deity to impel it and hold it to its orbit. This was done

to relieve the mind from the absurdity of attributing outward phenomena to inert matter as a source of force.

Indeed, it is now admitted by all but materialistic philosophers that "force is not a physical *phenomenon*, but a *mental dictum*." We cannot conceive of it but as originating in a Will. Outward nature presents us with nothing but sequence, which we have shown to be no evidence of *efficient causation*. "The idea of force is *home-born*, and born only of our own conscious effort. It is only as we are *agents* that we believe in action. It is only as there is causation *within* that we get a hint of causation *without*. Not gravity, not electricity, not magnetism, not chemical affinity, but *Will* is the typical idea of force. Will is the sum total of dynamic conception. It either stands for that or nothing. If science likes not this alternative, then it has no warrant for belief in *force* at all." Hence the great anxiety of materialists to evade this alternative; but we will not allow them to escape from it. They shall not play fast and loose with the terms *force* and *matter*, at one moment assigning absolute inertness to matter, and at the next an inherent autonomy, by which they would explain all the phenomena of force. We hold them to a definite choice between the two; and if they assign, as they do, an *inherent efficiency* to matter, let us for consistency's sake hear no more about its *inertia*. Let us commit to the flames all our books on natural philosophy, and lay the foundation of a new system upon this autonomy of matter.

Here it may be asked, "Do you mean to say that there are no inherent forces in inorganic matter?" That is just precisely what I do say. "What! is not gravity inherent in matter and the cause of the falling of bodies and of the centripetal tendency of the planets to the sun?" I say, no more so than the hammer is the *efficient cause* of driving a nail. The author of the theory of gravitation never considered gravity as an efficient cause. Newton was too sound a logician and too wise a philosopher to hold any such absurdity as that. He warned us again and again that he did not consider gravity a *cause* at all, but an *effect*. In his celebrated scholium to the third book of the Principia he uses this language: "Thus far I have explained the phenomena of the heavens and the earth by the force of gravity, but the *cause* of gravity I have not assigned." So that gravity with him was an *effect* of an unassigned cause. It is well known that Leibnitz and his school, misunderstanding the doctrine taught by Newton, opposed it and endeavored to banish the term *attraction* from philosophy upon the ground of its being a revival of the exploded dogma of *occult forces*. The defense of Newton was promptly undertaken by his followers, among whom Clarke, Desaguliers, McLauren, and Rowning were the most conspicuous in England, and Maupertuis in France. The line of defense in common to them all was a denial that Newton taught the *causal* nature of attraction. Hear what Clarke says in his reply to Leibnitz: "It is very unreasonable to call attraction an *occult* force after

it has been so often distinctly declared that by that term we do not mean to express the *cause* of bodies tending to each other, but barely the *effect* of a cause, whatever be or be not the cause itself." Rowning, in his "Natural Philosophy," says: "It is to be observed that when we use the word *attraction*, or *gravity*, we do not thereby determine a physical *cause*, but only use those terms to signify an *effect*." Maupertuis, in vindicating Newton before the French Academy of Sciences, uses this language: "Many people have been disgusted by the word attraction, expecting to see the doctrine of occult forces revived in philosophy; but in justice to Newton, it should be remembered that he never considered it as an explanation of the *cause* of the gravitation of bodies toward each other. He has frequently warned us that he employs this term not to signify a *cause*, but only an *effect*."

Now if it be thus with gravity, universally admitted to be the remotest generalization of the so-called natural forces, if it stands but for an effect, what shall we say of all other known physical forces? What else but this: "That they are *effects* only, exponents of the existence and efficiency of a cause back of them all?" And as I have shown that an *efficient* cause is predicable only of the volitions of mind, all the forces of nature are utterly impossible to our conception without the postulate of a self-existent, ever-active, ever-ruling, spiritual Power, apart from matter, the maker and the upholder of all things. Science cannot get rid of a self-existent, eter-

nal, absolute, and all-powerful spiritual Being. "Science, no less than religion, looks up to God."

Vain and absurd is the effort of materialists to frame a cosmology without the recognition of an intelligent Creator. In their effort to do so they demand the existence of atoms endowed with mutual attraction and repulsion, and held in the nebular condition by that form of physical energy which we call Heat. Here, then, at the very outset we have inanimate matter under the operation of forces. Where are the forces to come from? Force, as I have shown, is a *mental datum*, or it is nothing. So that the system breaks down *ab initio* if there be no intelligent and personal Creator. And granting even what materialists demand, it can and has been shown that their methods of evolving out of the primitive star dust the present condition of the solar system are replete with mathematical impossibilities and logical absurdities. There is an evolution which marks the successive genesis of the universe as it presents itself to scientific research, indicating the preconceived plan or eternal pattern, according to which the Creator intended to frame the universe, and which, as it is studied and unfolded and comprehended, awakens in the mind of the adoring creature the highest conceptions of the wisdom and power of Him who spake all things into existence.

Now, in conclusion, to what are we brought by this discussion? To this: that mind is the primal cause and the eternal ruler of the universe; and whether it hastens on to its purpose, or whether it lingers upon its way, is

a matter of perfect indifference. Whether the world was created in one moment or one day or six days or six thousand years or six millions of years is of no consequence in the discussion of the evidence that nature gives of an all-powerful and personal Being who created all things according to the counsel of his own will. And this discussion has brought us to the true nature of physical laws. They are but generalizations from observed facts, and are only the statements of the orders of co-existence and succession as determined by the Supreme Mind. They are scientific formularies, to express in the briefest manner the results of observations in regard to facts. There is no personality, no efficiency, no source of power in these laws themselves. They are the expressions of the modes in which divine power has chosen to operate. Their efficiency comes from Him. And they are invariable because He from whom they have come is without variableness or shadow of turning. But does not this drive us into Pantheism—a Pantheism as gross as that of Spinoza—that God-intoxicated man, as Novalis called him? By no means. Spinoza held that the visible universe was God, that all forms of matter were but attributes of God. But the principles I have laid down in this discourse, and the arguments based on them, lead to no such results. We hold that *matter is distinct from mind*, that it is the *depository of the forces* originating in an intelligent will. That Will is the only source of force. I have no objection to the doctrine of divine immanence, provided you maintain the person-

ality of God and his entire separation from and independence of matter. There is nothing in this doctrine contrary to either logic or religion. Nor am I opposed to the doctrine of *causal intermediation*, or, as it is commonly called, the doctrine of *secondary causes*, understood as the mere exponents of the modes of God's operations. This makes matter the *depository of force*, not the *source* of it. We have only to guard against attributing to secondary causes the efficiency inherent only in primal causes.

To go farther into this discussion would be a trespass upon your patience, and I therefore close it, trusting that enough has been said to satisfy you of the untenability, from a scientific point of view, of the doctrines of materialism.

CREED AND CHARACTER; Or, the Rationale of Faith.

“It makes no difference what a man believes, provided his life is right,” is a sentence we often hear upon the lips of a certain class of free thinking religionists who are overfond of belittling creeds and decrying dogmas. “What a man *does*, not what he *believes*,” say they, “is the test by which we are to try him in this enlightened day of thought-freedom. The day of dogmas is dead. Character, not creed, is what we want.”

Now there is just enough of truth in this statement to make it a misleading and dangerous error. For at heart the statement is radically false. It *does* make a difference what a man believes, and all the difference that can possibly be made. The man that has no creed has no character. The only honest man is the man who does what he honestly believes to be right and true, whose life accords perfectly with his faith. Right-doing is the result of right-believing, not right-believing the result of right-doing. The man whose faith is the outgrowth of his life is wrong both in faith and life in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. Of course every man’s faith, as to its form, is more or less influenced by his antecedents and environments; but of this we are not now speaking.

The great men of the earth have all been great believ-

ers, and their greatness of life and character is directly traceable to their faith ; and this relation between faith and life we believe to be true even where the greatness of life and character has been in other than distinctly religious lines. The man who *believes* something, who knows what he believes, who has convictions and the courage of his convictions, is the man to whom we are to look for great achievements.

It was the faith of Abraham that made him the founder of a race the most noted for its moral character and its achievements of all the ancient nations. It was the faith of Joseph that made him choose purity and a dungeon rather than guilt and freedom, and that made his name a synonym of innocence and virtue, and afterward made him the saviour of his people. It was the faith of Moses that was the secret of his life-work and character, that made him the deliverer of his race and the legislator of the nations. It was the faith of Daniel that made him the noblest example of courage and fidelity, and one of the greatest prime ministers the world has ever seen. It was the faith of Paul that inspired his life-work and made him the grandest missionary that ever carried the gospel to the regions beyond. It was the faith of "the fishermen of Galilee" that made them "turn the world upside down." It was the faith of Martin Luther that made the mighty reformer of the sixteenth century and saved the Christian Church from the superstitions and immoralities that threatened its very life. It was the faith of John Wesley that made him the greatest preacher

er and reformer of modern times, and enabled him amid persecutions and oppositions to inaugurate a work that to-day seems destined to envelop the earth with its doctrines of free grace and full salvation. The inspiration of every great man's work is his faith.

It was the faith of Paul the persecutor that caused him to make havoc with the early Church. It was the faith of Voltaire, the French infidel, that caused him to lead an immoral life, that prostituted his intellect to base purposes, and made his influence a moral poison upon society. It was the faith of Thomas Paine that made him write his "Age of Reason" and send it forth to subvert the faith and corrupt the life of every unwary youth that might be influenced by it. It was the faith of Baur, of Strauss, and of Renan that made them spend years in trying to undermine the foundations of Christian faith in the inspired word of God. It was the faith of the French Revolutionists that led them to attempt the overthrow of all government and authority, and turn peace and order into anarchy. It is the faith of the socialist and nihilist that makes them the worst and most dangerous elements in society. It is the faith of the Jesuits that has caused them, though calling themselves by the name of Christ, to be instigators of crime, and hence to be banished from almost every country. A bad faith makes a bad man. As a man believes, so is he. Can a man's faith point one way and his life drift another? Can a man believe that there is no God and no future life whose weal or woe depends upon his moral

conduct here, and yet it have no effect upon his life and character?

“It makes no difference what you believe, just so your life is right.” What stuff is preached under this text of modern free thought! and sometimes by ministers of the gospel! Just as well say that it makes no difference whether a tree has any sap in it, or is planted in the earth, just so it bears fruit; or that it makes no difference whether an engine has steam in it, just so it runs the machinery. Just as well say that it makes no difference whether the fountain be pure or impure, just so the stream is pure. Nay, verily; but make the fountain pure, and the stream will be pure. Faith is the fountain; life and character the stream. Make the faith right, and the life and character will be right. Faith is the condition of fruitfulness in the Christian life. The fruits of the Spirit are the fruits of faith. Faith is the motive power of all Christian character and life and labor. The inspiration of every great life-work is a faith, a strong faith, in some great truth. Let a man believe something, let him know what he believes, let him feel that he must deliver his message, let him have the courage of his convictions, and him men will hear.

A man is never greater than his faith, or better than his faith. A great faith makes a man great. Faith in a great truth inspires a man to great deeds. Every great man is necessarily an enthusiast. An enthusiast is not a fanatic. A fanatic is one who is enthusiastic over an error or over a half-truth. A great man is one

who is a believer in the truth, a great truth, and has the enthusiasm of his faith. Every great man that has ever lived was an enthusiast. Wesley was an enthusiast. Luther was an enthusiast. Paul was an enthusiast. Jesus of Nazareth was an enthusiast. *Every* great man that has ever done a great work in the world has been an enthusiast. But they were all enthusiasts over the truth, and it was what they believed in that made them enthusiasts. A timid half-faith is the certain forerunner of failure. An intelligent enthusiasm that is born of a mighty faith and of profound convictions is the sure guarantee of success. Men will listen to the man who believes something, and knows what he believes, who has convictions and is not afraid to state them. Such a man will be heard ; he cannot be suppressed. Opposition does not daunt him. Calling him a heretic and a fanatic cannot destroy the power of his message or the truth of his cause. Faith may be crushed to earth ; truth may be crushed to earth ; but faith in truth, though crushed to earth, will rise again ; it must rise again as sure as there is a God in heaven.

Faith is what is needed, a faith that knows what it believes, that has convictions, and imparts enthusiasm to the believer. And no other faith is entitled to the name. To such a faith all things are possible. "All things are possible to him that believeth." "This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith."

We have said that this principle holds true even in other than distinctly religious lines. Take Columbus,

for example, in his discovery of America. He believed that across the waters was another world. It was a faith, not a supposition, not an imagination, not a speculation, but a faith. The world doubted and denied; but faith can stand alone, can stand against the world, and overcome the world. His faith was not to be crushed by discouragements and oppositions. By faith he kept pleading with the king and queen until they at length honored his faith and sent him forth. By faith he kept sailing westward when all others had lost heart, and the crew threatened to kill him if he did not turn back. But faith triumphed. It is to the faith of Columbus that we owe America. Many discoveries are the result of accident. The discovery of America was the reward of faith. The great discoverers and inventors have all been men of faith.

It is a man's creed that determines his character, not his character that determines his creed. A man's creed is what he believes, and as a man believes, so is he. It is a man's faith that makes him to be what he is and to do what he does in life. To make a man's life and character and works better, work first on his faith. This is the Scripture order. Make the tree good and its fruit will be good. Make the faith right and the life will be right. But it must be *faith*, not speculation or credulity. Credulity is belief without evidence—that means calling some other man's faith yours—it means that you do not know what you believe or why you believe. Faith is belief upon evidence—that means you do your own

thinking, that you know what you believe and why you believe. Credulity is not faith; it cannot make character or inspire great deeds.

Faith in the great cardinal truths of revealed religion as held by evangelical Christianity has marked the greatest characters and inspired the noblest lives of the Christian Church. It may matter little whether a man believes in this or that phase of evangelical Christianity, but it does matter much whether or not he believes in the cardinal truths of Christianity itself. These truths are the food upon which the noblest characters and the greatest workers of the Church have been fed and nourished. The fruits of free thought in religion are not good. The history of those who have drifted away from the evangelical creeds of Christianity is a sad commentary on the effects of free thought in religion. The great evangelical creeds are the mighty vital and conserving forces of the Christian Church. They embody the faith of the great body of believers, and have stood the test of time, and have borne the noblest fruit. These great creeds are not true because multitudes have believed in them, and because they have borne the test of time; but rather multitudes have believed and do still believe in them, and they have borne the test of time because they are true, at least in large part, if not in whole.

The history of our own and other Churches has not been without sad examples of the truth of what is above said, viz., that those who have drifted away from faith in

the creed of evangelical Christianity have generally suffered deterioration in Christian character, have largely destroyed their usefulness, have lost interest in personal religion, and, as a final outcome, have sometimes drifted away from all faith in revelation. Within the past decade several notable examples of this ruinous tendency of free-thought in religion have appeared in America, representing different denominations, not to mention many similar cases that have occurred in England. Only a few days since it was stated in the papers that Rev. Dr. ——, a prominent minister of a sister denomination, had severed all connection with his Church, and was now rarely if ever seen within any Christian house of worship. A few years ago he was in good standing in his Church, an honored and useful minister of Christ. His usefulness and evangelical faith are gone; his scholarship and intellectual ability remain. This change did not come about in a day; it was a growth. He began by making a single breach in the creed of evangelical Christianity. First, he called in question the doctrine of the plenary inspiration of Scripture, then denied it, and later denied any and all divine inspiration in the construction of the written Word. But his elimination of the Church creed could not possibly stop here. One after another of the cardinal doctrines of the faith came under review and were ejected from his creed, until he has come now perhaps to hold very little in common with evangelical Christians. It is to be hoped that he will go no further. Not all who start as he did go so

far, while some go further, landing in skepticism and infidelity, and ending in the utter loss of all moral character. This case, with slight variations, finds a parallel in other Churches. When one begins to drift away from the faith of evangelical Christianity, it is not easy to calculate what the ultimate effect will be upon his own character and the characters of those whom he influences.

There is no more unfavorable symptom in ministerial character than to see a young preacher expending his energies in finding fault with his Church's creed. It usually foretokens degeneracy of character and loss of power far more than brilliancy of intellect or superior knowledge. But does the Church want to force its creed down its ministers and members, and allow them no right of private judgment, and no liberty of speech? By no means. No Church goes forth and captures men, and then undertakes to compel them to believe its creed. But rather the creed is that feature of a Church which draws to its membership those who sympathize with and believe in it, and the connection is entirely voluntary. A man who does not believe in a Church's creed has no business joining that Church. Let him seek the Church whose creed he indorses and heartily believes in. But what we are more immediately contending for now is loyalty to the creed of evangelical Christianity, that which is common, more or less, to all Churches. And what is this creed whose cardinal doctrines are the property of all evangelical Churches? Is it not the ripened wisdom of the Christian Church universal in interpret-

ing the word of God, and explaining the way of salvation? Has the Christian Church been studying and praying over the Bible for all these centuries without settling any thing as to its great cardinal doctrines? Surely no set of men, or generation of men, in any day, can do the thinking and creed-making for all time to come. But while this is admitted, it is also true that the consensus of Christian thought for eighteen centuries as to what constitutes the great cardinal and essential doctrines of the Christian faith has in it every probability of truth, and furnishes every ground of confidence; and he who is rash enough to deny any of these doctrines does so at the peril of his own character and usefulness.

“One of the results of the Broad Church teachings for the past thirty years,” says an English writer, “is the tendency to go beyond the limits supposed to be laid down by the leaders of this school of thought. We say supposed, for the limits really cannot be defined. Those who have come under the influence of their teachings have drifted by hundreds into a shoreless sea of doubt, the waters of whose uncertainty have encompassed the whole of their mental and spiritual life. It is willingly conceded that the intention of these teachers was a sincere and intelligent endeavor to meet the spiritual difficulties that have perplexed many minds; but it is affirmed with equal confidence that for every one that has been helped by them, at least scores have been hindered and unsettled, and for every man won to peace and rest,

a large number have perished in the black waters of modern skepticism. Nor is this fatal issue the only one. No thoughtful observer of the working of this school of religious thought can have failed to notice how the disciples cling to their teachers, and herald them as modern saviours, the pioneers of a new and re-adjusted gospel. And in proportion to the devotion of the disciples to their new creed, so is their drift from any practical Christian work or fellowship in lessening the over-brimming cup of human ignorance, sin, and sorrow that permeates our national life."

There are some writers and would-be religious teachers who are fond of decrying Church creeds as narrow, as antagonistic to *honest* faith, and as unproductive of the highest and best results in the ethical life of individuals and of the Church. They talk as if the Church allows no liberty of religious thought, as if the only honest faith was that of the man who, rejecting the Church creeds, had an original, though unformulated, creed of his own. They talk as if we should preach the morals of Christianity, and not the doctrines found in Church creeds, if we desire to see the highest ideals of Christian character. As for my part, I cannot see the narrowness of the Church's creeds, or any tendency toward the suppression of religious thought that is in sympathy with the spirit of evangelical Christianity; but I can see legitimate impatience in the Church toward those who are forever decrying her creed and warring against her institutions and proclaim-

ing themselves as martyrs to their honest convictions. Nor can I see why, if I believe in the creed of my Church, my faith is not just as honest and sincere as if I had written it myself, or as if I had a faith of my own at variance with the creed of my Church. And I hesitate not to affirm that the highest type of piety and the noblest fruits of Christian life are found among those who are devout believers of and in full sympathy with all the great cardinal doctrines of evangelical Christianity.

If a Church creed becomes a substitute for one's faith instead of the embodiment of it, it is a different matter. It is then credulity rather than faith. I once knew a man to join the Roman Catholic Church who assigned as his reason for so doing that "it saved him the trouble of thinking;" by assenting to the Church creed, the Church became responsible for his faith and did his thinking for him. It is to be feared that some Protestants are no better believers, and make their Church creed a substitute for a real, living, intelligent faith of their own, rather than an expression of it, thoughtfully accepted. Such a belief as that is a blind faith, and never yet developed Christian character or inspired a great and noble life. Mere assent to a creed, however evangelical and orthodox the creed may be, is not faith. There is more faith in honest doubt than in such subscription as this to creeds. In order to have faith it is quite as necessary to exercise reason as it is to exercise the faith-faculty of the soul; otherwise, faith would be

belief *without* evidence, rather than what it really is, belief *upon* evidence. The creed that makes character must be a living, personal faith in vital truth, not a substitute for faith to save the believer the trouble of thinking for himself.

The most active and aggressive periods in the history of the Christian Church have witnessed the birth of great creeds. The creed, however, has produced the era, not the era the creed—that is, activity in thinking and believing creates activity in working. Activity in studying the Bible and in discerning and appropriating its spiritual truths has always produced a high state of morals and an active and aggressive age in Christian labor. The epochs of Church history have been faith-epochs. Periods of degeneracy in morals have been periods characterized by a dead faith. The great reformations of Church history have all been produced by revivals in faith and doctrine, and the permanence of every reformation in the world is dependent upon the maintenance of sound doctrine and a living, personal faith within the Church. And these revivals must ever characterize the history of the Church. For whenever the period comes that men allow their Church creeds to become the substitutes for a living, personal, saving faith of their own, then another revival will be needed—a faith revival—and this no matter how rational and orthodox such creeds may be. And because there may be a tendency in the human mind to accept and simply assent to, rather than to *believe*, a creed long recognized as

true, it is probably true that no one generation can formulate a creed for all succeeding generations.

The success and strength of Methodism is due most of all to its doctrines, its creed, its faith. The powerful personality and undying influence of John Wesley, the fervent piety and intense earnestness that have so largely characterized its ministry and membership, the wonderfully wise and apostolic system of an itinerant ministry, have all been elements of power, and have helped to achieve the mighty results that have crowned the first one hundred years of its existence. But in studying the philosophy of Methodist history, none of these factors are, in our judgment, to be compared with the evangelical and Scriptural system of doctrine that has constituted the creed of universal Methodism. The doctrines of free grace and an unlimited atonement, of human free agency and responsibility, of the possibility and danger of apostasy, of the witness of the Spirit and of Christian holiness, are the doctrines the believing and preaching of which, in conjunction with its other common and cardinal doctrines, have given Methodism its success and power in the world. It was the faith of John Wesley that made him what he was. It is the faith of Methodism that makes it what it is, that accounts for every other element of power within it. It is its doctrine of free grace and an unlimited atonement in Christ that gives it its evangelical and missionary spirit. It is faith in the doctrine of human free agency and responsibility that has given such earnestness to the religion of its

membership and to the preaching of its ministry. The doctrine of the possibility and danger of apostasy has been the most powerful preventive of backsliding. Faith and experience in the doctrine of a conscious knowledge of sins forgiven is that which has given courage and clearness and power alike to the humblest believer and the most eloquent preacher in explaining to sinners the way of salvation. Its doctrine of heart-holiness and perfect love is what has led its membership to seek a higher and richer experience in the Christian life than mere conversion. It is the faith of Methodism that makes it what it is. It is the creed of a Church that makes its character.

After all, have we not simply reached the starting point of Scripture: "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be damned?" Is not the divine wisdom of Christ shown in making faith the one great condition of salvation. The more deeply we study the philosophy of the plan of salvation the more profoundly will we be convinced of the divine wisdom displayed in making faith and not works, belief and not life, creed and not character, the primary and cardinal condition of salvation. Christianity must have works, it must bring forth life, it must produce character. These things are not underrated in the Christian system. Indeed, in an important sense it is the whole object of Christianity to produce them. But to have demanded good works, a moral life and Christian character as the primary condition of salvation, without previously pro-

viding and demanding faith, would have been to demand fruit without providing the tree on which it is to grow, to demand the accomplishment of a result without providing the power by which alone it can be produced. For faith is not only the best way to produce good works, but the only way to produce them; and faith that does not bring forth good works is no faith at all. "Faith without works is dead." A good life can be attained only by faith. A moral and spiritual life, involving self-denial to the flesh, is possible only by the power of faith, and a belief that does not conform the life to itself is not to be recognized as any belief at all. Nor is character ever separated from creed. A man of character is always a man who has a creed, who has convictions and the ability and courage to state them. A man without a creed is a man without character. And so we affirm that there is no more striking evidence of divine wisdom displayed in the plan of salvation than is found in the fact that faith is made the one great cardinal condition of salvation. Make a man's faith to be just what the Bible makes faith to be, and his life and character will be what Christian life and character should be.

It is because of this vital and causal relation which faith sustains to life and character that gives it its importance in the Christian system and in the plan of salvation. If faith ended in itself alone, it would have no importance. Considered in themselves alone, character and life and works are far more important than faith. A noble character and a useful life are what pleases God,

not faith. It is not said that "faith pleases God," but rather "without faith it is impossible to please Him"—without faith it is impossible to attain unto that holiness of heart, that nobility of moral character, that usefulness and consecration to His service, that love to God and man, which are the real things which please Him. While it is true that we are justified by faith alone, it is none the less true that that faith by which we are justified is not alone, but is accompanied and followed by all the works of faith and the fruits of the Spirit, which together constitute a noble character and a useful life. There are two salvoons: one at the beginning of the Christian life, and the other at the end, at the judgment day. "He that believeth shall be saved" is the first. "He that endureth to the end shall be saved" is the second. At the first salvation we are justified by faith, and not by works; but at the second we are justified by works, and not by faith. "By thy works thou shalt then be justified, and by thy works thou shalt then be condemned." This is as it should be. Works, life, character is what alone will stand the test of the judgment day, but these can be attained only by faith in truth, in right, in God.

What to believe, why to believe, and how to believe are the three great questions concerning Christian faith. An eminent divine has said that ministers and religious teachers err in attempting to tell sinners *how* to believe, a thing which they already know, and concerning which they need no instruction. By giving lengthy and elabo-

rate explanations of how to believe, a very simple thing is made to appear difficult, and the penitent mind is confused rather than enlightened. There is, we believe, good ground for this criticism. The object of this lecture, it will readily appear, has not been to explain how to believe, nor yet to set forth what to believe, but simply to show why to believe—to show why it is that Christianity demands, and must necessarily demand, faith as the one cardinal condition of salvation.

Away then with this sophistry of modern religious free-thought: "It makes no difference what a man believes, provided his life is right." With a show of truth on the surface, the statement has in it the germs of most fatal error, and is radically false at heart. On the contrary, it makes all the difference what a man believes. A man without a faith is a man without a purpose in life and without character. A man with a bad faith is a bad man in life and character. A man with a timid, weak, wavering half-faith is a weakling among men, tossed about with every wind of doctrine. Faith in error leads to an erroneous life; faith in truth, to a true life; faith in Christ, to a Christian life. As a man believes, so is he. But it must be faith; not assent, not credulity, but a living, personal faith in the truth, and loyalty to that faith. Would you, therefore, make a man's life and character right, then make his faith right, and let his life accord perfectly with that faith. This is the divine relation between creed and character. This is the *rationale* of faith.

GERMAN HIGHER CRITICISM: The Tübingen Theory.

IN connection with our study of the Acts of the Apostles it is necessary to give some attention to the so-called Tübingen Theory of that important historical document. This theory owes its origin to Dr. F. C. Baur, a German professor of great intellect and imposing scholarship, and its name to the Tübingen University, where Baur was professor of theology from 1826 to his death in 1860. Both Baur and his famous pupil, David Friedrich Strauss, author of the *Life of Jesus* (1835), studied and adopted the philosophy of Hegel, and became pantheists. With severe logical consistency they applied the Hegelian philosophy to the gospel and apostolic histories, and the result was an entire reconstruction of the history of early Christianity and the Church. Strauss applied his destructive criticism to the gospel histories and originated the so-called mythical theory of the *Life of Jesus*, while Baur's principal work was with the history of apostolic and post-apostolic Christianity, though, as his theory necessitated, he had to dispose of all the writings of the New Testament. "He starts with the assumption of a fundamental antagonism between Jewish or primitive Christianity, represented by Peter, and Gentile or progressive Christianity, represented by Paul,

and resolves all the writings of the New Testament into what he calls 'tendency writings' (*Tendenz-schriften*), which do not give us history pure and simple, but adjust it to a doctrinal and practical aim in the interest of one or the other party, or of a compromise between the two."

The Epistles to the Romans, Galatians, and Corinthians, which are admitted to be without doubt the works of Paul, show the antagonism of the Pauline or progressive party to the earlier and narrower Petrine or Jewish form; while the Apocalypse of John (composed in A.D. 69), which is the only authentic document proceeding from the Petrine party, exhibits the peculiarities of older Jewish Christianity. "The other writings of the New Testament are post-apostolic productions, and exhibit the various phases of a unionistic movement, which resulted in the formation of the orthodox Church of the second and third century. Thus the whole literature of the New Testament is represented as the growth of a century and a half, as a collection of polemical and irenical tracts of the apostolic and post-apostolic ages, and the rich spiritual life of faith and love of the apostolic times is resolved into a speculative process of conflicting tendencies." Baur's theory, then, more particularly stated, and especially in connection with Acts, is as follows: * Christ in his teachings did virtually do away with the ritual of the old dispensation,

* Compare Fisher, "Supernatural Origin of Christianity" (p. 210), to which the author of this lecture acknowledges indebtedness.

and left no distinction between Jews and Gentiles. But the original disciples did not advance to the conclusion which lay in the teachings of their Master. They continued to believe that the way of salvation was through Judaism, and that the Gentile must enter the Church by the door of Judaism, and that the uncircumcised had no part in the kingdom of their Messiah.

Only the Apostle Paul, who came later, saw that the old rites were done away by the very nature of the true religion, and that the Gentile stood on an equality with the Jew, faith being the sole requirement. He held that circumcision and the ritual were no longer admissible, because they implied some other object of reliance than Christ and some other condition than faith. Thus there was a radical difference in doctrine between Peter and the Jerusalem Christians, on the one hand, and Paul and his followers, on the other. Not only so, there was a personal disagreement and estrangement between these two apostolic leaders, there was between the two branches of the Church a radical opposition in *principle*, and there grew up two antagonistic types of Christianity, two divisions of the Church, separate from each other and unfriendly to each other. Such was the state of things at the end of the apostolic age.

Then followed attempts to reconcile the two branches, and to unite Jewish and Gentile Christianity into one. With this view conciliatory and compromising books were written in the name of the apostles. The book of Acts, for example, written in the second century by a

Pauline Christian, is, as Dr. Schaff says, according to Baur's view, a Catholic irenicon, which harmonizes Jewish and Gentile Christianity by liberalizing Peter and Judaizing Paul and concealing the difference between them. The author represents Paul as circumcising Timothy (Acts xvi. 3), as conforming to the practice of shaving his head* at the expiration of a vow (Acts xviii. 18), and as participating in ceremonies concerning a vow at Jerusalem (Acts xxi. 24-26). Peter, on the other hand, is represented by the author of Acts as acknowledging the rights of the Gentiles, and as holding the same views as Paul (Acts xv. 7-11). He receives Cornelius into the Church without circumcision (Acts x. 1-48; xi. 3; especially x. 34), and eats with Gentiles.

But we quote the language of Baur himself:

It has been shown incontrovertibly by recent investigations † that the Acts is not to be regarded as a purely historical work, but only as a presentation of the history following a certain definite tendency. The true aim of the work, then, must have been to carry back the solution of the questions which were then the object of universal interest, to the point of the discussion of the Apostle Paul's relation to the older apostles. It, however, decidedly asserts its Pauline character in two particulars. It holds fast the principle of Paulinism, the universal scope of Christianity free from the law, by the side of Jewish Christianity. It carries this universalism through all the stages of the

* Though some hold, and Meyer is among them, that it was Aquila, and not Paul, who shaved his head on this occasion, as the order of the words will allow. See the Greek of the passage, Acts xviii. 18, and Meyer and Hackett *in loc.*

† Here he refers to Schneckenburger's work on the Acts, to his own *Paulus I.*, p. 4, and to Zeller on Acts.

history which it deals with, beginning with the words *which it puts in the mouth** of the Lord before his ascension about the uttermost parts of the earth (i. 18), and ending with the final declaration of the Apostle Paul, that the message of salvation is sent to the Gentiles (xxviii. 18). In the second place, it insists on the conditions without the recognition of which it was impossible for Christianity to fulfill its universal mission.

We must take up our position at this central point of the Acts, its Paulinism, in order to appreciate aright the aim and character of the work. In the two points we have mentioned it makes no compromise of Pauline principles. In every thing relating to the person of the apostle, however, it is lax and full of concessions. If we compare the account which the Acts gives us of his character and conduct with the picture which he gives us of himself in his own writings, we find a very remarkable contrast between the Paul of the Acts and the Paul of the Pauline writings. According to the Acts, he made concessions to the Jewish Christians, which, according to his own clear and distinct enunciation of his principles, *it is impossible he should have made.** On the other side we find the same phenomenon. The Acts presents Peter to us in a light in which we can no longer recognize him as one of the chief representatives of Jerusalem. *We are thus obliged to think** that the immediate object for which the Acts was written was to draw a parallel between the two apostles, in which Peter should appear in a Pauline and Paul in a Petrine character. In the doctrine of their discourses and in their mode of action as apostles they not only agree with each other, but appear to have actually changed parts. Before Paul appears at all in the book † Peter is made to baptize the first Gentile, Cornelius, with the consent of the Church at

* The italics are mine.—G. A.

† This is a mistake. Paul appears in chapter ix., while the account of Peter's baptism of Cornelius is given in chapter x. Comp. especially ix. 15.

Jerusalem, while Paul performs the rite of circumcision on Timothy, the Gentile Christian, out of regard for his Jewish fellow-countrymen, and, in general, conducts himself as an Israelite pious in the law. Even amidst the most pressing business of his apostolic labors he does not neglect to make the customary journey to Jerusalem ; he undertakes a vow and becomes a Nazarite with the express object of refuting the calumny that he taught the people to abandon the law ; he has so high a respect for the theocratic privileges of his people that, from first to last, he always preaches first to the Jews, and only turns to the Gentiles when compelled by their unbelief and constrained by the divine commands to do so. The two apostles are even made parallel with each other in respect to their call : Peter, as well as Paul, has a vision, in which he is charged with the apostolate to the Gentiles.

The only possible explanation of all this is that the facts of the case *were deliberately altered* in accordance with a certain tendency. This tendency is conciliatory or irenical. With this end not only were Paul and his cause to be recommended to Jewish Christians, but such a conception of Christianity and of the doctrine of Paul were to be made current as should remove or conceal the most offensive aspects of Paulinism and render it more fit for that union with Jewish Christianity to which the author aspired. The Acts is thus an attempt at conciliation, the overture of peace of a member of the Pauline party, who sought to purchase the recognition of Gentile Christianity on the part of the Jewish Christians by concessions made to Judaism on his side. It deserves to be specially noted how carefully the book refrains from touching the irritating element in the history of either apostle. For example, it passes over in complete silence the conflict at Antioch, of which the Clementines [!] had so lively a remembrance, and does not even mention Titus, who, according to Galatians ii. 1, caused such offense to the Christians

of Jerusalem. But instead of these two scenes it mentions the strife with Barnabas as if this much less important incident had been all that was wrong at the time (!). It looks as if the writer felt it necessary to make up in some way for his silence about the refusal to circumcise Titus, when in place of that incident he gives the circumcision of Timothy, with regard to which Paul was so ready and willing to meet the wishes of the Jews.

And how careful the Acts is to bring Paul in contact with the older apostles at every opportunity, thus suggesting, of course, that a truly brotherly relation had existed between him and them! What the Acts desired to have people believe did actually come to be believed, and the belief never afterward wavered. This proves how well the author of the Acts understood the age he lived in, and how accurate an estimate he formed of what it was necessary, for the general good of the Church, to keep hold of. These same considerations were at work also in the production of a number of those Epistles which bear apostolic names, but which we are obliged to pronounce pseudonymous. No other book of the New Testament, however, allows of so convincing a demonstration of the tendency under which it was written as the Acts of the Apostles.*

The Acts, then, according to this theory, is a production of the second century, in which fiction is ingeniously woven in with facts in the hope that a mutual friendliness between the respective partisans of the rival apostles might be brought about. Such is the theory, and there is certainly no vagueness or ambiguity about it. It is startling in its baldness, its boldness, and its remorseless

* "Church History of the First Three Centuries" (pp. 132-137). London edition, 1878.

destructiveness. Let us inquire into the basis on which it is founded and the materials out of which it is constructed. We shall find in it a good example of the methods and the madness of that fierce criticism which has turned poor Germany upside down, and would fain turn Christianity upside down.

It is a matter of historical fact that in the second century Jewish-Christian and anti-Jewish-Christian parties had been developed and were in existence. The first of these was called the Ebionite sect. "These," says Lightfoot,* "not content with observing the Mosaic ordinances themselves, maintained that the law was binding on all Christians alike, and regarded Gentile Christians as impure because they refused to conform. . They branded Paul as an apostate, and pursued his memory with bitter reproaches. In their theology, also, they were far removed from the Catholic Church, holding our Lord to be a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary. These Ebionites were the direct spiritual descendants of those '*false brethren*,' the Judaizers of the apostolic age, who first disturbed the peace of the Church at Antioch, and then dogged St. Paul's footsteps from city to city." They had a gospel of their own, called the "Gospel of the Hebrews" (*εὐαγγέλιον καθ' Εβραιούς*, not now extant, but referred to and quoted by the fathers), which, from the remains which are found in these quotations, bore a close resemblance to our Matthew, and was in all probability our Matthew altered and amplified, as a comparison of a

* "Commentary on Galatians," p. 159.

quotation from the "Gospel of the Hebrews," given in Origen's "Commentary on Matthew," will show.*

On the other hand, there arose also, in the second century, parties calling themselves Pauline, and repudiating all forms, rites, associations connected with Judaism. Such a sect was founded by Marcion, a native of Pontus, who went to Rome about 140 A.D. Neander, says Fisher, represents that the love and compassion of Christ had struck deep into Marcion's soul. But, ignoring the justice of God, he conceived that the representations of God in the Old Testament are inconsistent with the character and teachings of Christ. All the apostles except Paul seemed to him to be entangled in Old Testament views, and to have perverted the doctrine of Jesus. Hence the expressions in Paul about the Christian's freedom from the law and about free grace, imperfectly understood by Marcion, fell in with the current of his feelings. Hence, though starting from a practical and not a speculative point of view, he developed a Gnostical theory, according to which the god of the Old Testament was a demiurge inferior to the father of Jesus. He shaped his scriptural canon to suit his doctrinal system. The Gospel of Luke, as written by a companion of Paul, and as bringing out the Pauline doctrine, he regarded with favor. But, according to the unanimous testimony of the fathers, he abridged and mutilated even this Gospel in order to conform it to his own system. He

* It corresponds to Matthew xix. 16 *ff.*, and is about the rich young ruler.

took similar liberties with the Pauline Epistles, which he also received. He may have fancied that he was restoring these documents to their original form, but he changed them according to his own *a priori* notions of what Christ and his apostles must have taught. These are examples of parties that grew up in the second century, but it remains to be proven, as Baur *assumes*, that these or any similar parties *constituted* the Church, or were even recognized and fellowshiped *by* the Catholic Church. On the contrary, though the *onus probandi* is upon the aleger and not upon the denier of a proposition, Bishop Lightfoot, in his scholarly essay on *St. Paul and the Three*,* has proved that the Church of the first and second century was *not* Ebionite.† So far from it, these parties, Ebionites on the one hand and Marcionites on the other, were not included in the Church, but counted heretical by the Church. See that masterly discussion.

Baur, however, with his preconceived Hegelian and pantheistic notions, looking for some basis upon which to found a denial of the apostolic history, as his pupil Strauss had already, to the satisfaction of his party, demolished the foundations of the gospel history, and find-

* In his "Commentary on Galatians."

† It is an interesting fact that the Socinians, and notably Dr. Priestley, held, much earlier, the view of Baur that the primitive Church was Ebionite, especially as touching Christ's divinity, and that modern Unitarianism comes from ancient Ebionism.

ing the existence of these parties in the second century, *assumes* that these parties *constituted the Church*, and then *infers* that this same antagonism and division existed also in the apostolic Church in the form of Paulinism and Petrinism. Of this view of the condition of the apostolic Church he professes to find proof in the four Epistles of Paul which he accepts as genuine—namely, Galatians, First and Second Corinthians, and Romans.

Let us now examine, first, the ground of his assumption that these Jewish and anti-Jewish parties constituted the Church in the second century, and secondly his supposed proof of the prior existence of these parties in the apostolic Church. He gets, then, his notions of the Christianity of the second century mainly from a theological romance composed by some partisan Ebionite of Rome in the second century, which has not even the dignity of being anonymous, but which falsely pretends to emanate from Clement, the first Bishop of the Roman Church after the apostles, and forever wears the brand of the "*Pseudo-Clementine Homilies*." Impelled* by a love of the truth, this *Pseudo-Clement* journeys to the East, and is introduced to Peter, whose instruction fully satisfies his mind, and who is represented, instead of Paul, as the real apostle of the Gentiles, and the founder and first bishop of the Roman Church. Paul, though not mentioned by name, is described, is made the adversary of Peter, and is regarded with hostility. Peter is

*This account of this book is taken partly from Fisher.

represented as teaching the doctrines and recommending the practices of the Ebionites.*

“This spurious production,” says Dr. Fisher, “the work of an unknown author, and abounding in fantastic anti-Christian ideas which could never have gained the consent of any sober-minded Christian, is made by Baur a text-book for the opinions of the Church generally in the second century. Its authority is deemed sufficient to outweigh the testimony of approved writers who have always been depended on by scholars of all theological schools. Because this fantastic romance is Ebionite and anti-Pauline, such must have been the prevailing Christianity of the time.”*

Dr. Schaff says: “The Ebionite author of the “Pseudo-Clementine Homilies” and the “Gnostic Marcion” assumed an irreconcilable antagonism between Jewish and Gentile Christianity, just as Baur and the Tübingen school have assumed in modern times; and in the eyes of this Tübingen criticism these wild heretics are better historians of the apostolic age than the author of the *Acts of the Apostles*.”†

Satisfying himself on such authority (!) that this was the state of the Church in the second century, Baur was led by certain passages in the First and Second Epistles

*This work, the “Pseudo-Clementine Homilies,” is translated into English and is given in full with notes in Vol. VIII., pp. 222-346, of the “Ante-Nicene Fathers,” published by the Christian Literature Company, 35 Bond Street, New York.

†“Church History,” Vol. I., p. 211.

to the Corinthians and in that to the Galatians to conclude that this was the state of *the Church* in the apostolic age also, and as the statements and representations of the book of Acts conflict with this view and with his interpretation of Paul's Epistles, he concludes that the book of Acts must be a forgery gotten up in the second century by some pacific Pauline Christian to reconcile the two belligerent parties.

In considering this theory of the book of Acts two questions present themselves :

1. Can the passages in St. Paul's acknowledged Epistles which are alleged to prove that his character, doctrines, and deportment are inconsistent with the representations of him contained in the book of Acts be explained in a way to show that they are not inconsistent with those representations, but that, on the contrary, they confirm those representations ?
2. Are the contents of the book of Acts such as they might be expected to be on the supposition that it was written for the purpose alleged by Baur ?

Though * Christ himself observed, as a Jew, the ritual and all the requirements of the Mosaic law, yet he both implicitly and explicitly authorized the conclusion that in the new era which he was introducing the ceremonies of the law would no longer have place, nor be required. For example, he declared that not what "goeth into the mouth defileth a man ; but that which cometh out of the

* On this account of the extension of the gospel to the Gentiles, see Fisher, "Supernatural Origin of Christianity."

mouth. . . . Those things which proceed out of the mouth *come forth from the heart*, and *they* defile the man. . . . But to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man." In his eyes forms had no inherent value and no abiding existence. He says to the woman of Samaria: "The time cometh, and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship in spirit and in truth; for God is a Spirit, and seeketh such to worship him."

He laid down great principles, and did not define exactly what course the Gentiles were to take with reference to the Mosaic ritual, or what was to become of ceremonial Judaism. These things the apostles were left to learn by providential events and the inward illumination of the Spirit. He left the Church to be educated up to the point of seeing that these things were superfluous. But the twelve Apostles and the infant Church at Jerusalem seem to have had no thought of dispensing with circumcision and the other requirements of the ritual.

Paul, on the contrary, on account of the peculiarity of his experience and by means of his deep insight and the logical force of his mind, together with special enlightenment from above, discerned most clearly that faith, and faith alone, is the condition of salvation, and that to make the soul depend for pardon upon legal observances along with faith is to set the ground of salvation, partially at least, outside of Christ, and to found the Christian's hope on self-righteousness instead of his merits. He went straight to the inevitable inference that the ritual sys-

tem is not to be observed as a means of salvation, and is in no sense obligatory on the Gentiles.

These principles he announces, expounds, and defends with profound conviction, vehement eloquence, and conclusive logic, especially in his Epistle to the Romans and that to the Galatians. It is in the latter that we find the following strong statements: "I do not frustrate the grace of God: for if righteousness come by the law, then Christ died in vain." "That no man is justified by the law in the sight of God, it is evident." "The law was our school-master to bring us unto Christ, . . . but after that faith is come, we are no longer under a school-master." "There is neither Jew nor Greek: . . . for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." "Behold, I Paul say unto you, that if ye be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing. For I testify again to every man that is circumcised, that he is a debtor to do the whole law. Christ is become of no effect unto you, whosoever of you are justified by the law." "For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth any thing, nor uncircumcision; but faith which worketh by love." Moreover, we learn from Galatians that he refused to allow Titus to be circumcised.

In Romans, the following: "If thou be a breaker of the law, thy circumcision is made uncircumcision. . . . Shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfill the law, judge thee, who, though in possession of the letter and of circumcision, dost transgress the law?" "For that is not circumcision which is outward in the

flesh, but circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter." Again, in 1 Corinthians, he says: "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God."

But notwithstanding he held these advanced views concerning circumcision and the law, there is no evidence that Paul sought to dissuade the Jews from observing the ritual. He only rejected the doctrine that the observance of the law was essential to salvation, or obligatory upon the Gentile converts. But his opposition to the law extended no further. On the contrary, *he himself says*: "To the Jews I became as a Jew." He respected their national feelings and customs. Hence he found no difficulty in taking upon himself the vow which James recommended as a visible proof that the charges made against him of persuading the Greek-speaking Jews to forsake the Mosaic law and to abandon circumcision were false, and that he was not a traitor to his people.

Let us examine now those Epistles which Baur accepts as genuine, and which are said to show that St. Paul's real views were irreconcilably opposed to those representations of him which we find in the book of Acts. Baur affirms that there was at Corinth, as shown in the Epistles to the Corinthians, a party claiming to be the disciples of Peter, and holding an attitude of hostility to Paul and his doctrine. But there were other parties in the Corinthian Church also—the Christ-party and the Apollos-party—and there is no more proof that Peter headed or encouraged or even knew of this party than

there is that Apollos championed the party calling itself by his name.

Again, so far is St. Paul from evincing in the Epistles to the Corinthians any hostility or antagonism to the other apostles, as is alleged, he represents them as fellow-laborers in a common cause. To be sure, he says he was "not a whit behind the very chiefest apostles." (2 Cor. xi. 5.) Yet this is not saying, nor does it imply, that they were *not* apostles or that they taught false doctrine. He says, on the contrary: "For, I think, God hath set forth *us the apostles* last of all, as men doomed to death: for we are made a spectacle unto the world, and to angels, and to men. . . . We both hunger, and thirst, and are naked, . . . and have no certain dwelling-place. . . . We are made as the filth of the world, the offscouring of all things, even until now." (1 Cor. iv. 9-13.) Thus associating the other apostles with himself in noble service and self-sacrifice.

Again, in his enumeration of the appearances of Christ after his resurrection, he says in a way not to deprecate the other apostles, but himself: "And last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time. For I am the least of the apostles, that am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God." (1 Cor. xv. 8, 9.)

In 1 Corinthians, eighth chapter, Paul lays down and expounds the principle that we are to consider the weakness of the weaker brethren, and to deal with their ignorance and superstitious scruples in a spirit of love and

patience and helpfulness. This is precisely the principle in accordance with which he caused Timothy to be circumcised and agreed to participate in the vow, as narrated in the book of Acts; and the exposition and defense of this principle are all the stronger here because brought out incidentally and in the natural course and order of the Epistle.

In another portion of this same Epistle, Paul not only defends this principle and the duty of accommodating ourselves in unessential matters to the weak consciences of our weaker brethren, but he explicitly and unequivocally declares that it was *his own practice*. What could be more to the point than the following words? “To the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; *to them that are under the law, as under the law*, though not being myself under the law, *that I might gain them that are under the law.*” (1 Cor. ix. 20.) And yet in the face of this language, in an Epistle which Baur acknowledges as one of St. Paul’s, he persists in declaring that “according to the Acts Paul made concessions to the Jewish Christians which he, according to the principles proclaimed by himself in his Epistles in the most decided manner, cannot possibly have made.”

Still further, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul exhorts the Christians at Corinth to assist in the collection for the Christian brethren at Jerusalem, whom he does not hesitate to call *saints*. (1 Cor. xvi. 1-4.) So again, on the same subject he writes in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians: “For as touching the minister-

ing to the *saints*, it is superfluous for me to write to you." (2 Cor. ix. 1.) "While they themselves also, with supplication on your behalf, *long after you* by reason of the exceeding grace of God in you." (2 Cor. ix. 14.)

So, in the Epistle to the Romans, which Baur accepts as genuine, he says: "Now I go unto Jerusalem to minister unto the *saints*. For it hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a certain contribution for the poor *saints* which are at Jerusalem. . . . And their debtors they are. For if the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also to minister unto them in carnal things." (Rom. xv. 25-27.) He here not only calls the Christian believers at Jerusalem *saints* again, but he speaks of the Jerusalem Church as the fountain whence the Gentiles and especially the Romans received their Christianity. Does all this seem compatible with the view that the Church at Jerusalem had no fellowship with the uncircumcised Gentile believers and Christians? Do these passages in St. Paul's acknowledged Epistles leave it possible to believe that the leaders of the Jerusalem Church were the enemies of Paul, and that he considered them as heretics and in deadly error? "If the Corinthians and Romans had understood these Epistles as Baur does, how they must have been surprised and puzzled at Paul's expressions of brotherly regard for these Jerusalem heretics!"

We turn now to the Epistle to the Galatians, on which Baur chiefly relies for the support of his theory of the antagonism between Paul and Peter, and between Gen-

tile and Jewish Christianity. "This Epistle," as Lightfoot says, "furnishes at once the New Testament ground of the theory, and the ground of its refutation." That there were men holding the views and entertaining the hostile feelings against Paul which Baur attributes to Peter and the Jewish Christians is not denied. But these are, in this very passage which is Baur's main reliance, sharply distinguished from the apostles and sharply denounced. They are the "false brethren" (*τοὺς παρεισάχτους φευδαδέλφους*) who were trying to turn Paul's converts away from his doctrine, and to destroy their respect for his apostolic authority and their esteem for his person. But Paul clearly distinguishes them from the apostles and from the body of true believers.

Let us now examine this passage in the second chapter of Galatians, which is made so much of by Baur. Paul says he communicated his gospel, which he preached among the Gentiles, to the apostles, men who were the acknowledged leaders, men of repute (*τοῖς δοξοῦσιν*), men who were falsely quoted against him by the relentless and persecuting Judaizers. He communicated his gospel to these Jerusalem apostles (*μή πως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον*) not "lest" I should be running or had run in vain. That interpretation of the *μή*, which is linguistically but not contextually correct, would imply that Paul's past success was altogether uncertain, and that he himself entertained misgivings as to the correctness of his preaching, which is hardly probable in the

case of the man who said of his gospel, “Even though we or an angel from heaven preach to you any other gospel than that we have preached, let him be accursed.” The *μή* in this case, as is absolutely required by the context, has another meaning which is not uncommon—namely, *whether or not*. It occurs in this sense in Luke xi. 35, in the sentence *σκότει οὖν μή τὸ φῶς, τὸ ἐν σοὶ, σκότος εστιν*, “See then whether or not the light that is in thee is darkness.”* So Paul says: “I communicated to them the gospel which I preach (still) among the Gentiles, that they might see (and say) whether or not I was running or had run in vain.” He was not, let it be repeated, uncertain or wavering as to the soundness of his gospel. No mortal man was ever quite so positive as St. Paul; nor did he need their views or any instruction from them. It was that they might have opportunity to see that his gospel was the true gospel, the same essentially as theirs, and that the charges of the Judaizers against him were false; and that they might by indorsing his gospel make him able to silence the Judaizers everywhere by quoting against them those very apostles, the head men of the Jerusalem and Jewish Church, whom they were everywhere falsely quoting against him. And this is precisely the use he is now making of that interview with the Jerusalem apostles. He is quoting it to his Galatian converts, who had been sadly disturbed and distracted by these wolv ing Judaizers. For he goes on to say that from these acknowledged chiefs

* See Thayer's Lexicon, *μή*.

of the apostolic circle he received no suggestion—they imparted nothing to him. And why? For the obvious reason that they perfectly agreed with him in the gospel which he was preaching to the Gentiles. There was no difference whatever in their views on this point; and how perfectly this necessary implication of this passage agrees with what the book of Acts records of Peter's long previous reception of Cornelius and his house into the Church without circumcision, and with what is said in Acts xv. concerning the conference which was held at Jerusalem touching this very question of the relation of Gentile converts to the Mosaic law! So far, then, is this passage in Galatians, which is accepted by Baur, from flatly contradicting those two passages in the Acts, as he alleges!

So then the pillar-apostles at Jerusalem, on hearing Paul's gospel, made no suggestion of correction or change, but on the contrary (*ἀλλὰ τοῦντας*, a double adversative)—*i. e.*, instead of making any addition or correction, instead of finding any fault with my preaching, *they gave to me and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship.* Yes, silence those cruel, cruel Judaizers who are undoing all my work among you there in Galatia by saying to them that those apostles whom they refer to as the “pillars” *perceived* that I had been intrusted with the gospel for the Gentiles, *recognized* the grace of God which had been given to me, and, without proposing any change in my preaching, *gave to me the right hand of fellowship*, bidding me Godspeed in my ministry to the

Gentiles.* Moreover, these same chiefs among the apostles *requested* that Paul, while preaching and working among his wealthy Gentile parishioners, would remember the poor saints at Jerusalem, willing to put themselves thus under obligations to the Apostle of the Gentiles and his uncircumcised converts. Fisher says: "Did Peter, James, and John ask for money of heretics and heretical teachers? Did Paul and Barnabas labor to minister to the wants of *Judaizers*, 'dogs,' as Paul plainly calls them in another place? Hardly, hardly. The fellowship of the Jewish and Gentile teachers was genuine and cordial, and so the underpinning of the whole Tübingen theory falls away."

In the midst of Paul's account of the conference he describes the fruitless attempt of the "false brethren" to force the circumcision of Titus, who was a Greek and who accompanied Paul to Jerusalem, probably as a spec-

*The parenthetical remark, "Whatsoever they were, makes no difference to me, God accepts no man's person," is misunderstood when it is supposed to contain irony. It is simply a remark to guard his readers (the Galatians) from thinking that from the phrase he used in describing the other apostles he himself recognized or acknowledged them as his superiors. He used the phrase *οἱ δοκοῦντες*, "those who were in high repute," to show the superlative esteem with which they were regarded by Jewish Christians, including Judaizers, but for fear the Galatians might understand from it that he acknowledged *himself* inferior to them, as the Judaizers claimed he was, he adds the parenthesis: "Whatsoever they were makes no difference to me, God accepts no man's person."

imen of his Gentile uncircumcised converts. These "false brethren" "had crept in unawares," and were intruders where they did not belong. They are singled out and sharply distinguished from the apostles and from the true brethren and believers.

Now Paul's refusal to circumcise Titus is cited by Baur to disprove the historical truth of the circumcision of Timothy by St. Paul, as narrated in Acts. But it is plain upon a moment's reflection, even to a superficial observer, that there was a very great difference between the two cases. First, Titus was a heathen by birth, and secondly, his circumcision was demanded by false brethren on doctrinal grounds and as a necessary condition of salvation. His was a test case, and at a critical time. To have yielded would have been to give up the rights of the Gentiles, and justification by faith.

Timothy, on the contrary, was the son of a Jewish mother, and was circumcised out of consideration for unconverted Jews, and not Judaizers who professed to be converted. Timothy's circumcision had nothing to do with the question concerning the Gentiles, and did not conflict with the doctrine of justification by faith.

Moreover, the occasion upon which the circumcision of Titus was demanded was critical. Paul had gone to Jerusalem to have this very question settled, not for himself, as before said, but that by having the public recognition and indorsement of those who were the chief among the apostles to quote against the Judaizers, he might secure his converts from peril, as he does actually

use this indorsement in this very Epistle in arguing with the unsettled Galatian converts.

After this conference at Jerusalem, occurs that "scene" at Antioch which Baur magnifies into a doctrinal opposition and a personal estrangement between Paul and Peter. When Peter went to Antioch, recognizing the justice and propriety of the views which Paul defended, and which the conference at Jerusalem had indorsed, he mingled freely with the Gentiles, and ate with them. But under the momentary control of that same disposition which had led him in earlier years to deny Jesus in the presence of apparent danger, when some of the Jews from Jerusalem came to Antioch, Peter dissembled and secretly withdrew from association with the Gentiles. But who were these Jews from Jerusalem, and why should Peter be afraid for them to see him eating with Gentiles, if they knew of the decisions of the conference concerning the Gentiles? They had perhaps never been associated with Gentiles, and Peter perhaps imagined they would be shocked and offended at seeing *him* doing what they *had never* seen a Jew doing—eating with Gentiles—or, though knowing and approving the decision of the council at Jerusalem concerning the *circumcision* of Gentile converts, they perhaps under the influence of a life-long and ineradicable prejudice still held aloof from *associating* with Gentiles on terms of social equality. Indeed, we cannot even say that Peter himself would have violated the terms of the arrangement concerning Gentile converts if he had consistently and from the begin-

ning declined to eat with them. So then, while these Jews from James most probably did understand and accept the decisions and decrees of the council, they shrank from allowing that a Jew might in any case live on an equality with the Gentiles, and this would be enough to influence Peter in a moment and mood of weakness. If this be hard for us to understand, we need only remind ourselves that while we freely concede that many colored people are Christians, and perhaps in some cases better than ourselves, the force of prejudice or the fear of public opinion would make it difficult, if not impossible, for us to consent to live on terms of social equality with them.

“The offense, then, which Paul charged on Peter was, first, that he was guilty of hypocrisy in departing from the course which he pursued before the arrival of those from James, since in thus altering his conduct he acted against his real convictions and from fear; and, secondly, that he was guilty of a virtual attempt to lead the Gentile converts to Judaize”—that is, make them feel that, as they were not on an equality with the Jews, they ought to be circumcised. Peter was not, then, accused of an error in doctrine. He is not represented as disagreeing with Paul in that respect; he did not antagonize Paul on that ground, as Baur alleges. He was accused of an error in conduct.

“Peter behaved in a manner inconsistent with his real views and convictions, and there is as little reason,” it has been well remarked, “for imputing to Peter Judaizing principles on this occasion as for imputing them to

Barnabas, who was also, strange to say, led away with Peter." "Only if Paul in this passage had complained that Peter held a false principle, and that he did not understand the rights of the Gentiles, could this interview be urged in support of Baur's theory." But Paul did not, according to his own report of the collision, make any such charge or complaint against Peter. He does, however, say that Peter *walked not uprightly* according to the truth of the gospel; he does say that Peter was guilty of hypocrisy (*ὑποχρίσει*, Gal. ii. 13); he does say that Peter stood condemned *because—because of what?* because he held or preached a wrong doctrine? No; but *because* when certain Jews came from James he quit associating with the Gentile believers *out of fear* of those Jews (*φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς*).

Indeed, Peter's eating with the Gentiles before the arrival of those Jews, which is a part of this record, accepted as genuine and as true by Baur, *presupposes* an essential agreement between himself and Paul on the matter in question, and so the theory which has this passage for its main support falls to the ground.

The correct interpretation of this crucial passage, then, shows that there was nothing in Peter's conduct on this occasion at Antioch that is inconsistent with the statement in Acts that Peter preached to the Gentile Cornelius and his house, received them into the Christian Church without circumcision, and *ate with them*. (Acts xi. 3.) Ten or fifteen years* had elapsed since the con-

* See Hackett's "Chronology of Acts," "Commentary on Acts," pp. 23, 24.

version of Cornelius. Pharisees had become believers, and had retained their views and prejudices concerning the necessity of observing the Mosaic law. And in the Church at Jerusalem, isolated from all contact with Gentiles, it would be quite probable that the prejudice against social equality with the Gentiles would remain and even grow among the members of the Jerusalem Church. This explains how Peter, by constant contact with such people, such practices, and such views, would be in a condition to waver at Antioch, as he actually did.

An examination of the Epistles which are accepted by Baur as genuine furnishes no ground, then, for the position maintained by the Tübingen critics that these Epistles present Paul's personality in a way that is absolutely irreconcilable with the representations which we have of Paul in the book of Acts.

The only passages in the Acts which represent Paul as observing the Mosaic ritual are: (1) that which narrates his circumcision of Timothy (Acts xvi. 3); (2) that which represents him as shaving his head at the expiration of a vow (Acts xviii. 18); (3) that which states that he participated in ceremonies connected with a vow of other men (Acts xxi. 24-26).

In regard to the circumcision of Timothy, we have already shown that it was not at all inconsistent with Paul's principles. Timothy was the son of a Jewish mother, and to facilitate his reception among *unconverted* Jews as a preacher of the gospel and a helper of St. Paul, he was circumcised. *His* circumcision in no way

compromised the freedom of the Gentiles, or involved St. Paul's doctrine of justification by faith. Besides, it is perfectly in accord with a rule of St. Paul enunciated in one of the very Epistles where Baur finds proofs of the impossibility of Paul's allowing such a procedure. "Unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are *under the law, as under the law*, that I might gain them that are *under the law*." (1 Cor. ix. 20.)

The difference between the case of Timothy and that of Titus has already been shown.

The passage in Acts xviii. 18 *may* refer to Aquila; but if it refers to Paul, it is in keeping with his attitude toward Judaism and the law, as shown heretofore in this paper.

And he who made it a rule of practice to become a Jew to Jews, that he might win Jews, surely found no difficulty or inconsistency in taking part in the ceremonies concerning a vow of other Jews, in the way that James recommended, as a visible proof of the falsity of the charge that he was everywhere persuading the Jews to forsake the Mosaic law.

It is worthy of note, too, that the Jews who assaulted him about the time of the expiration of this vow were not believing Jews, nor even Jerusalem Jews, but unconverted, fanatical Jews from Asia Minor, where so many and cruel persecutions were stirred up against him during his missionary labors there.

Now let us consider, in the second place, whether the contents of the book of Acts are such as would naturally

be expected on the theory that it was written for the purpose alleged by the Tübingen critics. Only a few points can be noticed. In Acts i. 21, 22, it is said that an apostle to succeed Judas must be chosen from those that "accompanied with the eleven all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among them, . . . unto the day that he was received up;" and in i. 26 it is stated that not Paul, but Matthias, was chosen to fill the place of Judas, and "*he was numbered with the eleven*," making the apostolic college again complete without any place for Paul. Now if the Pauline and Petrine factions of the Church were such as these suspicious critics declare, and if furthermore, as they represent and claim, the adherents of Peter vehemently and bitterly denied the apostolic authority of Paul, and so excluded him from the apostolic circle, as certainly the *Judaizers* of that day did do, and if the book of Acts was fabricated for the purpose of reconciling these two parties, it is inconceivable that the fabricator of it should have made the statements of verses 21 and 22, and verse 26. For, so far from reconciling the two parties, that would only confirm the partisans of Peter in the opinion that Paul was no apostle, and would indeed give them additional reason for denying his apostleship.

Again, if the design of the writer of Acts was to reconcile these two parties and heal their differences, it certainly would have contributed very little to that design to represent that the thousands of the Jews who believed were "*all*" in apostolic times "*zealous of the law*" and

devoted to its ceremonial observances. "Thou seest, brother, how many thousands of them there are among the Jews which have believed; and they are *all* zealous for the law." (Acts xxi. 20.) Even if the writer had believed that to be the case, he would have concealed it; for the Tübingen theory is that the writer, being a forger, invented or omitted according to his purpose and pleasure.

Again, in Acts xiii. 38, 39, Paul is represented as declaring against the Mosaic law that it could not justify men, but only faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. "By this man every one that believeth is justified from all things, from which ye *could not be justified by the law of Moses*." According to Baur, the book of Acts is a forgery invented for the purpose of harmonizing the two factions, and so it represents Paul as friendly to the law and to Judaism, as when he has Timothy circumcised and when he joins in the ceremonies attending the expiration of a vow. How is it, then, that the fabricator of this same book of Acts makes the blunder of saying that Paul openly and squarely asserts that the law of Moses was impotent to justify men? This would hardly have served the writer's design, and might just as well have been left out.

We notice only one more example of passages that are absolutely inconsistent with the design attributed to the writer of Acts by the Tübingen critics. If the object of the writer was to make such a representation of the sayings and doings of Paul as would conciliate the Petrino

or Jewish faction, it is inconceivable that he should not have omitted those passages which represent Paul as speaking in severe and denunciatory terms of the Jews and to the Jews, and as turning away from them to preach to the Gentiles; as, for example: "It was necessary that the word of God should first be spoken to you. Seeing ye thrust it from you, and judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles." (Acts xiii. 46.) "And when they [the Jews] opposed themselves, and blasphemed, he [Paul] shook out his raiment, and said unto them, Your blood be upon your own heads; I am clean: from henceforth I will go unto the Gentiles." (Acts xviii. 6.) After Paul said, "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Isaiah the prophet unto your fathers, saying, Go thou unto this people, and say, By hearing ye shall hear, and shall in nowise understand; and seeing ye shall see, and shall in nowise perceive: for this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest haply they should perceive with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart, and should turn again, and I should heal them. Be it known therefore unto you, that this salvation of God is sent unto the Gentiles: they will also hear."

The question of the genuineness and authenticity of the book of Acts, on an independent basis, is a separate one, and too large to be treated at any length in this place. The external testimonies are of such a character as to satisfy critics of all schools but the *insatiable*

Tübingen school. The celebrated Muratorian Canon thus speaks of the book: "Now, the Acts of all the apostles were written in one book. Luke embraced in his work to the most excellent Theophilus only the things which were done in his presence, and this is plainly proved by his omission of all mention of the death of Peter and of the setting out of Paul to Spain." It is also attested by name by Clemens Alexandrinus, "Strom.," V. 12; by Tertullian, "Against Marcion," V. 2; "De Jejun," 10; "De Baptismo," 10; by Irenæus, "Against Heresies," III. 14, I. and III. 15, 1. The book is quoted also in the famous letter from the Churches of Lyons and Vienne in Gaul (France), which Irenæus bore to the Churches of Asia and to the bishop of Rome. (Eusebius, H. E., V. 1, 2.) No other but Luke is named by the ancient orthodox Church as the author of the book. It is included in the undisputed books of the canon by Eusebius, H. E., III. 25.

The moral tone of the book is opposed to the theory of its being a forgery. "There is manifest throughout the book of Acts a penetrating discernment of the sacredness of truth and the obligation of veracity. He who set down the record of the sin and punishment of Ananias and Sapphira was incapable of palming off, as a veritable history of the apostles and of the manner in which they were guided by the Holy Spirit, a series of fictitious stories invented by himself."*

* Schaff, "Church History," I., 739.

Again, a critical examination of the contents of the book will prove that the author shows a microscopically accurate knowledge of historical and political matters, as confirmed by profane historians, such as Josephus, Strabo, and Dio Cassius; that he is thoroughly acquainted with the details of the geography of the extensive regions which Paul traversed by sea and by land, and of many other things, the accounts of which can be and *have been* tested by the most thorough investigation, both on the ground where the events are alleged to have occurred and in the literary remains of those days.* Many examples of the author's accurate knowledge of details could be given, but one or two will serve as illustrations. In Acts xii. 1, Herod Agrippa I., son of Aristobulus and grandson of Herod the Great, is called *king*. "Now about that time Herod, the king, put forth his hands to afflict certain of the Church." Here the author has shown the most remarkable accuracy in the use of his terms. "There was no portion of time for thirty years before," says Paley, "or ever afterward, in which there was a king at Jerusalem, a person exercising that authority in Judea, or to whom the title could be applied except the last three years of Herod's life, within which period the transaction here recorded took place." Josephus relates that on the accession of Claudius (A.D. 41) Herod Agrippa received the entire sover-

*On this point see Hackett's excellent Commentary *passim*, Harman's "Introduction," pp. 637-743, and Schaff, "Church History," Vol. I., pp. 732-737.

eighty of his grandfather, Herod the Great,* and so became king; and he further relates that at the time of his death he had completed the third year after this extension of his power.†

In Acts xiii. 7 Sergius Paulus is called proconsul (*ἀνθύπατος*). This was for a long time supposed to be a mistake. Augustus Cæsar divided the provinces of the empire into two classes. Those which required a military force he retained in his own hands, and the others he committed to the care of the senate and Roman people. The governors sent to the emperor's provinces were styled proprætors or legates (*ἀντιστράτηγος* or *πρεσβευτής*); those sent into the people's provinces were called proconsuls (*ἀνθύπατος*). Accordingly, at this time, Cyprus must have been one of these senatorian provinces, or the author of Acts has given Sergius Paulus the wrong title. Strabo informs us that Augustus reserved Cyprus for himself, and committed its administration to proprætors. From this it was for a long time supposed that the author of Acts had made a mistake. But a passage was discovered at length in Dio Cassius (liii. 12), which states that Augustus subsequently relinquished Cyprus to the senate in exchange for another province, and *so proconsuls* (*ἀνθύπατοι*) *began to be sent thither.*‡ Besides this, coins have been discovered from the reign of Claudius which confirm this statement. (See Akerman, "Numismatic Il-

* Josephus, Ant. 19, 5, 1.

† *Ibid.*, Ant. 19, 8, 2. See Hackett, *in loc.*

‡ See Hackett's Commentary, *in loc.*

lustrations," pp. 39-42.) Indeed, as Dr. Schaff says, the very name of Sergius Paulus has been discovered by General di Cesnola at Soli, the second city of the island, in a mutilated inscription which reads, "In the proconsulship of Paulus," *Ἐπὶ Παύλου ἀνθυπάτου*.

The account of the voyage and shipwreck of St. Paul, contained in chapter xxvii., contains more information about ancient navigation than any work of Greek or Roman literature, and betrays the minute accuracy of an intelligent eye-witness, who was very familiar with nautical terms from close observation. He uses no less than sixteen nautical terms, some of them rare, to describe the motion and management of a ship, all of them most appropriately. He is strictly correct in his description of the localities at Crete, Salmone, Fair Havens, Clauda, Lasea, and Phœnix (two small places recently identified), and Melita (Malta), as well as the motions and effects of the north-east wind, called Euraquilo in the Mediterranean. All this has been thoroughly tested by an expert seaman and scholar, James Smith, who has made a contribution of permanent value to the evidences of Christianity in his book entitled "The Voyage and Shipwreck of St. Paul."* These are only three of many instances which might be given.

A distinct argument for the authenticity of Acts, and one in itself conclusive, has been constructed upon a comparison between the contents of the Acts and the Epistles of St. Paul. This argument has been worked

*See Dr. Schaff, "Church History," Vol. I., p. 736.

out in detail in a volume by Archdeacon Paley, called "Horæ Paulinæ," and is little short of a demonstration, though Baur and his Tübingen critics betray no knowledge of the argument. Paley says: "Between the letters which bear the name of St. Paul in our collection and the history of St. Paul in the Acts of the Apostles there exist many notes of correspondence. The study of the two writings is sufficient to prove that neither the history was taken from the letters nor the letters from the history. And the undesignedness of the agreements (which undesignedness is gathered from their latency, their minuteness, their obliquity, the suitableness of the circumstances in which they consist to the places in which those circumstances occur) *demonstrates* that neither the history nor the Epistles have been produced by meditation or any fraudulent contrivance. Coincidences from which these causes are excluded, and which are too close and numerous to be accounted for by accidental concurrences of fiction, must necessarily have truth for their foundation."

Take one example of this undesigned coincidence. "In 2 Corinthians xi. 24, 25 Paul writes: 'Of the Jews five times received I forty stripes save one. Thrice was I beaten with rods, once was I stoned, thrice I suffered shipwreck, a night and a day have I been in the deep.' Now these particulars are not given in the Acts of the Apostles, which proves that the Epistle was not framed from the history, nor could the history have been framed from the Epistle; otherwise, these particulars would most

probably have been inserted. And yet all these particulars are consistent with the history, which, considering how numerically circumstantial the account is, is more than could happen to arbitrary and independent fictions. When I say that these particulars are consistent with the history, I mean (1) that there is no article in the enumeration which is contradicted by the history; (2) that the history, though silent with respect to many of the facts here enumerated, has left space for the existence of these facts, consistent with the fidelity of its own narration. First, no contradiction is discoverable between the Epistle and the history. When St. Paul says, '*thrice* was I beaten with rods,' although the history records only *one* beating with rods—namely, at Philippi (Acts xvi. 22)—yet there is no contradiction. It is only the omission in one book of what is related in another. But had the history in Acts contained accounts of *four* beatings with rods at the time of writing this Epistle in which St. Paul says he had suffered only three, there *would have been a contradiction*, properly so called. But there is one clause in the quotation particularly deserving of remark because, when confronted with the history, it furnishes the nearest approach to a contradiction without falling into it. 'Onee,' says St. Paul, in the passage in 2 Corinthians, 'was I stoned.' And so the history in Acts distinctly mentions *one* occasion on which St. Paul *was stoned*—namely, at Lystra. 'There came thither certain Jews from Antioch and Iconium, who persuaded the people, and, *having stoned* Paul, drew him

out of the city, supposing he had been dead.' (Acts xiv. 19.) And this is the only occasion on which, according to the history, Paul *was actually stoned*. But it mentions also another occasion in which an assault was made 'both of the Gentiles, and also of the Jews with their rulers, to use them despitefully, and *to stone them* ;' but they were aware of it, 'and fled into Lystra and Derbe.' Now had this assault been completed, had the history related that *a single stone was thrown*, as it does relate that preparations were made by Jews and Gentiles to stone Paul and his companions, a contradiction between the history and the Epistle would have ensued ; or, had the account of the transaction stopped without going on to inform us that Paul and his companions were aware of the danger, and fled, in that case also there would have been a contradiction. Truth is necessarily consistent ; but it is scarcely possible that independent accounts not having truth to shape them should thus advance to the very brink of contradiction without falling into it."*

Lastly, among other proofs of the authenticity of the book of Acts may be mentioned the surprisingly abridged and abrupt ending of the book, the silence concerning the last labors and fate of the Apostle Paul, and the similar silence concerning the fate of Peter. It is hardly conceivable that a writer, forging the contents of the book in the second century, long after the deaths of Paul and Peter, should have omitted any reference thereto. The phenomena here referred to are intelligi-

* "Horæ Paulinæ," pp. 74, 75.

ble only on the supposition of a real and candid companion of the Apostle being prevented by circumstances from continuing his narrative, but would be altogether inconceivable in the case of an author not writing till the second century, and inventing and manipulating materials with a definite tendency, as Baur and the Tübingen critics hold.*

“The Acts of the Apostles,” says one of the most candid, learned, and scholarly critics of the age,† “in the multiplicity and variety of its details probably affords greater means of testing its general character for truth than any other ancient narrative in existence, and in my opinion it satisfies the tests fully.” And every argument for the genuineness and authenticity of this manifoldly tested document is an argument against Baur’s audacious and mendacious theory of a second-century tendency-forgery. Indeed, a most important change took place in Baur’s own mind shortly before his death in 1860. Says Dr. Schaff, who was a student at the University of Tübingen during the connection of Baur and Strauss with it: “As an honest and serious skeptic, he had to confess at last a psychological miracle in the conversion of St. Paul, and to bow before the greater miracle of the resurrection of Christ, without which the

* See Meyer, “Introduction to Acts,” p. 5.

† Bishop Lightfoot, *Excursus* on St. Paul and the Three in his Commentary on Galatians, p. 184. This *Excursus* refutes Baur’s position that the Church of the second century was Ebionite, and not catholic. See especially pp. 172, 173.

former is an inexplicable enigma." And when Baur was dying, his pantheism broke down, and, though he had looked upon the idea of a personal God with contempt, he prayed to the personal God to grant him a peaceful end. "Lord, grant me a peaceful end."

And Christianity abides, the Tübingen critics* to the

* As to the later phases of this Tübingen criticism Dr. Schaff says: While some pupils of Baur (Strauss and Volkmar) have gone even beyond his positions, others make concessions to the traditional views. [The change in Baur's own mind has already been mentioned.] Holtzmann, Reuss, Weizsäcker, and Keim have modified and corrected many of the extreme views of the Tübingen school. Even Hilgenfeld, with all his zeal for "Fortschrittstheologie" (progressive theology) and against "Rück-schrittstheologie" (retrogressive theology), admits seven instead of four Pauline Epistles, assigns an earlier date to the synoptical Gospels and the Epistle to the Hebrews, and says: "It cannot be denied that Baur's criticism went beyond the bounds of moderation, and inflicted too deep wounds on the faith of the Church." Renan admits nine Pauline Epistles, the essential genuineness of Acts, and even the narrative portions of John's Gospel. Schenkel (in his *Christusbild der Apostel*, 1879) considerably moderates the antagonism between Petrinism and Paulinism, and confesses that he has been "forced to the conviction that the Acts of the Apostles is a more trustworthy source of information than is commonly allowed on the part of modern criticism." Keim, in 1878, a year before his death, came to a similar conclusion, and proves in opposition to Baur, Schwegler, and Zeller, yet from the stand-point of liberal criticism and allowing later additions, the substantial harmony between the Acts and the Epistle to the Galatians as regards the apostolic conference at Jerusalem.

contrary notwithstanding, and calmly survives this cunningly devised form of assault, as it has survived a thousand others. Now, as when Jesus spoke to Saul, it is hard for men to kick against the goads. Christianity does not suffer. It is only the men who kick that suffer. And as the possibilities of hostile assault are gradually exhausted, the Christian may say with ever-deepening confidence:

“Should all the forms that men devise
Assault my faith with treach’rous art,
I’d call them vanity and lies,
And bind the gospel to my heart.”

While there are thus signs of disintegration in the ranks of destructive criticism, the historic truth and genuineness of the New Testament writings have found learned and able defenders from different stand-points, such as Neander, Dorner, Ebrard, Lechler, Lange, Hoffman (of Erlangen), Luthardt, Christlieb, Weiss, Godet, de Pressensé, and among Englishmen and Americans, Lightfoot, Westcott, Plumptre, Sanday, Farrar, G. P. Fisher Ezra Abbott. “Church History,” Vol. I., pp. 211, 212.

THE PRINCE OF PREACHERS: John Chrysostom.

THE fourth century was one of the most remarkable in the history of the Christian Church. Its intellectual activity is a marvel. Until we reach the period of the Reformation, or at least until we reach the period of scholasticism, we may in vain search elsewhere for so many eminent names. In the West, for example, we at this time find Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine—three of the four great Doctors of the Latin Church; and in the East, Athanasius, Basil, Gregory Nazianzus, Gregory Nyssen, and John Chrysostom, all of whom occupy an equally unrivaled eminence among the Greeks. We have here another illustration of the general law according to which great men come into the world, not singly, but in groups.

Concerning the last mentioned of these Fathers, whom the Homilies of the English Church call “that godly clerk and great preaehler,” I wish to write as briefly as the fertility of the theme will allow. The title of Chrysostom, or Gold-mouth, by which alone he is known in history, was not given him for at least a hundred years after his death. His real name was simply John. He was born at Antioch in Syria not earlier than A.D. 343, nor later than 347, but the exact date is not known.

His father, Secundus, a distinguished officer in the imperial army, died while he was yet an infant, and his whole rearing and training was devolved upon his pious mother, Anthusa. She was equal to the task, and discharged it with the most scrupulous fidelity. Left a widow at the age of twenty, in a generation on which all moral obligations sat lightly, she was noted down to the day of her death for her reverent regard for the memory of her husband, and her tender devotion to the interests of her son. Along with Maerina and Nona and Monica she shares the high honor of having been one of the “great mothers” of the early Church. Chrysostom himself informs us that when he began to attend the lectures of Libanius, his master inquired who and what his parents were; and on being told that he was the son of a widow who, at the age of forty, had lost her husband twenty years, he exclaimed in a tone of mingled jealousy and admiration: “Heavens! what women these Christians have!”

When this incident took place John was eighteen years old. His object in entering the school of Libanius was to prepare himself to be an advocate in the law courts. He here became so well acquainted with the best Greek authors, both in prose and poetry, that in later life he could always quote them with ease when he wished to “point an argument or adorn a moral.” He was also carefully drilled in oratory, and, from the beginning, showed that he possessed the highest ability as a speaker. One of his first rhetorical efforts, a panegyric

on Constantine and his sons, won unstinted praise from Libanius. His entrance upon his chosen profession was marked by every sign of a successful career. Fame and fortune were both before him. Stephens says: "The law was at that time the great avenue to civil distinction. The amount of litigation was enormous. One hundred and fifty advocates were required for the court of the Praetorian Prefect of the East alone. The display of talent in the law courts frequently obtained for a man the government of a province, whence the road was open to those higher dignities of Vice-prefect, Prefect, Patrician, and Consul."

But as John was nearing twenty-three years of age he suddenly underwent a great change—an out-and-out and most radical conversion. The faithful religious instruction which he had received from childhood, and the extraordinary influence exerted upon him by his intimate friend Basil, now brought forth their legitimate fruit. Half-way measures did not satisfy him. He not only forswore his sins, renounced the theater, and gave up all other worldly diversions, but he also abandoned the law, received baptism at the hands of Bishop Meletius, who had recently returned from exile, and was appointed to the semi-clerical office of reader in the Church. In fact, had it not been for the urgent and affectionate pleadings of his mother, he would at once have become a monk. When every other argument had failed her, she seated him on the very bed on which she had borne him, reminded him of all that she had done and suffered for

his sake, and, with tears in her eyes, besought him not to make her for a second time a widow by withdrawing from her home. Let us quote her very words as he has reported them to us: "I was not long permitted to enjoy the virtue of thy father, my child: so it seemed good to God. My travail-pangs at your birth were quickly succeeded by his death, bringing orphanhood upon thee, and upon me an untimely widowhood, which only those who have experienced them can fairly understand. For no description can approach the reality of that storm and tempest which is undergone by her who, having but lately issued from her father's home, and being unskilled in the ways of the world, is suddenly plunged into grief insupportable, and compelled to endure anxieties too great for her sex and age. . . . I implore you this one favor only—not to make me a second time a widow, or to revive the grief which time has lulled. Wait for my death; perhaps I shall soon be gone. When you have committed my body to the ground, and mingled my bones with your father's bones, then you will be free to embark on any sea you please." Being naturally of an affectionate disposition, John could not resist the force of such words; he yielded. At the same time, and as a sort of offset to this action, he insisted on subjecting himself to the most rigid asceticism, putting on coarse garments, sleeping on the hard floor, eating only the plainest food and that at long intervals, and giving up his days and nights to incessant prayer. In this "amateur monasticism" he was joined by three

other young friends—Basil, Maximus, and Theodore—the four putting themselves under the superintendence of Diodorus, and living by rule, much as Wesley and the first Methodists did at Oxford.

When John was somewhere between twenty-five and twenty-eight years of age he was singled out for ordination to one of the vacant bishopries of Syria. A like honor was thrust upon his friend Basil. After conference together, they agreed to accept the preferment and submit to ordination. But John doubted his own fitness for the work, and evaded his promise in a most unmanly way. The defense which he subsequently undertook to make of his conduct exhibits a certain suppleness of conscience and a sort of Oriental freedom in dealing with the truth, which are all the more amazing in a man whose character is in most respects so lofty.

Not long afterward, his mother probably having died, he carried out his original intention, and retired for six years to a rugged mountain on the south of Antioch, where, first in company with a single monk, and afterward in absolute solitude, he sought to subdue the flesh and to lead an “angelical life.” The rigid fasting that he practiced, the loss of sleep from which he suffered, and the terrible cold to which he was often exposed, broke down his constitution and sowed the seeds of those diseases which finally compelled him to return to his home, and which afflicted him for the rest of his life. I cannot stop here to discuss at any length the moral quality of these excesses. It is enough to say that the

whole conception of Christianity from which they spring finds no warrant in the New Testament. Let us remember, however, in charity to Chrysostom, that it is hard for a man to escape from the spirit of the age in which he lives; and let us not forget that in the fourth century there was an almost universal admission of the theory that monasticism is the highest reach of religion.

Seareely had John re-entered Antioch, when, at the earnest solicitation of Meletius, he was ordained deacon. This office he occupied for five years, enlarging meantime the scope of his knowledge, pursuing his work as an author, and winning favor with the people by his sanctity and by his diligence. As he approached his fortieth year, having reached the full maturity of his affluent intellectual energy, he was ordained elder by the new bishop, Flavian, and appointed to preach in the Cathedral Church. He had at last found his vocation. That he did not find it sooner is a marvel. Probably no man ever lived who possessed more of the elements of a great popular preacher. "His personal appearance was dignified, but not imposing. His stature was diminutive, his limbs long, and so much emaciated by early austerities and habitual self-denial that he compares himself to a spider. His forehead was very lofty and furrowed with wrinkles, expanding very widely at the summit; his head bald; his eyes deeply set, but keen and piercing; his cheeks pallid and withered; his chin pointed, and covered with a short beard." He was not specially profound, and he lacked the usual subtilty of

the Greek race; but he had vivid intuitions, a bright imagination, fervid sensibilities, fluent utterance, and an intensely earnest and practical purpose. As we have already said, his knowledge of Greek literature was extensive, and he was perfectly at home in the sacred Scriptures. The technical instruction, moreover, which Libanius had given him in the composition and delivery of discourses now proved to be of great use. With his first sermon, in spite of its glaring rhetoric, he captured the city, and for ten years held it a willing prisoner by his eloquence. During this whole time he occupied the pulpit on Saturday and Sunday of each week, besides officiating daily during Lent and other Church festivals; but his audiences never grew weary of him. Whenever he appeared the multitudes flocked to hear him, submitted themselves to the gentle fascination of his speech, and often broke out into rapturous applause at the beauty and power of his periods. It was a great grief to him that the same people who clapped their hands when he had said a specially good thing in the Church often went away and gave no further heed to his words. The ineessant praise that was heaped upon him did not turn his head. He knew its utter emptiness, protested against it, and, in language that reminds us of Frederick Robertson, bewailed the fact that his preaching did not yield more substantial fruit.

To the year 387 belong his twenty-four sermons on the Statues. "They constitute the most remarkable series of homilies delivered by him, containing his grandest

oratorical flights, and evincing most strikingly his power over the minds and passions of men." The circumstances under which they were delivered were as follows: The Emperor Theodosius the Great, being about to celebrate the successful termination of the first decade of his reign, had demanded of the city of Antioch, as well as of other provincial capitals, an enormous subsidy to be used as a donative to the army. This demand was met at first with murmurs of discontent, and then with loud outeries of resistance. Nothing is so foolish as an excited populace. In utter forgetfulness of the certain consequences of their conduct, a great concourse of citizens gathered together, attacked the Pretorium, ransacked the public baths, and ended by tearing down the statues of Theodosius and his deceased wife, Flaccilla, which had been set up in various parts of the city. Scarcely had they finished their work, when, realizing what they had done, they were seized with a terrible panic. Of a sudden all business ceased, the theaters were closed, the streets almost deserted. The cruel and resentful nature of Theodosius was well known. Three years later, in a spasm of anger, he let loose his soldiers upon the defenseless citizens of Thessalonica for a much less serious offense. While the public mind was in this state of suspense, the officers of the government, presently re-enforced by two special commissioners from Constantinople, began to arrest and punish all who were known to be connected with the riot, and to subject to the most terrible tortures even those who were only sus-

pected of having been implicated in it. It was rumored and really feared that the emperor meditated burning down the city, and giving over the inhabitants *en masse* to the tender mercies of the army.

In such an emergency, what could be done? All eyes turned to the aged Bishop Flavian, who responded most nobly to appeals of his distressed fellow-citizens. Tearing himself from the bedside of a dying sister, he hastened to Constantinople to intercede for mercy. In the meantime, Chrysostom rose to the height of the occasion. The extraordinary circumstances gave him a grand opportunity to deliver a message to the people, and he used it well. Every day he was in the pulpit, instructing, reproofing, warning, and comforting the dense throngs that crowded to hear him. It was of these discourses that a learned modern preacher said: "It is worth while learning to read Greek to be able to peruse them in the original." At last, near the end of the fourth week, Flavian returned, bearing the glad tidings of a full amnesty. Relieved of the pressure of anxiety, giddy and fickle Antioch, most giddy and fickle perhaps of all the Greek cities of the empire, swung back into its old ways, and went on in the mad pursuit of pleasure, as if there were no other end in human life.

Chrysostom escaped the episcopacy in his youth, but it caught him unawares in his old age. He had reached fifty, and was still riding the topmost wave of popularity in Antioch, when Nectarius, the Bishop of Constantinople, died. There was a large and importunate pack

of aspirants for the vacant place, which was practically at the disposal of Eutropius, a miserable eunuch who had managed to push himself up from the position of a slave into that of prime minister to Arcadius, the son and successor in the East of Theodosius the Great. The usual method of Eutropius was to dispose of all offices in the Church and State to the highest bidder; but for some reasons, which it is not worth while to try to find out, he now turned away from the clamorous candidates, and resolved that Chrysostom, whom he had heard on a recent visit to Antioch, should be the bishop of the capital. To accomplish this end, both secrecy and force were necessary. It was divined that Chrysostom himself would be averse to it; and that the people of Antioch, who prized him as they would have prized a notably good charioteer, for the fame he brought to their city, did not want to give him up. He was therefore invited to be present at some special services at the tomb of a martyr outside the city walls; and while there he was seized by an imperial officer, placed under guard, and hurried off on an overland journey of more than eight hundred miles to Constantinople.

As further resistance would have been useless, he quietly submitted to ordination, and entered with the utmost zeal upon the duties of his office. For a time it seemed as if his influence at Constantinople was to surpass that which he had exercised at Antioch. From the emperor and the empress down to the humblest citizen, everybody was his eulogist. The empress, in particular,

spared no pains to do him honor, and went to exaggerated lengths for the purpose of impressing him with the belief that she was a devout and earnest Christian. One of her freaks was a vast torch-light procession, in which were carried the relics of some martyrs to the martyrdom of St. Thomas, situated at a considerable distance outside of the city. The procession reached its destination just as day was dawning. Chrysostom at once mounted the pulpit, and pronounced an almost ecstatic sermon. Here is a sample of it: "What shall I say? I am verily mad with joy; yet such a madness is better than even wisdom itself. Of what shall I most discourse? the virtue of the martyrs, the alacrity of the city, the zeal of the empress, the concourse of the nobles, the worsting of the demons? Women, more delicate than wax, leaving their comfortable homes, emulated the stoutest men in the eagerness with which they made this long pilgrimage on foot. Nobles, leaving their chariots, their lictors, their attendants, mingled in the common crowd. And why speak of them when she who wears the diadem and is arrayed in purple has not consented along the whole route to be separated from the rest even by a little space, but has followed the saints like their hand-maid, with her finger upon the shrine and upon the veil covering it—she, visible to the whole multitude, whom not even all the chamberlains of the palace are usually permitted to see?"

This was a brilliant beginning; but a prophet might have foretold that it could not last. It was inevitable

that the new bishop would make many enemies. The best of his biographers says: "His genius was not of that practical order which displays itself in great discernment of character and tact in the management of men; and his virtues were of that austere kind, joined to a certain irritability of temper and inflexibility of will, which were ill calculated to first conciliate, and then delicately lead on to a purer way of life the immature flock committed to his care." His first work was to discipline his clergy most rigidly; he deposed numbers of them from office for dishonesty, adultery, homicide, and other such shameless crimes. Thoroughly a monk at heart, he despised the magnificent style in which his predecessor had lived, and sold for the benefit of the poor the costly carpets and plate with which the Episcopal residence had been furnished. Averse to all society, and especially to that of the rich and the great, he gave no splendid banquets to the laity, and attended none, but ate his frugal meal in solitude and silence. Afflicted with disordered nerves and a deranged digestion, he frequently lost his temper and forgot the value of gentle speech and conciliatory methods in the accomplishment of his aims. Living the life of a recluse, he depended too much on his archdeacon, Serapion, for information as to current events. This worthy was the narrowest of narrow ecclesiastics, a born absolutist, a believer in authority, and in nothing else. He once said to Chrysostom: "You will never subdue these mutinous priests, my Lord Bishop, till you drive them all before

you as with a single rod." Such advice, if followed, can be productive of only one result. For a time violent and repressive measures may succeed; but they end always in resistance and reaction. It is not strange that Chrysostom found himself confronted with multiplying antagonisms.

In the year 401 he made an episcopal visitation of the province of Asia Minor, and, assuming a questionable metropolitan power, degraded numerous unworthy bishops from their sees. This, of course, did not make him popular. In his absence from home, moreover, he had intrusted one of his suffragan bishops, Severian of Gabala, with the discharge of his ordinary duties. This prelate, unmindful of his position as a Christian minister and of the sacred obligations of friendship, used the opportunity to promote his own interests, and to alienate the minds of Arcadius and his wife, Eudoxia, from Chrysostom. A violent scene followed on Chrysostom's return. As soon as he became aware of the facts, and without the slightest mixture of prudence or worldly wisdom, he arraigned Severian from his pulpit as a flatterer and a parasite, and even spoke the sharpest things of Eudoxia herself, his mind evidently having undergone a complete change as to her character. The only strange thing is that he did not correctly measure her at a much earlier date; for, notwithstanding her excessive religiousness, the flagrant and almost public licentiousness of which she was guilty justly exposed her to the severest criticism. Preaching on a text taken from the history

of Elijah, he exclaimed : “Gather together to me those base priests that eat at Jezebel’s table, that I may say to them, as Elijah of old, ‘ How long halt ye between two opinions ? If Jezebel’s table be the table of the Lord, eat at it ; eat at it till you vomit.’ ” The allusion was too plain to be misunderstood. He had not spoken for the purpose of being misunderstood. He had called the empress Jezebel. Affront could go no further. She at once resolved to be revenged ; and with a woman’s undying persistency she did not stop till her resolution had been carried into effect.

An opportunity was not long wanting. It came about in this way. The latter part of the fourth century was agitated by a controversy concerning the orthodoxy of Origen, who had been dead for one hundred and forty years. On this subject, the Egyptian Church in particular was divided into two hostile factions. Theophilus, the Patriarch of Alexandria, was at first an ardent Origenist, but afterward, for purely selfish and personal reasons, swung round to the other side. The monks of the Nitrian desert, on the upper courses of the Nile, among whom “the four tall brothers” were the most eminent, were steadfastly devoted to the teaching and the memory of the great allegorizing father. These monks Theophilus treated with the most barbarous cruelty, showing the proverbial zeal of a pervert in the work of persecution. Not satisfied with using ecclesiastical weapons, he sent soldiers among them, who broke up their monasteries, put many of them to death, and

dispersed the rest in every direction. "The four tall brothers," accompanied by fifty followers, fled to Constantinople, where, not so much from agreement with their views as from sympathy with their misfortunes, Chrysostom befriended them. Theophilus raised a howl of indignation. He had bitterly opposed the appointment of Chrysostom in the first place, and had all along cherished a secret grudge against him. The monks appealed to the civil authorities for protection, and the affair took a tortuous course; but at last, by decree of the emperor, a synod was called to settle it, and Theophilus was summoned to be present. Accompanied by a long train of Egyptian sailors, who were ready to use their rough fists in defense of his orthodoxy, and loaded with treasures to be used as bribes, he put in his appearance three weeks in advance of the session. With great skill he had already enlisted in his cause the aged Epiphanius, Bishop of Salamis, who was everywhere much revered—a bigoted but honest man, and the spiritual progenitor of the whole tribe of heresy hunters—and he left no stone unturned to secure the good-will of all other influential persons who came within his reach.

To escape the possible violence of a mob in Constantinople, the synod met at a place called the Oak, not far from the city of Chalcedon, on the other side of the bay. The original question was largely lost sight of, and a series of twenty-nine charges was preferred against Chrysostom. They ranged up and down the scale of enormity. One of them was that he had eaten a lozenge

immediately after communion ; and another, that he had used treasonable language against the empress. Of the forty bishops present, all but seven were Egyptians, and even the most of these seven were the personal enemies of Chrysostom. Of course he denied their jurisdiction, refused to appear before them or to recognize them in any way, and called a counter-assembly of sixty bishops at Constantinople. Right and justice were on his side, but power was against him. Theophilus knew that Eudoxia would leap at a chance to ruin her hated enemy. He, therefore, proceeded with indecent haste to finish his work, pronounced Chrysostom deposed, and asked the emperor to carry out the decree.

But the crafty are often taken in their own craftiness. As soon as the news reached the friends of Chrysostom, who were almost as numerous as the middle and lower classes of the city, they rose up in resistance, and for three days guarded the episcopal residence. A single word from him would have produced an open rebellion, but he counseled peace ; and, at length, to forestall the possibility of bloodshed, he stole out through the ranks of his friends and gave himself up to the officers of the emperor, and was transported across the bay. On that very night there was a great earthquake. The superstitious empress accepted it as an omen of divine displeasure. God himself—so it appeared to her—was interfering in behalf of his persecuted and outraged servant. With a sudden revulsion of feeling, she threw herself at her husband's feet, and asked for the recall of

Chrysostom. Her request was at once granted. The tidings of this fact rapidly spread abroad, and the surging populace turned out to meet and greet him on his return. By night-fall the whole Hellespont was alive with the barges and ablaze with the welcoming torches of his friends. When the shore was reached they raised him, against his will, upon their shoulders, carried him to the church, and forced him to make an extemporaneous speech, the character of which may be judged from one of its opening sentences: "O noble flock, in the shepherd's absence ye have put the wolves to flight." He would have been either less or more than human if he had not been moved by such a display of the esteem in which he was held. This was in the summer of 403.

Several months passed away. There was a sort of armistice, but no peace. Eudoxia, as soon as her spasm of superstitious fear had abated, again nursed her wrath, and bided her chance. Inflamed with a mad and foolish ambition, she caused a costly statue of herself to be erected on a lofty porphyry pillar in front of the church of St. Sophia. The unveiling of this statue was accompanied with the most unbounded revelry, the noise of which even penetrated into the church and disturbed the services. Chrysostom took fire. It was the day of John the Baptist, and the sermon was in harmony with the season. "Again," said the fearless bishop, "Herodias is mad; again she rages; again she demands the head of John upon a charger." After such an utterance as this compromise was impossible. The signal of war had

been given, and the enemies of the great preacher, drawn together by the common and inextinguishable hatred which they bore him, flocked into the capital from all directions. A new council, carefully packed by the cunning manipulation of Theophilus, though he himself remained away, was speedily convened. It decreed that the original deposition of Chrysostom by the synod of the Oak was still valid, and that he was, therefore, guilty of the additional sin of contumacy in continuing to perform the functions of his office in violation of the canons of the Church. To carry out this decree, the interposition of the emperor was once more demanded. After some temporizing, on Easter evening of 404, an armed band of imperial soldiers, many of whom were pagans, broke into the great church, where three thousand catechumens were awaiting baptism, dispersed the congregation with much bloodshed, and pursued them with cruel rage through the streets. But they did not succeed in capturing Chrysostom. He was taken under the protection of his zealous adherents, who showed so formidable front that the emperor did not dare to renew the attempt to lay violent hands upon him. Things went so till June.

Once more the magnanimity of Chrysostom's nature displayed itself. He foresaw that there was likely to be a terrible conflict, and, to avert such a catastrophe, he resolved to surrender himself voluntarily to the malice of his enemies. What followed is enough to make one's blood boil even after the lapse of fifteen centuries. He

was put under a military guard, and, though it was in the heat of midsummer, he was hurried on for seventy days without comforts, over the worst of roads, through the most desolate of countries, to the little village of Cucusus, in Lower Armenia. Of the awful sufferings that he endured from heat and cold, from hunger and fatigue, from weakness and disease, during the three years of his stay at this place, I have not space to write. Even in this remote region, however, he met with unexpected kindness. One of the best houses was thrown open to him. His flock at Constantinople and his former parishioners at Antioch sent him supplies of money, the most of which he nobly used for other purposes than to supply his own wants. Letters of sympathy reached him from all quarters. Leo the Great, of Rome, not only wrote to him in the most brotherly spirit, but took up his cause, and demanded his restoration. It is one of the wonderful chapters of history that this bent and broken old man, though geographically isolated from the world, should have continued to be an object of affectionate regard to many thousands of people, and should have wielded an influence equal to that of any bishop in Christendom.

At Constantinople his friends and adherents were subjected to many indignities, men and women being imprisoned, tortured, and even put to death for no other reason than their loyalty to him. Into his office was thrust an old man of eighty years, Arsacius, whom Palladius affirms to have been "as mute as a fish, and as incapable

as a frog." Against Chrysostom himself, also, still further steps were taken. In 407 orders were given that he should be removed to Pityus, on the north-eastern corner of the Black Sea, the limit in that direction of the empire. The whole distance of several hundred miles was required to be traveled on foot, and the two soldiers who accompanied him as guards were given to understand that they would be suitably rewarded if their prisoner died on the way. Only the shortest delays were made. The better towns, where good food could be procured, were avoided, and lodgings were taken in the poorest villages. It could not be expected that Chrysostom would bear up under such a strain. He himself did not expect it. Prematurely aged (he was less than seventy), racked with disease, enfeebled by a thousand cares, he broke down at Comana, before the sea was reached. The end was pathetic beyond measure. He begged his guards to allow him to rest till eleven o'clock, but they rudely pushed him forward. Even to them, however, it soon became apparent that he could go no farther, and so they permitted him to return. When he knew that he was dying he begged to be carried into the little church, and having given away his own garments to the spectators, he requested to be clothed in the white baptismal robes. After this he received the sacrament of the Lord's Supper and expired, repeating with his latest breath the saying that had so often before been on his lips: "Glory be to God for all things!" Thirty-one years later, when Proclus, one of his disciples, had be-

come bishop at Constantinople, his remains were taken up and translated with great pomp to that city. In less than one hundred years the whole Church, Greek and Latin, had learned to reverence him as a saint. So it ever is. One generation murders the prophets, and the next garnishes their tombs. "It is a sad story, so often repeated in history, of goodness and greatness—unrecognized, slighted, injured, cut short in a career of usefulness by one generation—abundantly, but too late, acknowledged in the next; when posterity, paying to the memory and the tomb the honors which should have been bestowed on the living man, can only utter the remorseful prayer:

'His saltem accumulem donis, et fungar inani
Munere. . . .'"

I have said nothing of Chrysostom as a theologian. On the Trinitarian question he was an orthodox Athanasian, though it is probable that if he had lived a quarter of a century later he would have leaned toward Nestorianism. In common with all the great men of the Greek Church, he differed from Augustine and the leading Latin divines in regard to the freedom of the human will, and held to a synergism in the whole process of salvation. As an exegete and a commentator, he set the type for many successors, adopting the grammatical and historical method of the school of Antioch, instead of the allegorizing fancies of Origen and the Alexandrians. His works, including nearly one thousand sermons, fill thirteen folio volumes of Migne's Pa-

trology. The two best biographies available to the English student are that of Neander (translated from the German, and published by Harper & Brothers) and that of Rev. W. R. W. Stephens. The last mentioned work was published by John Murray, London, 1872, but has not yet been reprinted in this country. There is also an excellent sketch in Dr. Smith's "Dictionary of Christian Biography," and a more than ordinarily satisfactory outline in the respective histories of Milman, Neander, Gieseler, and Schaff.

THE FAITH OF THE ANTEDILUVIAN PATRIARCHS,

According to the Hebrew Narrative in Genesis.

LECTURE I.

OUR subject leads us to view faiths, not theories; to study them in narratives, not in theologies. The literary forms in which these narratives are presented, beautiful and fascinating as they are, have no claim upon our attention in our present investigation except so far as they enshrine the *faiths*. We seek not to study the edifice, but the indwelling powers. Therefore we shall pass by much which the curious questioner might wish to have treated, and shall fail to notice much that some might regard essential. We would allege in each case as excuse that our plan of treatment required none of these things.

It is not to present a theology, nor a part of a theology, which is our assumed task. We shall study faiths, connected at first not with theological systems, but with living men; the faiths which Adam and Eve held; Abel, Cain, and Lamech knew; Enoch and Noah obeyed. These faiths are the earliest faiths of the human heart, and so constitute the great significance of these earliest personages to the Hebrew; they are, therefore, the

chiefest glory of these patriarchs in the mind of after ages. Other nations remembered only heroes who were great in deeds, but the Hebrews cherished those who were great in faiths. And these earliest worthies among the Hebrews stand as light-towers, flashing forth faiths that illumined the human heart when man directed first his thoughts toward God. Briefly, then, we may sum up the purpose in these investigations as a study of the faiths of those who first worshiped Jehovah. These faiths were the guiding faiths of their lives. They are, therefore, very attractive; yet not attractive alone, but unutterably precious, since the faiths which once gave light to the human heart, as it felt out in darkness after God, may be ever accounted helpful to those who come after, and must be so, if these faiths be a part of Revelation.

Our method of presentation will be simple. We will treat only of the faiths of the antediluvian patriarchs. There are two classes of these: those learned in Eden, and those uttered after the expulsion from Eden and before the flood.

FAITHS TAUGHT IN EDEN.

First Faith.—God is Creator, man the creature likest him.

In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.

These are the generations of the heavens and the earth, when they were created; in the day when Jehovah God made the heavens and the earth.

These passages furnish the statement of the earliest belief in God as the Creator, if we confine ourselves to

the Hebrew Scriptures. The same creative act is attributed, in the two passages, to God and also to Jehovah God. The two names, then, refer to the same personal being. The account of the creation of the heavens and the earth, as portrayed in the first chapter of Genesis, is simple, is sublime. It has ever awakened wonder in the human mind by its beauty and comprehensiveness. A study of the record of creation, as preserved in nature, brings to light remarkable resemblances to this record of Scripture. Many regard both accounts identical in all essentials. Yet not merely to teach us the order of the creative work of God was this record of creation kept, but to make us aware of that fundamental faith in God which was earliest with the human race, and without which there could be no sure ground for faith in Jehovah God. It is therefore, for our purpose, simply a side issue to inquire here whether the creative day and the geological period are interchangeable terms; also whether the work in a creative day and a geological period is identical. The primary questions are whether in this record of Scripture God is worthily presented to our minds, and also whether the presentation has fact at its basis.

Notice the stupendous and amazing character of the Creator's works. The silent stars of the night, innumerable in number, immeasurable in distance, were made by God. The vast waters, swarming with countless forms of life, rising in their rage into resistless sublime powers, were made by God. The fruitful earth, declaring plan and purpose in every plant, and dazzling the mind with

its infinite variety of all life, was made by God. Such is the God of the Hebrew Scriptures. Alone He stands in the midst of His works, and their glory declares the incomprehensible majesty of their Creator. The fact of the universe is the basal fact, according to the Hebrews, for belief in God. The unspeakable worthiness of what he made manifests the exalted worthiness of their Maker.

The second part of this Hebrew faith, that the creature man is likest God who made him, rests on the following passages:

And God said,

"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,
And let him have dominion over the fish of the sea,
And over the fowl of the heavens and over beasts,
And over all the earth and over all that creepeth on the earth."

And Jehovah God said :

"It is not good that man should be alone,
I will make for him help like to him."

Having likeness to God, man possesses fitness for dominion ; God gives him a domain. Man shall rule over the fish, over the fowl, over the beasts, over the earth. The likeness is found in man's personality. Dominion, the exercise of the power by this person man over other creatures, is but one phase of the activity of this personality. If we define all the possibilities of this human personality, then only have we an adequate and complete understanding of this likeness. The grandeur of this truth is belittled when we seek to confine it to the limits of certain ethical qualities. Like God in righteousness ? yes ; in holiness ? yes ; but still in both attributes of

character we are infinitely less than he. There are, indeed, other resemblances which combine to constitute this likeness. We may not limit this marvelous statement of the Hebrew Scriptures. The likeness of man to his Creator is not limited to any one or any select number of the powers and attributes of personality. Man is like God in possessing all of them. He is unlike God, however, in having the limitations of flesh.

Beautiful now appears the reciprocal relations between God and man. All that God has made become incentives to call forth the activities of man. God calls into life the luxuriant beauties of the flowers. Man cannot produce them alive save from the seed, but he may cut out their shape in stone, and may even give them their color and form on the canvas. Man receives hints from the works of God, and then creates works of his own. Again, God pours down his "rain on the just and the unjust." Man sees the impartiality of God in caring for the necessities of his creatures, and learns from this likewise to have a provident care over others in matters of necessity. If man was not prompted first by suggestion from God to make provision for the helpless, reflection upon God's doing would teach him that in so acting he simply follows him whose likeness he bears. Such is the faith concerning man which the Hebrew Scriptures present. Would we know God? Then truly know man. Would we know man? Then truly know God. Advance of reliable knowledge in either realm assures advance in the other.

It is not too venturesome a claim to affirm that the primary condition for a universal religious faith is the conviction, based on indisputable grounds, that man bears the image of his Maker. Such a condition is met by the Hebrew Scriptures. Its antithesis is found in the pagan world. Man by nature makes God anthropomorphic; man under revelation seeks to make man Godlike. Man by nature makes for himself a Pantheon, where is represented the deification of every mysterious power which he may behold; but man through revelation forms for himself scriptures, where God becomes manifest, and man, by beholding, is changed into his likeness. The loving disciple John declares that "we shall be like Him." Christian faith believably cherishes his confident utterance. The oldest hope of the human heart, nourished by revelation, is that we may return to our first estate, that we again may have "the image of God."

When beholding this magnificent endowment conferred on man by his Creator, as recorded in Genesis, we may not be unmindful of the characters which separate man, as he is related to the earth and time, from his Maker. Sex, and all upon which sex is conditioned, differentiates man from God and relates man to the animal world at least. He is denizen of the earth, for from it he was made. All with a conscious nature, dependent upon a physical organism, has relationship to him. But by virtue of his likeness to God he is claimant upon the inhabitants of the skies. The nobler activities which they pursue he is capable of in his degree, and longs to

be participant with them in the noble services and joys. His mortal coil he will drop, he will associate with all who have the likeness of God; yea, be in communion with God himself, and all this because he was created in the "image of God." Such is the promise enshrined in this first faith of the Hebrew Scriptures.

Second Faith.—Jehovah God, the bountiful Provider, gives man the earliest commandment, revealing at the same time the consequences of disobedience.

And Jehovah God had made grow out of the ground
 Every tree that is pleasant to the sight and good for food;
 And the tree of life is in the midst of the garden,
 And the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.
 And Jehovah God commanded the man, saying,
 "Of every tree of the garden thou mayest eat freely;
 But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil
 Thou shalt not eat from it;
 For in the day thou eatest from it,
 Thou shalt surely die."

These passages in Genesis presuppose that Jehovah God is known to man as Creator. This knowledge must be presupposed in order that the earliest commandment might have authority. The first faith is the necessary forerunner to this second faith. The Hebrew heart cherished the Creator who was also the bountiful Provider. Jehovah God lovingly cares for the creature man. There is no antagonism here between God and man, such as heathen mythology and faiths present. Harmony and love prevail.

Man, according to the Hebrew view, has a physical

nature. He is formed from the ground. Every tree in the garden, planted by Jehovah God himself, and growing out of the ground, is food for the nourishment of this physical nature. But man also has a spiritual nature. Jehovah God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." The bountiful, provident Creator must also provide for the nourishment of this spiritual nature. There are two trees in the midst of the garden. It is said that they grew out of the ground. It is said, also, that they are different—yea, sacred—and must not be touched. How are we to understand this narrative? The question is old. The Church is by no means a unit in its answer. Any view must be tentatively held. The trend of meaning, however, must be essentially the same, whatever be the minor differences, in all views which are in harmony with revealed religion. The narrative is no pretty poetie fiction; it embodies serious and momentous truth. Here is enshrined the elements of a fundamental religious faith. The exegete must take his facts from the narrative, in the most original form in which it is preserved. The *data* for conclusion must be drawn from this source.

The Hebrew narrative requires that these two trees shall have grown out of the ground. So it must at the outset be conceded that there is no necessity for concluding these trees to be other than veritable trees. However, no sure ground is thus far obtained to warrant the conclusion that the two trees are not removed to the region of symbols. These trees are defined: one is the

tree of knowledge of good and evil; the other is the tree of life. Such trees cannot appeal to the sense of taste. The tongue cannot taste knowledge. The forbidden fruit of these trees, then, can be tasted only by mind, by spirit. Yet this tasting by the spirit is conditioned on the physical act of tasting. It would seem, therefore, the more reasonable to accept that, when the narrative speaks of eating from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the language is figurative. The fact—knowledge of good and evil—is not a physical but a spiritual one. The eating, then, is not a physical but a spiritual process. Choice would be as much present in the spiritual process of eating as in the physical. It would precede.

There is significance in the fact that whatever is represented here is beheld only at the center of things—“in the midst of the garden.” Elsewhere it was possible to acquire only the knowledge of good. All that Jehovah God had made was good. One place alone furnished the possibility of procuring the knowledge of good and evil. It was at the middle of the garden, the place of prohibition and of loving warning.

The compound idea—good and evil—must not be hurriedly passed. Jehovah God is known to man as Creator, bountiful Provider, and loving Admonisher. Man also must know good. Every thing made was good, according to the judgment of the Creator himself. All that man saw was good. Every judgment upon what he saw must have been good. Nothing could be looked

at which was evil, yet it was possible to know good and evil. Jehovah God forewarns man of this possibility, and tells him of the direful consequence which such knowledge would entail. If man made choice contrary to the commandment, he could not thereby erase the knowledge of good. The compound idea—good and evil—would ever witness to him his likeness to God, would ever remind him of his lineage. Yet this very compound idea, when once learned through choice, and not as warning, would be death.

This second faith, then, teaches us that in the beginning Jehovah God was near to man, providing for him, warning him. Man could also be disloyal to him, and so man could die.

Third Faith.—A personal power, named the serpent, beguiles mankind.

And he (the serpent) said to the woman :

“ Is it true that God said,

‘ Ye shall not eat from every tree of the garden ? ’ ”

And the woman said to the serpent :

“ From every tree of the garden we may eat ;

But from the fruit of the tree,

Which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said :

“ ‘ Not shall ye eat from it,

And not shall ye touch it, lest ye die.’ ”

Then the serpent said to the woman :

“ Ye shall not die, for God knows

That when ye shall eat from it

Your eyes shall be opened,

And ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil.”

And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food,

and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat. Then the eyes of them both were opened, and they knew that they were naked.

The woman stands before the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The tree, as a tree, had fruit thereon. The eating of such fruit would induce no other physical result than the eating of fruit from any other similar tree. But the tree had no special significance through its appeal by means of its fruit to the physical sense of taste. It bore fruit which the physical eye could not see nor the physical tongue taste. This peculiar fruit was desirable "to make one wise." The manner of partaking this fruit is through eating the natural fruit on the trees. The fact that it could be partaken is asserted.

It should not seem strange that Jehovah God should set apart two trees for special use. This peculiar purpose would usurp the natural purpose of the trees. Men dwelt in tents in later times. One tent, however, was set aside for special purpose. Men entered this tent, but all its uses were different from those uses to which men put the common tent. Language is employed for this special sacred tent similar to that employed for other tents. If, however, a man enters this sacred tent, it is with other feelings than those he has when entering his own tent. The same may be said of that special house set apart for the house of Jehovah. Our conclusion is that these trees in the garden had as

special a function as the special tent or the special house. The language employed in connection with these trees must likewise have special and new meaning. The eating from these trees must be a process different from a mere physical process, yet it is contemporaneous and conditioned on eating the fruit, which appealed to the physical sense of taste.

The serpent is no crawling reptile, endowed for the time being with the power of speech. He is a personality as veritable as the woman or the man. He must have assumed a form as noble—yea, nobler—than that of man, else the woman could not have remained in converse with him. Such supposition is necessary, else the narrative contains such absurdities that it is more reasonable to accept that the whole narrative is a poetic fiction for the retainment of a spiritual truth. This person, the serpent, is at variance with God. He is acquainted with the garden. He understands the language which is intelligible to the woman. These are fundamental assumptions, if the narrative deals with facts.

The serpent knew the commandment given by Jehovah God to man. It was the commandment placed by God upon all created personalities, upon himself as well as upon all others. He had disobeyed the commandment. He was at that moment in punishment. He was at enmity with God, and always this is punishment. He who asks knew that God had given this commandment. Her answer is emphatic and certain. Not eating alone, but touching the tree was death. Contact

was destructive. Such was the understanding by the woman. The resultant utterance of the serpent is: "Ye shall not surely die." This assertion makes man as a personality a battle-ground. Two mighty personalities are the contestants. They are from root up antagonistic. One expresses himself respecting an act: "Do it, and thou shalt surely die." The other says, respecting the same act: "Do it, and thou shalt not die."

Mankind is influenced to choice by motive. Such moments are ever critical to him. Two voices have spoken to him. The one has said, "Thou shalt not eat;" the other has said, "Thou mayest eat." The motive presented by the one who commanded not to eat was that death ensued upon the eating. The motive urged by the other, who counseled eating, was that the eating made the partaker as God. So far as experience went, mankind was equally ignorant of both conditions. He did not know what it was to die, or what it was to be like God, except by inference. Death was the opposite of life. Yet the contrast was no greater than that furnished by the difference between man and God. These are fundamental acknowledgments.

Two contradictory voices are heard by mankind. Two motives are urged upon mankind—the one negative, the other positive. Choice brought, according to the one, awful loss; according to the other, greatest gain. If truth was uttered by both voices, then mankind made the best choice in eating. To be like God was to be their highest ideal. But one limitation, according to

the serpent, separated them from this high attainment. It was the knowledge of good and evil. This could be removed by eating of this tree. Seductive indeed was the temptation. No penalty and to be like God were the inducements. Mankind chose to be like God.

The serpent introduced the first lie into human life. The act which he affirmed would make man "like God" was the act which made man as unlike God as was possible. There is no doubt but that this understanding of the narrative was accepted by Christ. The foundation is here for his assertion that the devil was a "liar and the father of it." The character of the serpent is unchangeable. He is false at the core. His weapon in battle is the lie. So the Hebrew Scriptures represent him.

The fall of man may rightly suggest the question whether Jehovah God had providently protected man against the deceptive power of Satan. The answer is clear. The hourly experience of man must have demonstrated that Jehovah God, whom he knew, would have withheld nothing that could have contributed to his blessedness. The fullness of all the gifts of God and the conscious knowledge, through experience, that these all were good had as a natural sequence the awakening of an absorbing love, which would have had as its peculiar manifestation a perfect obedience. The only protection against the fall, which was possible but was not provided, would have been to have made the fall impossible. There are laws over our body beyond the control of man. We must breathe, we must eat, if we would live. We

cannot walk in the air. We cannot live under water. It might have been decreed that we could not have disobeyed. Such decree, however, would have made impossible the creation of man in the image of God. Apart from the enactment, which would have made it impossible to have disobeyed, every motive and every inducement which Jehovah God could have employed to protect man was employed. Man was surrounded by every object which could awaken only love for his God. He fell, because he would be as the highest and best he knew, because he would be as God. This is the stand-point which is taken by the first book of the Hebrew Scriptures.

We are not left in doubt as to the exact change which took place in man by his choice to disobey Jehovah God. Man knew hereby good and evil. Such knowledge was his death. To know good alone was life; to know evil alone was impossible, since his birthright gift was to know good. Memory must ever have retained such knowledge for man. The moment he learned good and evil by experience, that moment he was transferred to the realm of conflict, of struggle, of death. We are now in position to give the definition of good and evil according to the earliest Hebrew beliefs. The knowledge of good is obedience to Jehovah God; the knowledge of good and evil is disobedience to him.

The faiths already considered have shown us that man, although possessed of such knowledge of Jehovah God as to win him ever to an increasing love for his Creator,

had nevertheless been led to disobedience. A new phase of revelation is now inaugurated. Man is to be taught the attitude of Jehovah God to his disobedient creatures. The next faith embodies this lesson.

Fourth Faith.—Jehovah God is true and just. For truth's sake he punishes disobedience; for justice's sake he punishes deception and gives promise upon confession.

This faith will be considered in this lecture only as the occurrences in the garden make it manifest.

And Jehovah God called to the man and said to him :

“Where art thou?”

And he said :

“Thy voice I heard in the garden, and I feared because I was naked, and I hid myself.”

And he said :

“Who told thee that thou wast naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee, that thou shouldst not eat?”

And the man said :

“The woman whom thou gavest to be with me she gave to me of the tree, and I did eat.”

And the Jehovah God said to the woman :

“What is this thou hast done?”

And the woman said :

“The serpent deceived me, and I did eat.”

Jehovah God calls to man. He asks: “Where art thou?” Man heard, man feared, man hid himself. The new feeling experienced by man after disobedience was fear of Jehovah God. The new conduct on his part was the hiding of himself at the voice of God. This conver-

sation with Jehovah God has the same kind of reality as the conversation with the serpent. The higher and the highest order of intelligent beings may assume form and so enter conversation with man. Such is the assumption of this narrative. The new experience of fear, the new conduct of hiding, have their sufficient cause in man's disobedience. Jehovah God knew that man had disobeyed. Man therefore must answer before him, face to face, for his conduct. Hence the question: "Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee, that thou shouldst not eat?" This question faces Adam with the command and also with the opportunity for confession or denial. The answer was a frank confession. It was: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me, she gave of the tree, and I did eat." This is no acknowledgment of the bewitching influence of womankind over mankind. Such an acknowledgment is present in pagan faiths, but not in the revealed faiths of Scripture. Much less is it an attempt to shift responsibility. The degradation of man through ages of sinful generations may have made a coward of man, but it was not so at the beginning. The answer has in it nobility, and reflects credit on man; else it contains elements unworthy of the dignity of the record, and is contrary to the earnest nature of revealed truth. Such claims at least must be made, and yielded only when found impossible of establishment, by those who hold to the revealed character of Scripture truth.

The response of Adam has in it two elements, which had weight with Jehovah. The first is expressed in the

words: "The woman whom thou gavest to be with me." She was given to be a "helpmeet for him." She was given by Jehovah God. The divine purpose was that the two should live together. Jehovah God planned that they be together in obedience. Man chose that they should be together in disobedience, after the woman had disobeyed. The magnanimity of the choice of Adam must have commended itself to Jehovah God. The choice ennobles man. It is worthy of him. Unless we keep constantly in mind the revealed facts concerning the creation of woman, it is difficult to find such features of this narrative as will command the continued respect of the reasoning mind. The basis of that wonderful movement of the Middle Ages is a sentiment like that which led Adam to eat of the tree. Knighthood had its very essence foreshadowed in this choice of Adam. The second element is the confession: "I did eat." There is no hesitation. It is manfully made and without excuse. It awaits the threatened punishment without asking mercy. There is no presumption. There is no vaunting of man against God. Simple confession, confession of disobedience, and the only motive assigned which could have had any weight with God. If one may dare to speak of the emotions of God at this time, basing his remark on the likeness of man to his God, we may say that this knightly choice of Adam commended him to his Maker. But confession is ever the first step in reconciliation and in the obtainment of mercy. The judgment upon the man is withheld until all the facts have

been clear to the knowledge of the human pair. The woman is next addressed.

A similarly searching question is made to the woman by Jehovah God. It is: "What is this that thou hast done?" The answer of the woman is as direct and simple as that of the man. "The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat?" This response also has two elements in it. The first becomes known in the words: "The serpent deceived me." There is tremendous meaning in these three words. A woman utters them. Reflection teaches us that the tragic sorrow of life, which has given basis for most of the poems and dramas where women are heroines, is summed up in the one word "deceived." Moreover the cry of the fallen women of the world, as it in agony goes up to the Father, may be gathered in one word, "deceived." The first woman, as she faces Jehovah God, suffering from the torturing consciousness that she had been deceived, made as her only plea in her reply to the question of her Creator: "The serpent deceived me." If the manly choice of Adam commended him to Jehovah, the heart-misery of the woman, when she said "deceived me," kindled that love of Jehovah which finds its expression in the revelation of the Old Testament and has its culmination in the New Testament. Likewise there is found in this answer of the woman, as its second element, confession. It is uttered in the words: "And I did eat." The woman too took the first step toward reconciliation. She made a frank confession.

These truths are the great gift of the narrative up to this

point. The most skeptical mind cannot deny them. But when we place emphasis upon the form in which they are conveyed to us, and bury in our defense of the shell the meat within, we are and worthily become a laughing-stock to keen-minded men. Our little desire to hold some mystic meaning in the form of the narrative makes us little before all who investigate to find truth and are willing to accept any form in which it may be conveyed.

Jehovah God, as true and just, declares in these passages his judgments upon the serpent, the woman, and the man.

And the Jehovah God said unto the serpent:

“Because thou hast done this,

Thou art cursed. . . .

And I will put enmity between thee and the woman,

And between thy seed and her seed.

It shall bruise thy head,

And thou shalt bruise his heel.”

Unto the woman he said:

“I will greatly multiply thy sorrow in conception. . . .”

And unto Adam he said:

“Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife,

And hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying:

‘Thou shalt not eat of it,’

Cursed is the ground on account of thee,

In sorrow thou shalt eat of it all the days of thy life.”

Already the relation of the serpent to Jehovah God had been declared. Now his future relations to the human pair is made manifest. His conduct in both instances

determined his position. The narrative here simply reveals his conduct as it has reference to man.

The serpent was evil, was wicked, was malignant in seeking the overthrow of man. His conduct had in it not one mitigating circumstance. Jehovah God passes judgment on so heartless, pitiless a deceiver in the words "Cursed art thou." Not an upright, but a crawling personality shall be his portion. His realm of power shall be not in the spirit domain, but in the flesh. His nourishment shall be dust. The reciprocal relation between man and the serpent is outlined in words which have been characterized as the Protoevangelium. They are :

And I will put enmity between thee and the woman :

And between thy seed and her seed :

It shall bruise thy head,

And thou shalt bruise its heel.

Two words in this First Gospel demand careful study. They are "enmity" and "bruise." The Hebrew word for "enmity" is *ÆBAH* (אֶבֶה). It is used but five times in the Hebrew Scriptures: the present passage and two in Numbers (xxxv. 22, xxxv. 21), and also two in Ezekiel (xxv. 15, xxxv. 5). The passages in Numbers furnish us with the dominant element in the word. The discrimination in each passage is made between the man who kills another by accident and the man who commits murder. The penalty of manslaughter inspired by "enmity" (אֶבֶה) is death. Hence "enmity" between parties was recognized as culminating in the death of one of them.

Ezekiel furnishes two passages. The first is: "Thus saith the Lord God: Because the Philistines have dealt by revenge and have taken vengeance with a despitful heart to destroy for the old hatred [אִבֶּה, enmity]." The second is: "Because thou hast had a perpetual hatred [אִבֶּה, enmity] and hast shed the blood of the children of Israel." Here too, in Ezekiel, the essence of the word is found in an hostility, culminating in death. The enmity, then, which Jehovah God places between the woman and the serpent is a death-feud.

The Hebrew word translated "bruise" is also a rare word. It is used in but two other passages (Job ix. 17 and Ps. cxxxix. 11). The passage in Job reads as follows:

For He breaketh [יִשְׁוֹפֵךְ, bruise] me with a tempest,
And multiplieth my wounds without a cause.

The passage in the Psalms is:

And should I say;
"Surely darkness shall overwhelm [YASHUPH, bruise] me,
Yet the night shall be light about me."

It is most probable that the passage in Job should have this Hebrew word translated not as "break," but as "overwhelm." Then the passage in Genesis would be the only one where this word has the signification of "bruising." The context alone must give the meaning, or at least be accordant with the definition assigned. The word "bruise," or "wound" has been generally accepted as the correct equivalent. This meaning would also suit equally the passage in Job.

We may now better apprehend the import of this first

gospel. Jehovah God places between the serpent and man "enmity," a deadly feud. The advantage is with man. He shall have power to bruise the serpent's head; he shall wound a mortal part; he shall deal death-blows. But, on the contrary, the serpent shall bruise the heel of man; his wounds shall produce lamming. Such is the word of Jehovah God to the serpent. The law of limitation is placed upon the serpent. The decree of death also is passed upon him. Such is the just judgment of Jehovah God upon the serpent. This deceiving person, who falsely told man, saying, "Thou shalt not die," is told that he must die, and that too by the hand of man whom he had deceived. Such is the paradox of Jehovah God. Powerlessness, inability to execute a lie upon man, is the final doom of the serpent. So much, at least, is here meant by the assertion that the serpent must die. He has his doom involved in the seed of the woman. This is a fundamental faith of the Hebrew Scriptures. Its expression in words for the first time in these Scriptures constitutes the passage which utters to us the first gospel promise. There is in these words hope for deceived mankind. Their fulfillment will be the realization of the Messiah's dominion over mankind.

Jehovah God turns from this dooming of the serpent to the woman and the man. She has confessed, she has urged the only mitigating circumstance. Her confession was: "I did eat." The mitigating circumstance was: "The serpent deceived me." The man also confessed and at the same time urged the motive which led him to dis-

obey—a motive itself God-given. His confession was: “I did eat.” The motive was: “The woman that thou gavest to be with me.” The man chose to eat, because he wished to share such penalty as might be placed upon the woman whom Jehovah God gave to be with him. Loving pity for the deceived woman tempered the penalty imposed on the woman, loving admiration mollified the penalty meted out to man. Confession from each secured them favor. Still ever disobedience to Jehovah God entails punishment that cannot be escaped from.

This punishment is summed up for both in the word “sorrow.” Yes, sorrow shall be the lot of the woman and the man. Sorrow shall be the part of the woman in her home—life, sorrow shall be the part of the man in his work—world. The words of Jehovah God to the woman are: “I will surely multiply thy sorrow in conception.” His words to the man are: “In sorrow shalt thou eat of the ground all the days of thy life.”

These faiths and these punishments, and this promise are inseparable with the Garden of Eden in the mind of the Hebrews. Sorrow could not have place in Eden. Hence the man and woman, who had sorrow, must be expelled from the garden. However, they do not go forth hopeless. They are conscious that a deadly feud exists between them and the personal power named The Serpent, and they know that in the warfare the advantage would be with them. All subsequent revelation is simply the helps given by Jehovah God to enable man to be ever superior to the serpent, when the battle should become shifted to new fields.

RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM.

“If you have any faith, give me a share in it. If you have only doubts, keep them to yourself; I have enough of my own.”—*Goethe to Eckerman.*

“If any man wills to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God.”—*Jesus of Nazareth.*

CAN there be such a thing as honest skepticism? May a period of religious doubt characterize an honest truth-seeker among unbelievers, or a sincere and loyal disciple of Christ? I once heard an eminent divine say from the pulpit that “any man that said he ever had an *honest* doubt about the existence of God or the truth of the Bible was telling a falsehood, and he knew he was telling a falsehood when he made such a statement.” I believe that the statement made by the preacher was not only false, but calculated to do a great deal of harm, and to repel and drive away from all sympathy with the Church many whom it is the privilege and duty of the minister of Christ to lead out of their spiritual darkness into light. There is a great deal of dishonest skepticism in the world, and especially among young men, but there may be, and is unquestionably, skepticism that is honest. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the subject in such a way as to show what is honest, and what is dishonest, doubt in matters of religion, and to convict the dishonest doubter of his sin and lead the honest doubter

out of the state which he deplores into the full assurance of faith.

First let us notice the skepticism of the unregenerate world. Among unregenerate men there are both believers and unbelievers. By the term "unregenerate unbelievers" we would designate those who have a positive disbelief in the existence of God or the truth of the Bible. Such are materialists, atheists, infidels, and those who under the popular epithet of agnostics conceal a positive and absolute no-faith in the Christian revelation. But there are also those whom we may properly designate as unregenerate believers—not believers in the sense that they have saving faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, but simply in the sense that they believe in the existence of God and in the truth of the Christian Scriptures. They are nominally Christians. The great majority of unconverted people in Christian lands come under this class. This faith does not imply a saved relation; indeed, "the devils believe and tremble." It is simply the faith of assent; it is with the intellect, speculative, dead. That faith which is the condition of justification and regeneration is personal trust—not assent, but consent. It is with the heart, not intellect, that man believeth unto righteousness and salvation.

Now between the two classes here designated as unregenerate believers and unbelievers, there comes a third class, the skeptics—those who, on the one hand, do not deny the existence of a Divine Being and the truth of the Scriptures, but who, on the other hand, are not fully

persuaded and convinced of the truth of these things. They stand in doubt. *Skeptomai*—I doubt.

The man who professes to be a skeptic, who boasts of his skepticism and prides himself in it, is rarely, if ever, an honest skeptic. Honest skepticism is humble and modest; it seeks to hide itself, save as it seeks light. There are a great many young men in our larger towns and cities, and in the atmosphere of our colleges and universities, who are professed skeptics; and some even of older years pride themselves in being skeptics, as if, through superior intellects, they had discovered something which the less intellectual and unenlightened did not know—viz., that the Christian religion after all may not be true. But, as a matter of fact, their so-called skepticism is simply a cloak to hide their religious dishonesty and sin. It is simply one of the modes which the carnal nature of unregenerate man employs to defend itself against the demands of God's righteous law. A very convenient, non-committal position is that of the professed skeptic. Charge him with being an atheist or infidel, and he indignantly repels the odium of such a charge by saying that he is not. On the other hand, urge him to become a Christian, to forsake his sins and lead the self-denying life of a disciple of the Master, and he retorts at once that he is a skeptic, that he has his doubts about the truth of Christianity, and so denies his moral obligation, as long as that state of mind continues, to forsake his sins and become a Christian. By encouraging his own skepticism, and persuading himself that

the Christian religion may not be true, he manages to ease his conscience while he continues in the indulgence of those sins which the law of God forbids and which his carnal nature craves. Such professed skepticism is the essence of dishonesty, and is simply one of the many ways in which the unregenerate nature of man seeks to defend itself against the exacting moral law of God. It is sin, and only that Spirit who convinces of all sin can break its dominion.

But there is such a thing as honest doubt, and it has this comforting assurance from the Master: "If any man *wills* to do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God or whether it be of man." Not "*will* do His will," as the old Version has it, and which I have often thought was a hard condition for the sinner to fulfill—viz., to have to do a thing and not know that it is of God until after it is done. But rather, "if any man *wills*, intends, desires, purposes, is honestly striving to do God's will," he shall not be left in doubt, but will be made to know of the doctrine, that it is from God and not from man.

If religious skepticism claims to be honest in doubting the truth of Christian revelation, in whole or in part, we may determine the justness of this claim by applying certain infallible tests. In the first place, skepticism, if honest, will make careful and earnest investigation of the evidence in favor of the truth of Christianity before it asserts itself. Such have been the number and character of those who have believed in it, such the ante-

cedent preponderance of evidence in favor of its truth, and so momentous are the issues involved, that nothing less than this is reasonable. The man who says he has doubts about the truth of Christianity, but who has not carefully read and studied the Bible and made a reasonable examination of the leading evidences in favor of its truth, is not worthy to be listened to for a moment, much less to be argued with. Such superficial skepticism has dishonesty on its very face, and is one of the marks of a carnal nature that is enmity against God. Apply this righteous test, and how much of the so-called honest skepticism of the day will be scattered to the wind or convicted of its dishonesty. How absurd the idea, what conceit of ignorance, that a man should call in question the truth of the Bible—that book which the wisest and best men and women of all ages have believed in and followed—when he has never once carefully and honestly read it in search of the truth! The man that has read and studied the Bible, and honestly investigated the evidences of Christianity, and still has doubts, is to be listened to and reasoned with. He is entitled to be heard. But not so the skeptic who captiously calls in question the truth of the Bible when he has nothing but the most superficial knowledge of what it is. Such skepticism is sin, and is to be dealt with as all other sin is. How many such captious skeptics, when powerfully convicted of sin and soundly converted, have scattered their doubts to the wind and never once cared to have their questions answered. Men may have read the Bi-

ble through for the purpose of criticising it, and studied the evidences of Christianity for the purpose of refuting them, and, characterized by such a spirit, may have ended such reading and study as full of doubt as when they began. But it is a question whether a man ever yet read the Bible through carefully, conscientiously, and prayerfully, honestly seeking the light, and investigated the evidences of Christianity in the same spirit, but that he was richly rewarded by being relieved of all his doubts. He it is for whose encouragement the Master said: "If any man wills to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." Honest skepticism may characterize the investigator and truth-seeker, but not the man that is at rest. Long continuance in a state of skepticism, without any earnest effort to get out of it, proves it to be dishonest.

But again, if skepticism be honest and intelligent, it ought to be able to tell just *what* is doubted and *why* it is doubted. Ralph Waldo Emerson said he could tell what he believed and what he doubted; but if any one asked him why he believed or why he doubted, he was quite helpless to reply. And some critic has thoughtfully observed that if this great man of letters had trained himself through life to give the whys and wherefores of his beliefs and doubts, his faith would not have diverged so largely from that of evangelical Christianity. But how few professed skeptics, claiming to be honest and intelligent, can give either the what or the why of their doubts! "Skeptical about what?" you ask of him.

“Tell me what you doubt in religion and why you doubt, and it may be I can help you.” “O I am just skeptical,” he replies, “skeptical generally”—and that is all you can get out of him. Miserable cant! What stuff is sometimes palmed off by young men under the profession of honest skepticism!

A skeptic was once complaining that the Bible stated things too vaguely and obscurely for a book that demanded implicit faith. “For instance,” he said, “if the Bible meant to teach that Christ was divine, why did it not declare this truth in plain and unmistakable terms, such as men could not misunderstand?” “How would you have had it state this truth in order to satisfy you?” asked a Christian man. “I would have had it say that ‘Jesus Christ is the true God,’ and then there could be no mistake about it.” “I am happy to be able to tell you,” replied his friend, “that your doubts are relieved, for the Bible does say this very thing.” And turning to the First Epistle of John, he read, Jesus Christ “is the true God and eternal life.” But, strange to say, the skeptic manifested no pleasure at finding the Bible had expressed the doctrine in his own chosen terms. He rather showed confusion and regret that it was so. And he was no more convinced than he was before. Yet he called himself an honest skeptic, and seemed to hold God responsible for his doubts in that he had not stated things plainly enough.

How profound and far-reaching was the truth the Master uttered when he said: “If they believe not Mo-

ses and the prophets, neither would they believe, though one rose from the dead." If they believe not the evidence they have, neither would they believe though it had been just what they might demand—even to the raising of one from the dead. They imagine that they would believe if the evidence were different, but it is not so. He who made the human mind, and made the Christian religion for it, has said that if men believe not Moses and the prophets—that is, if they believe not with the evidence they now have—neither would they believe though one rose from the dead. And in proof of this truth, did not One rise from the dead? and did all men after that become believers? The trouble is not that the external conditions and evidences of the faith are not fully provided, but rather that the carnal mind is enmity against God. "With the *heart* man believeth unto righteousness."

"How long dost thou make us to doubt?" said the Jews to Christ, "If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly." The skeptic tries to make it appear, or at least to persuade himself, that God, or the Bible, or the Christian religion, is responsible for his doubt. "How long dost thou make us to doubt?"—thou art responsible for our doubt. The inference is that if Christ would tell them plainly, they would believe on him, and become his obedient disciples. Let us see if such was the case. "Jesus answered them, I have told you already, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." But still, as ye call for a

plain answer concerning my Messiahship and divinity, I will give it: "I and my Father are one." Can any thing plainer than that be spoken? But did they believe? No: "Then they took up stones to stone him." This reveals the animus and spirit of their skepticism. This proves the truth of what Jesus had said unto them: "Ye believe not because ye are not of my sheep. My sheep hear my voice and follow me." The real cause of skepticism in most instances is not that the intellectual conditions of faith are wanting, but the heart conditions in the unbeliever are wanting. "The carnal mind is enmity against God."

In a certain literary circle, where skepticism was quite popular, some slighting allusions were made, on a certain important occasion, to the Christian religion. So uncalled for were these allusions and so captious the spirit that prompted them, that one who was present—himself a literary man and no professed defender of the faith*—could not resist the temptation to administer the following just rebuke: "It will be found that any form of Christianity, whatever its defects and imperfections, which has an open Bible and proclaims a crucified and risen Christ, is infinitely preferable to any form of polite and polished skepticism which gathers as its votaries the degenerate sons of heroic ancestors, who, having been trained in a society and educated in schools, the foundations of which were laid by men of faith and piety, now turn and kick down the ladder by which

* James Russell Lowell.

they have climbed up, and persuade men to live without God, and leave them to die without hope. The worst kind of religion is no religion at all; and these men, living in ease and luxury, indulging themselves in the amusement of going without religion, may be thankful that they live in lands where the gospel they neglect has tamed the beastliness and ferocity of the men who, but for Christianity, might long ago have eaten their carcasses like the South Sea Islanders, or cut off their heads and tanned their hides like the monsters of the French Revolution. When the microscopic search of skepticism, which had hunted the heavens and sounded the seas to disprove the existence of a Creator, has turned its attention to human society, and has found a place on this planet ten miles square where a decent man can live in decency, comfort, and security, supporting and educating his children unspoiled and unpolluted; a place where age is reverence, infancy respected, womanhood honored, and human life held in due regard—when skeptics can find such a place ten miles square on this globe, where the gospel of Christ has not gone and cleared the way and laid the foundations and made decency and security possible, it will then be in order for the skeptical *literati* to move thither and there ventilate their views. But so long as these very men are dependent upon the religion which they discard for every privilege they enjoy, they may well hesitate a little before they seek to rob the Christian of his hope and humanity of its faith in the Saviour who alone has given to man

that hope of life eternal which makes life tolerable and society possible, and robs death of its terrors and the grave of its gloom."

We come next to consider the skepticism of regenerate believers. May a true believer ever have any doubts in matters of religion? He may, but it is always accompanied by the prayer, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief." An unbeliever's skepticism may be honest or dishonest, but that of a believer must always be honest. Does the fact that a professing Christian finds himself sometimes troubled with doubts concerning one or many points of the faith prove that he is not a regenerate child of God? Not necessarily. But the religious doubts compatible with a state of saving faith in the Lord Jesus Christ is a subject that requires clear analysis and cautious treatment, lest it be made a stumbling-block to believers rather than what it should be, and is here designed to be—viz., a means of guiding all such as may be troubled with doubts out of their unhappy state into the clear light of a satisfying faith. The question is, whether a true believer may in any degree, or in any sense, or at any period have doubts concerning any of the great cardinal doctrines of the Christian faith. We are not, of course, discussing whether a *denial* of any part of the faith is compatible with a regenerate state. As to how much of the truth of Christian revelation a man may deny, and still have a vital or saving faith in Christ, is a question with which we have not here to do. To doubt is not to deny. Doubt,

as we shall see, may perform an important office even in the evidences of Christianity.

We wish to notice three phases of skepticism: (1) that which is the outgrowth of temperament or disposition; (2) that which is the outgrowth of circumstances; and (3) that which is incident to the transition period between youth and manhood.

Of the first of these, the skepticism of the Apostle Thomas is a case in point. It was due to his peculiar mental temperament. Some people are by nature credulous; they believe readily, and require little or no evidence. Others are by nature skeptical; they are slow to accept statements that demand faith, and they require much and strong evidence before they will believe. To the former class Peter belonged; his impulsive nature was quick to believe and quick to act. Thomas belonged to the latter class. He was slow to believe, and he demanded strong and full evidence before he would believe. But our Lord, though he somewhat chided, yet had respect unto his skepticism. It was honest. The faith of the latter class when once secured is stronger and more deeply felt than that of the former. None of the holy apostles was more faithful and firm in his loyalty to Christ than Thomas. He was utterly incapable of doing what Judas or Peter did. While no other apostle doubted as Thomas did, yet none, when convinced, believed as he did. His confession of faith and his testimony to the divinity of Christ after the resurrection were clearer and stronger than came from any other apostle: "My Lord and my

God!" I have always been glad that the skeptic Thomas was among the apostles. His belief is the best evidence of all. I know that if he, with his cautious and skeptical temperament, was convinced, there was certainly no mistake about the resurrection. Peter might have been deceived; Thomas never. Saint Augustine has well said that "Thomas doubted that we might not doubt."

Sometimes never to doubt means never to believe. Some never doubt any thing much and never believe any thing much. Intelligent doubt often leads to the careful examination of evidence, which, when found conclusive, leads to the strongest faith. To believe without evidence is credulity, not faith. Faith is belief upon evidence. To avow belief too readily is the surest proof that there is no real faith. The Scotch told King Charles that if he would accept and subscribe to their creed, they would support his royal cause against his political enemies. They brought the document to him to read and sign, if he found that he could do so conscientiously and sincerely. "O it is not necessary to read it," said he; "give me the pen; I believe it." But the Scotch were quick to see that such ready belief and acceptance as that, without any examination whatever, was really no belief at all; and so they put no faith in his subscription or in his fidelity.

Hence the tendency of the human mind to doubt is, within reasonable limits, a safeguard against credulity and superstition. The office of human reason is to for-

bid the human mind to believe any thing until the proper evidence has been furnished. If, as we have said, faith is belief upon evidence, then there can be no real faith without the exercise of reason. Unless we were naturally disposed to doubt until reasonable evidence is furnished, the human mind could be easily imposed upon in matters of faith. "To doubt at the right place," says Dr. Bledsoe in his *Theodicy*, "is the best cure for doubt, and to believe at the wrong place is the surest road to skepticism." To doubt things that ought to be doubted is the surest road to believing things that ought to be believed. Truth is not afraid of a skeptic; it rejoices to meet him if he is honest. It is error that can ill afford to be called in question. The Master feared not the doubter with his cruel questions; He only demanded that he should be sincere. Christianity has nothing to lose from skepticism, but much to gain. Neither Christ nor Christianity lost any thing by the skepticism of Thomas, but gained much every way, and his skepticism is indeed now numbered among the credentials of Christianity. "He doubted that we might not doubt," and he also believed that we might believe.

There is a second form of skepticism that we would notice as sometimes occurring in the experience of a regenerate child of God. It is a skepticism that is born of circumstances, or a combination of circumstances, which may seem to the believer to be incompatible with the infinite love of an all-wise and omnipotent God. The believer here does not deny, but he finds himself ques-

tioning, the providence of God. Take the case of John the Baptist in prison, sending his disciples to Jesus to know if He was the Christ. John could not understand how it was that, if Christ were really divine, He would suffer him to be cast into a dungeon and retained there for no other crime than the simple and honest discharge of his duty as a preacher of righteousness. Can it be that the omniscient and omnipotent Son of God will sit quietly by and see a wicked and heartless tyrant imprison and put to death his own forerunner and prophet who in the faithful and fearless discharge of his duty has denounced the wickedness of royalty? How can Christ be divine and suffer this outrageous wrong? That was the question that confronted John as he sat in his loneliness amid the damp walls and foul atmosphere of the gloomy dungeon of Machærus, awaiting his execution. He did not deny that Jesus was the Christ, but he was thrown into doubts, he began to question, he could not understand, he sought and needed reassurance—and this notwithstanding the fact that he had baptized Christ and seen the divine attestation that accompanied that event. John's state of mind was not unnatural in view of all the circumstances. But his doubt was sincere and honest, and it is both interesting and instructive to see how the Master met it. He bade the messengers take their seat and wait. He was busy. "And in that same hour Jesus cured many of their diseases and plagues and evil spirits; and on many that were blind he bestowed sight. And then he answered and

said unto them, Go your way and tell John what things ye have seen and heard: the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached unto them. And blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me." That message was doubtless enough, and was just what he needed to reassure him that Jesus was the Christ.

And so it sometimes occurs in the experiences of God's children that they are surrounded by circumstances that seem to them for the time being to be irreconcilable with the overruling providence of an all-wise and an all-good God. They are thrown into a questioning state of mind. It is usually trials, misfortunes, sorrows, afflictions, death of loved ones under circumstances peculiarly trying, that plunge the despondent believer into this species of skepticism. While this doubt may prove that his faith is not all that it ought to be, it does not necessarily prove that he does not believe in and love the Lord Jesus Christ. I have known good people to get into such a state. It is a period rather than a state. It does not last long. The clouds roll away, and the doubting and despondent believer not only sees the sun again, but as he looks upon the receding clouds, he sees them lighted up with brightness and glory from above. Faith, if thrown out of its equipoise, soon reacts and reasserts itself. Such skepticism I know is inconsistent with the highest ideal of Christian faith; but it is nevertheless true that such experiences do sometimes occur in the lives of sincere and

useful believers in the Lord Jesus Christ. If a Christian ever finds himself, in a moment of misfortune and weakness, calling in question the divine character of Christianity, he needs only do what Christ bade the disciples of John do—viz., consider the works of Christ and Christianity through all the ages. They are the vindication of its divine claims and the unanswerable argument in proof of its divine origin and character. All the noblest deeds of human history and all the blessings of our civilization we owe to Christianity. Christianity asks no surer vindication of its divine claims than that it be studied and judged in the light of what it has done for the human race.

Again, is there not a skepticism that pertains to youth, to youth as it is turning into manhood? Is there not a skeptical period through which every thoughtful young Christian, more or less, must pass before he settles down into the mature faith of manhood? Not every one, indeed, but certainly many do pass through just such a period. This skepticism marks the transition period between the immature faith of youth and the mature faith of manhood. A youth often forms crude and childish ideas of God, of heaven, of the soul, of the Bible, of all spiritual doctrines and things. These crude ideas must be abandoned and give place to more intelligent and correct ideas of spiritual things. The young Christian, in giving up his early formed ideas of spiritual things, is very apt to feel or to fear that he is giving up his faith in these things themselves. Not so—certainly not necessarily

so. This test of the faith, if met thoughtfully and passed successfully, makes one a stronger and more intelligent believer than was possible before. It oftentimes drives the thoughtful young man, while his faith is thus unsettled and he is at unrest, to earnest study and careful examination of the evidences of his faith, and as a result he is able to give thereafter an intelligent reason for the hope and the faith that is in him. If the skepticism of young manhood accomplishes this result, it is not an unmitigated evil in one's life. Under religious instruction in the nursery, at home and at Sabbath-school, a Christian youth grows up into a religious faith without much thinking for himself. The time comes when this intellectual and religious creed of youth must be recast. This questioning or skeptical period of young manhood seems to be the occasion for doing this.

This is not only an important but a critical period in a young Christian's life. For one may come out of this unsettled state not only into a stronger and more rational faith, but, unfortunately, if the other alternative be chosen, into a state of agnosticism or infidelity. The influences that are around a young man at this critical time—his companions, his spiritual advisers, the books he reads—have much to do with determining in which of these two ways he will come out of his skepticism. If he has positively Christian companions, if he is fortunate enough to find sympathetic spiritual advisers who can explain his state of mind to him and lead him out of it, and if good books fall into his hands and occupy his thoughts,

nothing is to be feared as to the result. But if, on the other hand, his companions are religious scoffers and confirmed skeptics, if he has no wise and sympathetic counselor from whom to seek advice, if skeptical books fall into his hands, then it is almost as certain that he will come out a confirmed skeptic or a positive disbeliever in Christianity. Such a lamentable course many young men do unfortunately take. One of the most earnest and Christian young men of my acquaintance years ago, one who had the Christian ministry in view, became skeptical when about twenty-one or two years of age. Just at this critical time he began reading the writings of Matthew Arnold, John Stuart Mill, Professor Huxley, and the like. It was not long before he decided not to preach, and soon thereafter abandoned all faith in the Christian religion.

I have seen it stated that Peter Cooper was in his youth a Methodist, but, becoming skeptical concerning some of the doctrines of Christianity, he went to his pastor for counsel, stating his doubts to him. But his pastor met his confession of religious doubts with no sympathy and replied rather roughly, telling him that he must confess his sin and pray for divine forgiveness just as he would for any other sin. This was poor satisfaction to one in his state of mind. He turned away with a sad heart. Soon thereafter he chanced to go to worship in a Unitarian Church. The preacher was telling in his sermon of how that he used to be in his youth an orthodox Christian; but soon doubts came. He fought

a long time with his doubts, thinking the orthodox faith must be right; but presently it occurred to him that possibly his honest doubts might be founded in truth and the orthodox faith be in error. Working along that line he came to the light. It was—so the preacher argued—the only satisfactory solution of the skepticism inseparable from the orthodox creed, viz., to abandon it for the rational and satisfying faith of Unitarianism. The result was that young Cooper became a Unitarian. Had his Methodist pastor met his doubts with sympathy and consideration, and prayed with him, Peter Cooper might have been saved to Methodism and his life and wealth have been made a far greater blessing to humanity than they were, although he was, in spite of his Unitarianism, a noble man and philanthropist.

And even young ministers sometimes encounter periods of skepticism, especially if they never had such an experience before entering the ministry. The young Christian grows up with the idea that the Christian religion is certainly true, and that there is no argument of any weight, or worthy of any consideration, against it. But when he begins the study of philosophy, metaphysics, science and theology, he finds that there are some real arguments on the other side. They are new to him, and while they shock him, yet they, in a certain sense, have a fascination for him. He shudders at the consequences of what opens before him as a possibility even, viz., that this and that fact or doctrine of Christianity may not be true after all; and if they are not true, does not the whole

system of Christian Revelation likewise fall through with them? He is disturbed at his thoughts and is made very unhappy. Now it is the privilege of every Christian to have the witness in himself so clearly revealed and to enjoy so fully the assurance of the faith that he will be in no way disturbed at the discovery of some arguments against the divine character of Christianity of which he had no knowledge before. But not every young Christian, not every young minister, lives up to this high privilege as he ought. The faith of such is much unsettled when such an experience comes. Happy are they who, when their faith is thus sorely tried, know like John the Baptist where to go for reassurance and comfort. One needs only to study the works and influence of Christianity in the world to be convinced of its divine character. If such an experience leads the young minister to earnest prayer and to an examination of the foundations of his faith—and if his prayers lead him to attain the witness in himself, and his examinations fill his mind as never before with the truth and force of all those great evidences in proof of the divine origin and character of Christianity that have been called forth by the opposing arguments of the unbelieving world—if this be the outcome of his experience, as it often happily is, then he will be a better and stronger Christian and a more efficient minister of the gospel for having passed through such an experience.

Many who at this critical period turn away from Christianity and spend their lives in the delusions of skepti-

cism yet come back in the more mature and sober reflections of closing life to the simple faith of their parents and of their childhood. George Eliot, one of the most intellectual women and most popular writers of romance in the nineteenth century, was reared in the simple faith of evangelical Christianity. Early in life she became skeptical, and, in the pride of intellectual womanhood, abandoned the faith of her youth. Throughout her brilliant literary career she was recognized as one whose intellectual gifts were used to undermine, rather than to confirm and establish, the foundations of Christian faith. And yet it is said that when she came to die, she gave expression to a love and sympathy for the faith of her early life that showed unmistakably that, howsoever well skepticism might support one in the vigor and pride of active life, the heart yearned for something surer when it was about to take its final leap into the dark unknown.

So, too, Thomas Carlyle was in early life a consistent believer in Christ, and was even designed by his pious Scotch parents for the Christian ministry. But becoming skeptical in early manhood, he abandoned not only the ministry but also the faith of his youth and of his parents. Throughout his long and illustrious literary career, he wrote in a critical and skeptical way concerning many of the vital doctrines of the Christian faith, and his influence was recognized as hostile to evangelical Christianity. But when in a ripe old age he came to die, that hatred of sham and hypocrisy and that stern love of

honesty and truth that he had so often given expression to in life, made his honest heart yearn for something more solid to rest upon, and he, too, virtually came back to the simple faith that his pious parents had taught him in his childhood, if his sayings were correctly reported.

Do not understand me as saying that these two illustrious persons made what is commonly called a "death-bed repentance" and openly recanted their skepticism. Nor do I mean to say that their biographers record the facts that I mention concerning their giving evidence toward their death that faith was better than doubt to die with. No; for the biographers, as well as the admirers, of such skeptical and literary persons are more concerned to make their heroes *consistent* throughout in their life and sayings than they are to give due weight to what is said by them when death is approaching. It is a well-known fact that many skeptics and infidels when they come to face the stern realities of another world, give expression to those about them of their dissatisfaction with their skepticism; but rarely does a biographer, generally himself a skeptic, take any notice of such facts. He considers them as the vagaries incident to the approach of death, utterly inconsistent with the man's whole life. And this same pride of consistency keeps, we believe, many a man from abandoning his skepticism in the midst of life—having committed himself, he must maintain his consistency. But to be true is a great deal better than being consistent. To follow truth is the only real consistency.

John Randolph of Roanoke is said to have filled his copy of the "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," on his first reading, with annotations on the margin, approving the deistical notions of Gibbon. Most of these notes he obliterated in after life. The following is what he wrote on the margin of the celebrated fifteenth chapter, when, later in life, he reread the book:

"When the penciled notes to this and the succeeding chapter were written the writer was an unhappy young man deluded by the sophisms of infidelity. Gibbon seemed to rivet what Hume, and Hobbes, and Bolingbroke, and Voltaire, etc., had made fast, and Satan—the evil principle in our (fallen) nature—had cherished ; but, praised be his holy name, God sent straight to his heart the sense of sin and the arrow of the angel of death, 'unless ye repent,' and with it came the desire of belief; but the hard heart of unbelief withstood a long time, and fear came upon him and waxed great, and brought first resignation to his will, and after much refractoriness (God be praised, but never sufficiently, that he bore with the frowardness of the child of sin, whose wages is death), God in his good time sent the pardon and peace which passeth knowledge in the love which struck out fear. Hallelujah."

An eminent and useful missionary to India was much troubled in his young manhood with religious doubts. But in the midst of his doubts he yet, strangely enough, felt the call of duty to go as a missionary to India and work for the salvation of the heathen. He went. Years

later he returned to America on a visit, his labors in the meantime having been crowned with abundant success. Some one who had known of his early spiritual troubles chanced to meet him one day and asked him how he had settled his religious doubts. "I went earnestly to work for Christ," said he, "and I have been so busy trying to save the poor heathen among whom I have been laboring for the past several years, that I have not had time to think of my doubts. I never did answer my difficulties and questions. But they ceased to trouble me when I became busy in the Master's work, and I would not waste the time now that it would take to have them explained." There are doubts born of having nothing to do, and the only way to cure them is to go to work for Christ. Christians that are busy in the Lord's work, in helping the poor, in seeking and saving the lost, are rarely, if ever, troubled with doubts.

"Nearly every young man in civilized lands," says Professor Townsend of Boston University, "has his period of doubt. I passed through my period of personal skepticism while at college. The experience was intense, lasting perhaps two years. A few sensible remarks from Dr. Lord, president of the college, suggesting that Christianity is a system which, to a certain extent, can be tested as other matters are tested, furnished a key that subsequently opened the door leading back to the faith of early boyhood."

It is to be hoped that every Christian's religious experience is so deep, and his relation to Christ so close, that

he will not need rational and theological arguments to sustain his faith when circumstances arise which might tend to produce a state of skepticism. But, if not, some facts may be mentioned that will prove helpful to such a one.

It is remarkable how often Christ appealed to his supernatural works as the proof of his divine character. And so there is no plainer or stronger or more satisfactory argument in favor of the divine origin and nature of Christianity than to appeal to its influence and work in the world, whether upon nations, or communities, or individuals. What has been the effect of Christianity upon the nations that have come under its influence? Take Great Britain, for example, whose inhabitants were, before the entrance of Christianity, as thoroughly heathen people as are those of China and India to-day. What has wrought this change? When Queen Victoria was asked by the Japanese minister as to what was the secret of England's greatness, she very truthfully replied, pointing to an open Bible: "That is the secret of England's greatness." What is the effect of the Christian religion upon a community that comes under its influence? Take, for example, such a notoriously wicked and lawless one as "Five Points" in the city of New York. For many long years it defied the law, and so strongly was crime enthroned there that even policemen feared to go there. It continued such until the Christian missionaries began their work among the law-breakers and criminals there. But through the influence of the Christian religion it has been transformed into one of the most law-abiding and

moral sections of the great city. How account for the transformations in moral character accomplished in the thousands of individuals in almost every community on any other hypothesis than the divine character of Christianity? Never mind about inconsistent professors of religion—Christianity is in no way responsible for their failures, but condemns them as strongly as do the critics of Christianity. Judge Christianity by those who do what it bids men do, not by those who fail to do what it bids them do. The greatest and best men that have ever lived have been believers in Christianity and have ascribed all the good that was in them to the Christian religion. “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.”

That Christ is the wisest and best man that has ever appeared in the history of our race, all men admit, even skeptics and infidels. This wisest and best man claimed to be divine: “I and the Father are one.” That he made this claim is as certain as that he once lived. The documents that prove to us that he once lived are the same which assert that on many occasions and in many ways he claimed to be divine, and the Jews fully understood that he “made himself equal with God.” Now this claim is either true or false. If false, it must be because he was a willful impostor or was himself self-deceived, a religious fanatic. Neither of which hypotheses is in the remotest degree compatible with the universal verdict of the human race—that he is the noblest and best man that has ever lived.

So, too, the Bible is universally conceded by all men, whether believers in Christianity or not, to be the best book, in its moral influences, in the literature of the world. Now nothing is plainer than that this best of all books claims to contain a series of divine revelations from God. If this claim were not true, it not only could not be the best of books, but it would be the worst book in the literature of the world, an impious fraud from beginning to end. To deny the truth of the Scriptures, would be not merely to affirm that one prophet, or inspired writer, was a deceiver or self-deceived in claiming a supernatural communication from God, but that a succession of prophets and writers, extending over a period of fifteen hundred years, entered into the pious fraud, or were alike victims of a common delusion—to believe which would require more “blind faith” than to believe the vain superstitions of Roman Catholicism in the dark ages, not to speak of the rational and self-consistent faith of intelligent Christianity in the nineteenth century. Before one rejects Christianity he ought to consider what such rejection necessitates his believing instead of it. For every one difficulty that is presented to the human mind in rationally accepting Christianity, there are a hundred of a much more serious nature involved in denying Christianity and accepting infidelity. A young person especially is apt to overlook this important and serious consequence growing out of a rejection of the Christian faith.

Again, Christianity is universally conceded to be the best institution in the world for the moral elevation of

the race. Now Christianity claims that all its distinguishing features and doctrines are of divine origin ; and if there is any thing divine about it, it is all divine. If this claim is false, it is the most gigantic fraud in existence on the earth. Can it be that that institution which, in spite of all its alleged defects, is yet the best in existence, is totally or even partially false ? Can it be that it is the most gigantic fraud in existence ? But it must be this, if it is not of divine origin and divine authority.

Skepticism makes life a failure. It robs character of its chief strength. The man who does not know what he believes can influence no one. It is the man who believes something, who knows what he believes, who has a faith, has convictions, and the courage to state them, that is going to make himself heard and going to be believed and to win success among men. "I don't know" is the language of skepticism. "I don't know whether there is a God—whether Jesus Christ is divine—whether there is any such thing as regeneration and spiritual religion—whether there is any immortality for human souls—I don't know." "I know" is the language of faith. "I know that my Redeemer liveth—I know whom I have believed—I know that whereas I was blind now I see—I know that I have passed from darkness to light—I know that all things work together for good to them that love God—I know that if this earthly house of my tabernacle is dissolved, I have a building of God, a house not made with hands eternal in the heavens."

And as skepticism makes life a moral failure and en-

velops it in gloom, so it throws darkness around the grave and makes death a leap into the dark unknown. We want faith, not skepticism, to die with. "Here is an argument," said Hannah More, "with which to answer all the sophistries of skepticism: No man ever yet repented of the Christian religion on his death-bed." "There is one thing," said a skeptic, "that mars all the pleasure of my life: I am afraid the Bible might be true." And well he may; for, if it does, his case is hopeless. But if skepticism or infidelity, or any anti-christian "ism" in existence, should prove true, the Christian is just as safe as any one in meeting the issues of eternity.

Lord Byron was through life a skeptic, and died a skeptic's death. Among his last words were these:

"My life is in the yellow leaf,
The fruit and flower of love are gone;
Henceforth the canker and the grief
Are mine alone."

Paul, the Apostle, was through life a believer, and he died a believer's death. Among his last words were these: "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing."

I set before you skepticism and faith. Which will you take to live with? Which will you take to die with?

A BRIEF STUDY OF THE CANON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

INTRODUCTORY.

IT is not by any means my purpose to undertake in this place any thing like an exhaustive treatment of the canon of the New Testament, which is confessedly a large and difficult subject, but only to indicate some of the methods of studying it, and some of the facts bearing upon it. It is a subject, however, about which it is our privilege to inquire and our duty to be informed. In these days nothing escapes investigation, analysis, criticism. And if we felt no personal interest in this inquiry, as ministers we come in contact with reading and inquiring men inside the Church who do feel an interest in it, and whose questions we ought to be able to answer, as well as with gainsaying men outside the Church who have knowledge of these things, and whose cavils we ought to be able to meet.

Without stopping to give the etymology of the word canon, or to distinguish it from other terms, it is sufficient to say that there is in the possession of the Church, and has been for many hundreds of years, a body of writings known as the New Testament, and held by all branches of the Church during all these hundreds of

years to be of divine origin, inspiration, and authority, and so standing apart from and superior to all other writings in existence. This collection of books is what is known as the canon of the New Testament. It stands for us complete, closed, exclusive. And yet it cannot but be a matter of great interest to us to know, if we may, the history of this collection, when and how it was formed, how long it has been what it is at present. It would be interesting to inquire, if it be done with reverence, what relation the books of our canon bore to the great mass of so-called apocryphal literature which has come down to us from a very early age, and what ground we have for believing that the early Church, with divinely attested qualifications and divinely approved tests, made a decided and rigid distinction between the books of our canon and all other books. Though we shall not be able, with entire satisfaction, to answer all these questions, we need have no fear, I think, that these investigations will result in damage to the foundations of our faith. On the contrary, besides furnishing answers to inquiries that are natural and commendable, they will, it is believed, have a positive apologetic value, and bring into clearer light the solid character of the historical foundations of our faith. The origin of Christianity will bear investigation, invites investigation. And if any fact or event in the history of this world ever endured investigation, the origin of Christianity more. But all these investigations—many-sided, microscopical, irreverent, hostile, persistent as they have been—so far

from showing any weakness or cause for wavering, have only resulted in revealing more clearly the impregnable historical basis of Christianity.*

METHODS.

Obviously, the canon of the New Testament, as such, is a different thing from the canonicity of any single book, and must be treated in a different way, though a discussion of the canonicity of each separate book would constitute altogether a discussion of the canon of the New Testament, and this would be the more thorough and satisfactory way.† But the canon of the New Testament, as a whole, may be discussed with some degree of satisfaction without descending to the discussion of the canonicity of each several book. Sometimes it is convenient to examine the canonicity of certain groups of the New Testament books; as, the four Gospels, the catholic Epistles, the Epistles of St. Paul, or the group of books constituting the so-called *antilegomena*. In the discussion of the canon of the New Testament as a whole we make use of three well-known facts:

1. The books considered of apostolic authority and counted as sacred scripture were translated into other languages, as the Latin and Syriac, and so it happens in

* Compare the lecture on the Tübingen Theory in this volume.

† Both methods are employed by Professor Charteris in his work entitled "Canonicity" (Edinburgh, 1880). This is an admirable work, and gives the completest view of the subject anywhere to be found.

this incidental way that we have lists preserved to us of those books.

2. It happens also that many of the early writers made lists of the books which in their day were received as sacred scriptures, were read in their assemblies, and were regarded as standing apart from all other books in existence, while other writers make quotations from them.

3. A little later Church councils took in hand the consideration and settlement of this question, and upon large *data*, much of which is not now accessible to us, officially declared just what books should be regarded as constituting our New Testament.

The examination of these lists, then, furnished us in this threefold form, is what we mean by a discussion of the New Testament canon as distinguished from the canonicity of any particular book or of each of the books severally.. We shall find upon examination that there is substantial agreement among these lists.

There are, as Dr. Addison Alexander says, two methods of conducting this inquiry. The first consists of a historical deduction in the order of time, beginning with the first notices of the books and the entire collection, and continuing to the present time. The other, setting out from undisputed and notorious facts belonging to the present, traces up the testimony to the times of the apostles. The fact from which we set out in the use of this second method (which we shall follow in this lecture) is that the book now called the New Testament is the same in every language and throughout the world.

This cannot even be said of the Old Testament scriptures, the canon of which is different in the opinion of Roman Catholic and Protestant Christians, the former accepting the Old Testament Apocrypha as Scripture, while the latter do not. But, though the New Testament Apocrypha are more numerous than the Old Testament Apocrypha, no one of them is anywhere regarded as belonging to the canon. It is not strictly correct to say that this absolute identity of the canon has existed for fourteen hundred years and more; for though the Church, as a whole, Catholic and Protestant, has held the canon to be the same, yet individual students and scholars within the pale of the Church have at different times questioned, on various grounds, the canonicity of particular books; as, for example, Martin Luther rejected the Epistle of James, that of Jude, and the Apocalypse of John; and there are scholars at the present day who question the canonicity of particular books; as, for example, Canon Farrar questions that of 2 Peter.* Still, it is true that, so far as the Church as a whole is concerned, it is a well-known and undisputed fact that the canon of the New Testament has been what it now is for nearly fifteen hundred years, back to the fourth century. So that our investigation will have reference to the canon previous to that time.

* See "Early Days of Christianity," p. 99 f. I say he questions the canonicity of it; for though he says it is rightly accepted as canonical, yet, in the discussion which follows, his facts and statements lie as much against its canonicity as its genuineness. See especially p. 100.

THE HISTORY OF THE CANON.

FIRST PERIOD, 397-315.—The complete canon of the New Testament, as we now have it, was ratified at the Council of Carthage (397 A.D.), in North Africa, one of the most enlightened portions of the Church. The Council of Hippo, in North Africa also, four years earlier (393 A.D.), made a definitive statement of the canon of the New Testament scriptures, having previously ordered that nothing shall be read in the Churches as divine scriptures except the canonical scriptures (*præter scripturas canonicas*). It then specifies these as follows: The canonical scriptures are four books of the Gospels, one of the Acts of the Apostles, thirteen Epistles of Paul, and one of his also to the Hebrews, two Epistles of Peter, three of John, one of James, one of Jude, and the Apocalypse. Besides this, we have the explicit testimony of Rufinus, an eminent and learned Church Father of Northern Italy (born, 360; died, 410), who enumerates the books of the New Testament by classes, as follows: The four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, fourteen Epistles of St. Paul, two Epistles of Peter, one of James, one of Jude, three of John, and the Revelation of John. This is not merely a statement of his own private judgment, but he says: "These are the scriptures which the Fathers have included in the canon, *Hæc sunt quæ patres inter canonem concluserunt.*"

Going now still farther back in the fourth century, and to still another quarter of the Church, we find in one of the letters of Athanasius (born, 296; died, 373) a state-

ment of the Alexandrian canon. This contains a clear and positive list of all the books of the New Testament as they are now received with us. Moreover, Athanasius adds, "These are the fountains of salvation, so that whosoever thirsts may fill himself with the oracles contained in them. Let no one add to them, or take any thing away from them," which is a strong statement of his view of the completeness and exclusiveness of the canon. So far, we have not found the least dissent from our existing canon. It was received in its present form, as we have seen, in the Latin Church, both of Italy and North Africa, in the Greek Church, as is testified by Athanasius; and the fact that Ephrem Syrus, the greatest Syrian father (died 378), quotes in his extant writings every one of the books of our present canon is sufficient proof that at the time in question the Syrian canon was the same.

The next writer that we come to in this retrograde investigation is Gregory of Nazianzus, in Cappadocia (born, 330; ordained, 361; died, 389). He received all the books of our canon, with the exception of the Apocalypse of St. John, which is excluded from his catalogue. Cyril, Bishop of Jerusalem from 350 to 381, gives the following catalogue: Four Gospels, with a positive exclusion of all others as spurious and injurious (*ψευδεπίγραφα καὶ βλαβερά*), Acts of the Apostles, seven catholic Epistles, and fourteen Epistles of St. Paul. He makes no mention of the Apocalypse, it will be observed.

So far, we find the canon of the New Testament to be the same as at the present day, with the single exception

of the Apocalypse or Revelation of John, which is excluded from the catalogues of Gregory and Cyril. Further than this, no intimation has been found of any question concerning the other books.

Eusebius, 340-315.—We come now to the catalogue or canon of the celebrated Eusebius, the learned and scholarly Church historian, who was Bishop of Cæsarea in Palestine from 315 to 340. He was the confidential friend and adviser of Constantine the Great, and wrote a biography of him which is still extant. His work on Church History has earned for him the distinction of “Father of Church History.” His testimony concerning the canon is full and discriminating, though it is not free from difficulties. He divides the writings that were current among Christians in his day, and claiming to emanate from the apostolic age, into three great classes :

1. The *homologoumena*, or undisputed.
2. The *antilegomena*, or disputed.
3. The *notha*, or spurious.

Perhaps it will not be improper to quote the passage in full: This appears to be the proper place to give a summary statement of the books of the New Testament. And here among the first must be placed the holy quaternion of the Gospels; these are followed by the book of the Acts of the Apostles; after this must be mentioned the fourteen Epistles of Paul, which are followed by the acknowledged first Epistle of John, also the first of Peter, to be admitted in like manner. After these is to be

placed, if proper ($\epsilon\imath\gamma\epsilon\varphi\alpha\nu\epsilon\eta$ *), the Revelation of John. These then are acknowledged as genuine ($\delta\mu\lambda\omega\gamma\omega\nu\mu\nu\alpha$). Among the disputed books ($\alpha\gamma\tau\iota\lambda\epsilon\gamma\omega\mu\nu\alpha$), although they are well known and approved by many, is that called the Epistle of James and that of Jude and also the second Epistle of Peter and those called the second and third of John. (He speaks of Hebrews as disputed in Bk. iii. 3.)

Among the spurious ($\nu\omega\theta\alpha$) must be numbered the books called the "Acts of Paul," that called "Pastor," that called the "Revelation of Peter," the "Epistle of Barnabas," and what are called the "Teachings or Institutions of the Apostles." Some also number among these the gospel according to the Hebrews. (E. H., iii. 25.)

As has been said, Eusebius does not express any doubt of his own concerning the so-called *antilegomena*, † but only records the doubts of others and gives a statement and history of the question, so to speak.

One thing must be borne in mind in examining the statements and testimony of Eusebius concerning the books of the New Testament canon, a consideration that will be helpful in examining the references to New Testament books found in the writings of the ages preceding Eusebius, and this is, that there existed then much evidence which is no longer available for us. Canon Farrar is therefore hasty and inaccurate in his statement that "the Church of the fourth century had not the least pretense to greater authority than the Church of the nineteenth." ‡ They did

* Westcott says this seems to mean in case its authenticity is admitted.

† Compare Bk. iii. 3.

‡ "Early Days of Christianity," p. 98.

have abundantly more evidence than we have, and consequently had a better right to judge ; and as we shall see further on, they were discriminating, hesitating and cautious to a fault in deciding upon the reception of any book into the canon.

Now it is true that Eusebius does not always *cite* his authorities, nor does he by any means enumerate or name all the books which according to our certain knowledge he had access to. This "silence of Eusebius" has been made much of by the author of "Supernatural Religion," a pretentious and plausible book, published in England some years ago. The difficulty raised by this author on the "silence of Eusebius" has been completely and triumphantly laid by Bishop Lightfoot in articles of surpassing ability published in the *Contemporary Review* for 1875. The author of "Supernatural Religion" claims that as Eusebius promises to bring forward every reference to the books of the New Testament found in ecclesiastical writers (H. E., Bk. iii. 3), when he does not adduce any such reference by any such author, it is proof that that author had nothing concerning the books of the New Testament and knew nothing of them. For example, the extracts quoted from Hegesippus by Eusebius contain no reference to the New Testament books, but only to a certain apocryphal book. Therefore Hegesippus did not use our New Testament books.

But this author has simply misunderstood Eusebius. Eusebius does not promise to record every reference to

New Testament books in various writers, but only references to the disputed books (the so-called *antilegomena*). He says (H. E., Bk. iii. 3): "As the history goes forward, I shall make it a business to show, along with the successions of bishops, which of the ecclesiastical writers in their several times used any of the *antilegomena** and which of them they used, and also *what things* have been said by them *concerning* the canonical and acknowledged writings and whatever things have been said by them concerning those not such." This means that he will, for the purpose of helping decide the question of the canonicity of the *antilegomena*, show what writers used them (i. e., the *antilegomena*); but that he will only relate facts and incidents *concerning* the universally acknowledged books (the *homologoumena*), as, for example, how they came to be written and under what circumstances. *And this is precisely what he does.* Hence he does not refer to Polycarp's quotations of Paul, though he had Polycarp's letter and mentions it. He does not refer to Ignatius' frequent quotations from the canonical books, though he had the epistles of Ignatius and gives quite a lengthy account of them in his Ecclesiastical History, Bk. iii. 36. So again, he quotes a reference by Clement of Rome to the Epistle to the Hebrews, because it was one of the *antilegomena*, but nowhere mentions the explicit statement of Clement that Paul wrote to the Corinthians, because this was an acknowledged book and there was no

*These are, as has already been said, James, Hebrews, Jude, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John, and the Apocalypse.

need of adducing testimony from Clement for it. Now it happens that we have the letter of Polycarp, those of Ignatius, and that of Clement, and we see that they did refer to and quote from the undisputed books repeatedly, although Eusebius is silent concerning these quotations.

Moreover, that this is the correct interpretation of the passage where Eusebius makes his promise is abundantly confirmed by his practice. For he *does* give accounts of the manner in which the undisputed books originated or any other matter of history he happened to know concerning them, as, for example, in Bk. iii. 24, he shows in what way the four Gospels came to be written and in what order. This is further confirmed by what he says also in Bk. v. 8, where he repeats his promise.

But when Eusebius mentions the reference of any writer to uncanonical books, and does not mention that writer's reference to the *canonical* books, the author of "Supernatural Religion" and critics of his class jump to the conclusion that that writer knew only those uncanonical books. But we happen to have the writings of some men whose references to disputed books Eusebius has preserved, though at the same time not mentioning any reference of theirs to the canonical or undisputed books; and yet in these writings, many of which we have, we find that these men *do* refer to the canonical books. For example, Eusebius mentions the reference to the Apocalypse found in the writings of Theophilus of Antioch, but ignores entirely his direct quotations from the Gospel of John.

SECOND PERIOD, 315-170.—Leaving Eusebius, the next period will extend from his time back to the date of the earliest regular lists which remain to us of the New Testament books: 315-170. In this period we need refer to only four authors—Origen, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Irenæus—but the last in particular because of the peculiar character and value of his testimony. If the Latin translation of Origen's Homilies be trustworthy, he held the same canon which we have at the present time, but it is known that the Latin translator did in some instances modify the teaching of Origen. “There is, however, ample evidence in the *untranslated* writings of Origen that he received all the books of our canon except that he appears to have no quotations from the Epistle of James, 2 Peter, and 2 and 3 John.” “He accepted the Apocalypse of John as the undoubted work of the Apostle John.” (Westcott.) The canon of Clement of Alexandria, Origen's predecessor and preceptor (220 A.D.), was the same as that of Origen.

Tertullian (A.D. 160-222), the oldest Latin Father, and with one exception the ablest and greatest, recognizes in his writings, says Charteris,* all the books of our New Testament except James, 2 Peter, and 2 and 3 John. Moreover, besides thus recognizing the books of our New Testament canon, he speaks of “the whole instrument,” †

* See “Canonicity,” p. 46. Charteris gives all his quotations in the original languages, but generalizes and summarizes in English.

† He says that the heretical teacher, Valentinus, used “the whole instrument,” but perverted the meaning by his false interpretation.

meaning by that the New Testament as a whole and according to Westcott "the canon of North Africa in Tertullian's time, as shown by the Latin Version, prepared there about A.D. 170, included all the books of our New Testament but James and Second Peter."

Irenæus, 177.—Because of the importance of the testimony of Irenæus it will be proper to present a fuller account of this illustrious Gallican Father.* He was born probably about A.D. 120. At any rate, the important fact is that he was connected directly with the apostles and the apostolic age by two distinct personal links, if not more. He must have been 16 or 18 years old when Polycarp was teaching and Irenæus heard him. Polycarp himself was born A.D. 69, and must have been 30 years old when St. John died. Irenæus says he remembered much about Polycarp's conversations, his discourses, and even his manner and expressions and especially what he said about his intercourse with St. John and other personal disciples of Jesus. Then he adds that their accounts were entirely in accordance with the Scriptures.

But Irenæus was connected with the apostolic age by another companionship. He was the leading elder in the Church of Lyons in Gaul, of which Pothinus was bishop, and he succeeded Pothinus on the martyrdom of the latter in 177 or 178. So he must have had almost daily intercourse with Pothinus. But Pothinus, we know, lived to be more than 90 years old, which would put his birth

* In this account of Irenæus and his testimony I have followed Lightfoot's Essays in the *Contemporary Review* for 1875.

about A.D. 87, making him at least ten years old when St. John died. Moreover, there is every reason for believing that Pothinus, like Irenæus, went originally from Asia Minor, and he must have known whether certain writings attributed to the apostles and evangelists had been in circulation as long as he could remember, or whether they came to his knowledge only the other day, when he was already advanced in life. Moreover, in his work on Heresies, Bk. IV. 27, Irenæus gives an account of elaborate discourses which he had heard from a certain "Elder" who had himself "listened to those who had seen the apostles and to those who had been disciples," *i. e.*, personal followers of Christ. It seems most natural to identify this "Elder" with Pothinus. But if this elder was *not* Pothinus, then he forms a third distinct link of connection between Irenæus and the apostolic age. Whoever he was, it is clear that the intercourse of Irenæus with him was both frequent and intimate. "The Elder used to say," "the Elder used to refresh us with accounts of the ancient worthies;" "the Elder used to discuss"—these are some of the expressions which Irenæus uses in writing of this anonymous elder. So that Irenæus *could not have failed* to ascertain the mind of the early Church with regard to the evangelical and apostolic writings. Nor were these the only advantages which Irenæus enjoyed. When he speaks of the recognition of the canonical writings, his testimony represents three Churches at least:

1. In youth he was brought up in Asia Minor.

2. In middle life he staid for some time in Rome, whether he had gone on an important mission. One of the manuscripts of the martyrdom of Polycarp says that "Irenæus, being in Rome at the time of the martyrdom of Polycarp, taught many." Besides, the letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons, preserved in Eusebius, was sent by Irenæus to Rome. *Eccles. Hist.*, Bk. v. 4.

3. Before and after this he held for many years a prominent position in the Church of Gaul, as, first, a leading Elder and afterward Bishop of Lyons.

He was engaged in all the most important controversies of the day. He gave lectures, as we happen to know, for Hippolytus* attended his lectures on "All the Heresies," delivered perhaps during one of his sojourns at Rome. He was a diligent letter-writer, interesting himself in the difficulties and dissensions of distant Churches. He composed several treatises whose general character may be estimated from his extant works. The subjects which he treated forced him to an examination of the Scriptures which constituted the canon. In connection with the Montanist controversy, in which he took a chief part, he had to examine the doctrine of the Paraclete in the fourth Gospel. He was equally prominent in the Paschal controversy, into which the relation between the Synoptists and John entered largely. He was contending all his life against heretics of one sort or another,

* Hippolytus was Bishop of Portus, near Rome, in the first quarter of the third century. He afterward wrote himself a "Refutation of All Heresies."

and constantly appealed to the Scripture records for testing and refuting their errors, as we see in his extant works.

He possessed exceptional opportunities for forming an opinion on the points at issue. His honesty is beyond the reach of suspicion. He was a man of intelligence and culture, with a considerable knowledge of classical literature, though he makes no parade of it. He argues against his opponents with much patience. His work is systematic, and occasionally shows great acuteness. In short, Irenæus betrays no incapacity which affects his competency as a witness to a broad and comprehensive fact.

So much, then, for the witness, his opportunities, qualifications, and competency. We are now prepared to examine his testimony. As to the authority, says Lightfoot, attributed by Irenæus to the four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of Paul, several of the catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse, it falls short *in no respect* of the estimate of the Church catholic in the fourth or the ninth or the nineteenth century. He treats them just as he does the books of the Old Testament, cites them as Scripture, attributes them to the respective authors whose names they bear. He regards them as handed down in the Churches from the beginning; he fills his pages with quotations from them; he has not only a very thorough knowledge of their contents himself, but he assumes a recognition of and an acquaintance with them in his readers.

For example and especially in the third book* he undertakes to refute the opinions of his Valentinian opponents directly from the Scriptures, and because they added other gospels to which they appealed, he relates briefly the circumstances under which our four Gospels were written. He points out that the writings of the evangelists arose directly from the oral gospel of the apostles. He shows that the traditions of the apostles were preserved by a direct succession of elders which in the principal Churches can be traced *man by man*, and he asserts that *this teaching accords entirely with the evangelical and apostolical writings.*

He maintains, on the other hand, that the doctrine of the heretics was of comparatively *recent* growth. He assumes throughout not only that our four canonical Gospels alone were acknowledged in the Church, but that this had been so from the beginning. The Valentinian heretics accepted these, but superadded *others* to which they appealed, while heretics of a different type, as Marcion, for example, adopted some *one* Gospel to the exclusion of all others. He argues there could not be more nor less than four Gospels. There are four regions of the world, and the Church must be supported by four Gospels as by four pillars. Again there are four general covenants of Noah, of Abraham, of Moses, of Christ. It is therefore audacious folly, he says, to increase or dimin-

* Irenæus "Against Heresies," Bk. III., Chapter 11, pp. 426-28, Vol. I. Ante-Nicene Fathers, published by Christian Literature Co., 35 Bond Street, N. Y.

ish the number of the Gospels. Can we imagine, he continues, that these documents sprung up at once full-armed from the earth, no one could say how? and that they had taken their position at once by the side of the Law, the Psalmist, and the Prophets as the very voice of God?

From this it appears that Irenæus exercised the most rigid discrimination and that he was as severe in excluding all the apocryphal trash which some "liberal" critics would like to put along-side our canonical Gospels, as he was vehement in defending each one of the holy four against the intemperate and irreverent manipulation of men who, like Marcion, ventured to mutilate them. And for all this he gives the best and most satisfactory reasons. But not only is the testimony of Irenæus explicit as to the Gospels, it is so also as to nearly all the books of the New Testament. The only books of our New Testament that are not quoted by him are Philemon, Jude, and 3 John, which probably escaped quotation on account of their brevity or the personal character of their contents, or both.

When we come to the lists of which mention was made in the first part of this paper, we find a remarkable agreement between them and the testimony given by Irenæus.

The Old Latin Version, 150-170.—The old Latin Version (giving the canon of North Africa), which was prepared as early as A.D. 170 and was already in existence when Irenæus wrote his work, had, according to Mr. West-

cott, "the four Gospels, the Acts, thirteen Epistles of St. Paul, the three catholic Epistles of St. John, the First Epistle of Peter, the Epistle of Jude, and the Apocalypse. To these the Epistle to the Hebrews was added before the time of Tertullian." In other words, it had all the books of our existing canon except James and 2 Peter.

The Muratorian Fragment, 170.—The next of these lists which we shall mention is that known as the Muratorian Fragment, discovered in manuscript form by Muratori in the library of Milan and published by him in 1740. It is very mutilated and fragmentary, and presents the most perplexing difficulties. Without discussing these, we may say with Chateris,* who is very cautious and candid in estimating its testimony, that it bears witness to the Gospels, thirteen Epistles of St. Paul, Acts, at least two Epistles of St. John, the Epistle of Jude, and the Apocalypse. Lightfoot thinks that it probably bears witness also to the other Epistle of John besides the two above mentioned, and Westcott that a clause in it probably refers to Hebrews as written by a friend of St. Paul. He also discovers indications of two breaks in the fragment where the Epistle of James and First and Second Peter may have been named in the original list.

This list probably represents the Roman canon.

The Syriac Version, 170.—There is one other catalogue of New Testament books dating from the second century

* He gives the Latin text of the Fragment on p. 3 of his work on "Canonicity" and discusses it on p. 79 and following of his *Introduction* to that volume.

and representing still another quarter of the Church. This is the Syriac Version of the New Testament. It was probably in use before A.D. 170. "Its list of books is the same as our present canon, save that it wants the Apocalypse, Jude, 2 Peter, and 2 and 3 John." (Charteris).

Thus there is substantial agreement among the canons of this period, namely, that of Irenæus,* the old Latin, the Muratorian, and the Syriac. But it must be remembered, as Bishop Lightfoot says, that the canon of the New Testament was not taken up by Church councils till the latter half of the fourth century. When we find, therefore, this agreement on all sides in the closing years of the second century, *without* any formal enactment, we can only explain it as a consequence of independent testimony showing that the general sense of the Church had singled out the books which they had reason for accepting and holding as apostolical, inspired, and canonical.

The Antilegomena.—But what are we to say concerning the omission of some of our canonical books from these lists? We have already seen from Eusebius that in his day seven of the books of our canon were questioned by some, and so got the name of *antilegomena*. These seven were the Apocalypse, Hebrews, James, Jude, 2 Peter, and

* Not that Irenæus gives a formal list of the books composing the canon in his day. We arrive at a knowledge of his canon from his quotations of the New Testament books. If he had given a formal statement of the canon, it would most probably have coincided *exactly* with our present existing canon.

2 and 3 John. We find that one or more of these seven books are wanting in the last four catalogues we have examined, namely, the old Latin Version, the Muratorian Canon, the Canon of Irenæus, and the Syriac Version. This is probably the reason that later, or in the time of Eusebius, there were still some who questioned these books. It is not possible within the limits of this paper to make a thorough investigation of them, but we may speak of them roughly, taking up each one separately.

The Apocalypse.—If we take the Apocalypse first, we find it is wanting in the Syriac Version, though it stands in the old Latin Version, the Muratorian Canon, and the Canon of Irenæus. Its omission in the Syriac Version may be accounted for by the fact that the ancient versions of the Scripture were not made for general circulation, as now, but to be read in the Church-service, and the Apocalypse was thought to be unsuited to that purpose, just as, until the last three or four years, the Episcopal Church both of England and America omitted it almost wholly in her calendar of lessons,* though expressly specifying it in her articles of faith as a part of Scripture. It will be remembered that the Apocalypse was excluded by some Church Fathers of the fourth century.† This is explained by the fact that at that time millenarian doctrines of a gross form prevailed. These views were so repudiated by the Church in general and by some distinguished

* This bit of information is due to a friend who is a clergyman of the Protestant Episcopal Church.

† See pages 167, 168.

teachers in particular that they rejected that portion of Scripture which contained the passage held to be the foundation of these erroneous doctrines, as Martin Luther erected an arbitrary standard of his own and rejected the Epistle of James because it seemed to conflict with Paul's doctrine of justification by faith.

The testimony of Irenæus is very important. He not only testifies to the canonicity of the Apocalypse but to the authorship of John the Apostle. (Bk. IV., 20. 11.) *Sed Joannes, Domini discipulus, in Apocalypsi gloriosum regni videns adventum, . . . inquit, etc.* The Apocalypse is quoted three times in the Letter of the Church of Vienne and Lyons, once as *Scripture*, *Ινα ἡ γραφὴ πληρωθῇ*, etc. (Eusebius, H. E., v. 1.) This letter was sent by Irenæus to Rome. Justin Martyr has an explicit quotation of the Apocalypse, which is indeed his only citation of a New Testament book *by name*. He says, “*Καὶ ἀνήρ τις παρὸς ἡμῖν, ὃς ὄνομα Ἰωάννης, εἰς τῶν ἀποστόλων τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ἐν ἀποκαλύψει προεφήτευσε τοὺς τῷ Χριστῷ πιστεύσαντας ποιῆσεν χίλια ἔτη ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ.*” “A certain man among us, John by name, one of Christ's apostles, prophesied in the Apocalypse that believers in Christ would spend a thousand years in Jerusalem.” (Dial. w. Trypho, ch. 81.) “Papias, who came into contact with the early disciples, and perhaps with John himself, quoted the Apocalypse as inspired and trustworthy.” (Charteris.)

The Epistle to the Hebrews.—As to the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is witnessed to by the Canon of Irenæus, by the Syriac Version, by the old Latin Version, though

added a little after its first formation and before the time of Tertullian, and it is believed by Westcott that the Muratorian Canon also contained it, though, on account of its mutilated and fragmentary condition, it cannot be certainly determined. There are many undoubted instances of correspondence between the Epistle of Clement of Rome and Hebrews, says Charteris (p. 272), and he cites also correspondences between Hebrews and Polycarp, Justin Martyr, and others coming later. "That it was probably written to Alexandrian Jews may have retarded its reception in the Western Church, and the fact that the knowledge of its authorship was lost may have contributed to the same result." The ancient doubts had reference more to its authorship than its canonicity.

The Epistle of James.—The Epistle of James was accepted in the Eastern Church from the beginning, as is shown by its place in the Syriac Version. The slowness with which it was received in the Western Church is probably due partly to the fact of its uncertain authorship, as there were three Jameses, and partly to the impression current in all ages of a doctrinal divergence between James and Paul on the fundamental doctrine of justification by faith. It is well known that Martin Luther rejected it.

The Epistle of Jude.—The Epistle of Jude is found in the old Latin Version and is expressly named in the Muratorian Canon, but it is wanting in the Syriac Version, which may be due to the same cause that explains the absence of the Apocalypse from that version (see page 182). It is not quoted by Irenæus, though that may be due to its brevity.

and is no proof that it was not regarded by him as a canonical book.

2 Peter.—The earliest quotation of 2 Peter is that found in 2 Clement. Justin's references are worthy of notice, and so are those of Irenæus. Clement of Alexandria commented on 2 Peter as a part of Scripture. In estimating the evidence for the canonicity of 2 Peter it must not be overlooked that there is between this Epistle and that of Jude a most remarkable resemblance, not only in contents and meaning, but even in minute and peculiar forms of expression.* This would be a cause of suspicion and hesitancy. On the natural assumption that but one could be canonical and the other an imitation, it is easy to see how the judgment of the Church would be for a long time divided.

2 and 3 John.—The Second and Third Epistles of John are in the Latin Version of the second century, and are probably named in the Muratorian Canon. Certainly one of them is. It mentions two Epistles of John, and it is the opinion of Lightfoot that these two are the Second and Third, while the First is referred to in another part of the fragment. Second John is certainly and professedly quoted by Irenæus (Bk. I., 16 : 3), “*Ο γὰρ λέγων αὐτοῖς,*” φησι, (*Ιωάννης*) “*χαίρειν, κοινωνεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῶν τοῖς πονηροῖς,*” which is an exact quotation of 2 John 11. Compare it. These two shorter Epistles, it ought to be said also, are so perfectly in the style of the Gospel and First Epistle of John that it is impossible for even an untrained and

* See Farrar's “*Early Days of Christianity*,” pp. 110, 111.

uncritical reader to read them without marking and remarking the similarity. In accounting for the omission of these from the Syriac Version and from the writings of the Fathers it is to be remembered they are extremely short, very personal and particular in form and design, and both half-anonymous. And indeed it is true of all these four last-named Epistles—Jude, 2 Peter, 2 and 3 John—that they are all very short, and therefore furnish very little matter for quotation, which will explain the fewness of the references to them in the writings of the Fathers of the second century.

Thus we can give a reasonable and probable account of the omission of some of these seven books, the *antilegomena*, from some of the canons and Fathers of the second century, and these omissions in the second century will account for their being questioned in later times and will furnish, in particular, a sufficient explanation of the fact that these same books were disputed by some in the time of Eusebius, as we have already seen.

THIRD PERIOD, 170–69 A.D.—It remains to make an examination of references to books of the New Testament to be found in authors that come before the time of Irenæus—as Justin Martyr, Ignatius, Clement of Rome, Polycarp, and Barnabas, from each of whom we have one or more writings. But the limits of this paper will not allow any such examination in detail. We may say, however, in general, that though no one of these writers has a list of the books composing the New Testament and no one of them quotes all the books of the New Testament, yet they all

quote one or more books of the New Testament. For example, there are many coincidences between Justin Martyr and each of our four Gospels, as well as some incidental correspondences with Paul's Epistles.* There are twenty-nine quotations of the New Testament books in the epistles of Ignatius, one of them being from the Apocalypse. Besides these, there are forty-three similarities of tone and thought, which Charteris calls "echoes," including one from the Apocalypse and one from 3 John.† In the single extant letter of Polycarp there are thirty-five quotations and twenty-four "echoes." One of the "echoes" is from Jude, one from James, and one from 2 Peter, though they are doubtful.‡ In the epistle of Clement of Rome there are twenty quotations of the New Testament books and eleven "echoes," including two from James.§ In the epistle of Barnabas there are twelve passages that coincide in substance or form with passages in the New Testament, most of them with passages in the Gospel of John.||

But the fact that we find no more references in these earlier writers to the New Testament Scriptures is not at all strange, but rather what was to be expected. Take the Gospels, for example. "The universal recognition of the four Gospels is the *only fact* which can explain the

* Charteris, "Canonicity," *Introduction*, pp. 61, 62.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 30-33.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 40.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 7.

fragmentary notices of them and references to them in these earlier writers." *If there has been any questioning of them or any false ones challenging equality with them, as there did come to be later, in the time of Irenæus, that would have occasioned discussion, as it did in the time of Irenæus, and so we should find more frequent and explicit mention of them in these earlier writers, as we do find in Irenæus.*

As Bishop Lightfoot says in his admirable articles in the *Contemporary Review*, Irenæus is the first extant writer in whom, from the nature of his work, we have a right to expect explicit information on the subject of the canon. Earlier writings which have been preserved are either epistolary, like those of Ignatius and Polycarp, where any references to the canonical books must necessarily be few and incidental; or devotional, like the Shepherd of Hermas, which is equally devoid of quotation from the Old Testament and the New; or historical, like the account of the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons, where any such allusion would be uncalled for; or apologetic, like the great mass of Christian writings of the second century, in which the reserve of the writer leads him to be silent about authorities that would be of no weight with his heathen or Jewish readers. The work of Irenæus is the first controversial treatise addressed to Christians on the subject of Christian doctrine, where the appeal is naturally to Christian documents. And this clear and positive testimony of Irenæus, giving to the New Testament Scriptures an authority in no respect falling short of the estimate of the Church catholic in the

fourth or the ninth or the nineteenth century, implies, besides, as its historical background, a New Testament canon virtually complete, as it was some time afterward formally so pronounced by the universal Church and is still so received, and not without good reasons historical and internal.*

* In this paper the inquiry has been historical only, and very incomplete at that. No comparison as to contents and character has been made between the New Testament writings and the other writings of antiquity. On this point the following verdict of a great scholar is just and moderate: The Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians and that of Polycarp to the Philippians come nearest to the Epistles of Paul and John, but even they are separated from them by a *very great distance*. Barnabas, Ignatius, Hermas, Papias, Justin Martyr are still further off, and *bear no comparison* with the apostles and evangelists. As to the apocryphal compared with the canonical Gospels, the difference between them *is as between night and day*.

No transition in the history of the Church is so sudden, abrupt, and radical as that from the apostolic to the post-apostolic age. God himself has established an impassable gulf between his own life-giving word and the writings of mortal men, that future ages might have a certain guide and standard in finding the way of salvation. (Schaff's "Companion to the Greek Testament," p. 81.)

THE CHRISTIAN MINISTER AS A PREACHER.

IN the lectures heretofore delivered to the class in Pastoral Theology, I laid down successively, and endeavored to maintain, the following propositions: 1. "Our Lord Jesus Christ has himself ordained that his Church shall have in all times, and under all circumstances, special men appointed to the superintendence of worship and the guidance of human souls." Or, to put the matter differently, we have good reason to assert that the Christian ministry, as a distinct and permanent institution, finds its warrant and justification in the Scriptures of the New Testament. 2. This ministry is not to be looked upon in the light of a merely human profession, which a man may take up of his own choice, as he would take up merchandising or law or medicine; but is, on the contrary, to be regarded as a divine vocation, upon which no man should enter without a conscious and imperative impulse from the Holy Ghost. 3. The dignity of this ministry, which is indeed very great, does not rest upon the supposition of its being a sacrificing and mediating priesthood, a thing both unnecessary and impossible in a purely spiritual religion; but upon the twofold fact that it is appointed to expound and proclaim the word of God, and to exercise a just and rational pastoral supervision over the Church.

It is the first of these functions concerning which I wish now to speak. To be brief, my theme is: *The Christian Minister as a Preacher*. The full and scientific treatment of this theme belongs, of course, to Homiletics, but in a general way, and for the purpose of emphasizing its importance, it must be noticed here. There is abundant ground for affirming that preaching is the minister's highest work. Let us present in the outset a few of the facts that make this declaration good.

I. *Jesus Christ himself was a preacher*. Soon after his baptism he opened his ministry in the synagogue at Nazareth by quoting and applying to himself this passage from Isaiah lxi. 1: "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the gospel to the poor; he hath sent me to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and the recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the acceptable year of the Lord." In the course of three years he delivered numerous lengthy discourses: the Sermon on the Mount; the sermon to Nicodemus; the sermon to the Samaritan woman; the farewell sermon of the last Passover. In addition to these, much of his time was taken up with mere informal religious teaching, the utterance of those brief but pregnant sayings that fell from his lips as occasion called them forth. His preaching arrested attention, and fixed itself in the memory of his hearers. There was nothing about it that excited so much remark as this, that "he taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes." He was no mere com-

mentator, repeating by rote the dull platitudes that had been so often repeated before him, but an original, commanding, and inspiring Teacher, with a message of his own for the world; not an echo, but a clear, fresh, living voice. He did not begin and end with, "Rabbi So-and-so said so-and-so," but rather with an authoritative, "I say unto you." Even toward the law of Moses, as one has well said, he took up "a lofty critical and revisionary attitude." There was never the slightest wavering, hesitation, or indecision in his words. He went forward straight as an arrow to its mark, turning aside neither to the right hand nor to the left. Priest and King he was, but none the less a Prophet.

II. *The great commission which Jesus gave to his apostles indicates not merely the extent to which he wished them to proceed in the propagation of the truth, but also the method according to which he wished them to accomplish that work: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature."* In spite, however, of a deliverance so explicit, two widely differing theories of propagandism prevail among Christian people. The first of these, for lack of a term more accurately descriptive, may be called the *sacramental theory*. It is held in a modified form by High-church Episcopalians and some other sects; but is found in its fullness only among the Roman Catholics. It is, of course, correlated with the doctrine of one universal, visible Church, outside of which there is no hope of salvation, and with the other doctrine of a mediating priesthood, which, by virtue of its position in that Church, holds the keys of the king-

dom of heaven. It puts the sacraments in the forefront. It is sensuous, sentimental, aesthetic; it appeals principally to the faculties of taste and imagination, and only in a subordinate way to the intelligence and the conscience. It minifies the sermon and magnifies the service. Ritualism is its joy and glory. It requires of its ministers, not breadth and strength of brain, nor thoroughness and richness of culture, nor power of persuasive speech, but close attention to the rubries at all seasons of religious worship, and special decency of behavior at weddings and funerals. It calls to its aid all the fine arts: architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and man-millinery. It builds Gothic cathedrals, and adorns them with the best productions of the chisel and the brush. It uses pipe organs and quartet choirs, not that the simple folks may be led to "make melody in their hearts to the Lord," but that the senses of the cultivated few be regaled with "the concord of sweet sounds." It keeps on hand an elaborate ecclesiastical wardrobe, so that the make-believe priests who serve at its altars may be different as much as possible in appearance from their brother men who plow the fields or throng the marts of trade. The odors of a musty medievalism cling to it, and it seems utterly out of place in the open daylight of the nineteenth century.

The other theory, and the true one, is the *preaching theory*. It insists that the Christian minister is not to be a mere dumb servitor at the altar, following the fashion of a pagan priest, and taking a listless and perfunctory

part in a more or less empty ritual. Such a work as that would make no high demand upon his head, no supreme draft upon his heart. A greater trust is committed to him. He is appointed to be the bearer of a message, the teacher and dispenser of an intelligible system of religious truth. This message he must understand, not giving it out in an unconscious and mechanical fashion like a phonograph, nor repeating it by rote like a parrot, but delivering it to the world *ex corde*, out of his very heart. This truth he must grasp, both in its wider and more abstract reaches, and in its narrower and more concrete details. Nay, a mere intellectual apprehension of it, however clear and penetrating, will not suffice him for the effective discharge of his task. Somehow or other he must get the truth incorporated into his spirit, woven into all the texture of his character, so that his speaking of it may be as if he were yielding up the impalpable flame and essence of his own life. To him also is addressed the charge of Paul to Timothy: "Preach the word; be instant in season, out of season; reprove, rebuke, exhort with all long-suffering and doctrine."

The philosophy of the whole matter is finely expressed in Romans x. 13, 14: "For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" The practice of all the apostles, moreover, was in strict accordance with the teaching of this passage. St. Peter

opened the new dispensation of the Spirit on the Day of Pentecost with a sermon that had in it all the elements of exposition, application, and exhortation—a sermon that cut like a sword and burned like fire. St. Paul said of himself (1 Cor. i. 17): “For Christ sent me not to baptize”—not to make baptism, nor the performance of any other visible rite, the business and object of his ministry—“but to preach the gospel.” So small a relative importance did he attach to baptism and other such things that he also said in the same connection: “I thank God that I baptized none of you, but Crispus and Gaius; lest any should say that I baptized in my own name. And I baptized also the household of Stephanas: besides, I know not whether I baptized any other.” Imagine a man with such a moral earnestness as this befooling himself with vestments and wax candles and incense and processions and bowings! The thing is impossible. But wherever he went he left the memory of his sermons; and this, too, in spite of the fact that his enemies declared his “bodily presence” to be “weak” and “his speech contemptible.” “From Jerusalem and round about unto Illyricum,” in a wide-sweeping circle, he “fully preached the gospel of Christ.” In Jewish synagogues, in the open streets of heathen cities, in the philosophical school of Tyrannus at Ephesus, in the upper chamber at Troas, on the summit of Mars’ Hill at Athens, on the sandy sea-shore at Miletus, he “opened his mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel.”

III. *It must be added that every subsequent age of great*

religious activity, every age of revival and reform, has been marked as a period of preaching. Not to go into wearisome minuteness of detail, I will call your attention to only a few examples of this fact.

In the thirteenth century preaching had fallen into disuse. As a matter of theory, it was the special work of the bishops. But the bishops had other tasks to look after. They were busy with war or diplomacy or the management of the vast estates which a prodigal liberality had bestowed upon the Church. In many instances they were engrossed with pleasure, and wallowing in the mire of a godless licentiousness. The number of them who had either the capacity or the disposition to occupy the pulpits of even their cathedral churches was not great; and in the rest of their dioceses "their presence was but occasional, a progress, or a visitation of pomp and form rather than of popular instruction." Dean Milman says: "The only general teaching of the people was through the Ritual. But the splendid Ritual, admirably as it was constituted by its words and symbols to impress the leading truths of Christianity upon the more intelligent, and in a vaguer way upon the more rude and uneducated, could be administered, and was administered, by a priesthood almost entirely ignorant, but which had just learned mechanically, not without decency, perhaps not without devotion, to go through the stated observances."*

The Church was in grave danger of losing its hold

* "History of Latin Christianity," Book X., Chap. IX.

upon the popular mind of Europe; for there was at this time a wide and profound intellectual quickening in all classes. To the great universities scholars of all degrees flocked by the thousand, and outside of the universities there were manifest signs of a new life. What was the Church to do in order to meet this emergency? The heresies were moving. In the south of France Peter Waldo was sending out his itinerant preachers to proclaim an almost Protestant version of the gospel. If Rome was to maintain her hold, she must bestir herself. "Just at this moment," again says Milman, "there arose two men wonderfully adapted to arrest and avert the danger which threatened the whole hierarchical system—St. Dominic and St. Francis, the founders of the Friar Preachers. By them Christendom was at once overspread by a host of zealous, active, devoted men, whose function was popular instruction. In a few years, from the Sierras of Spain to the steppes of Russia, from the Tiber to the Thames, the Trent, the Baltic Sea, the old faith, in all its fullest, medieval, imaginative, inflexible rigor, was preached in almost every town and hamlet." By such means the Medieval Church recovered the ground that it had almost lost; and not only so, but won new conquests, and made for itself a widened domain.

In the same connection, we must not omit to mention the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Martin Luther knew the value of the pen and of the picture. The newly invented printing-press was a good angel to

him. He kept it moving day and night to turn off a sufficient supply of his almost numberless books and tracts; and, in company with his artist friend, Lucas Cranach, he actually flooded Germany with his pictorial caricatures of the pope and the papacy. But he also made the walls of the great Wittenberg Church ring with his sermons, and besides found time for frequent preaching tours throughout Germany. There was one occasion when, speaking after the manner of men, he actually saved the Reformation by his sermons. During his year's voluntary confinement in the castle of Wartburg the so-called "prophets of Zwickau" came to Wittenberg, and made a great stir. By their revolutionary views they carried off even Professor Carlstadt, one of Luther's colleagues, who at once sought to introduce the most radical and untimely measures. Luther heard of it, and could not be held in check. Though warned that he could come out of the place of his concealment only at the risk of his life, he dared every thing, flew to Wittenberg, and for eight consecutive days and nights lifted up his voice from the pulpit against the folly which seemed about to wreck the fair prospects of ecclesiastical reform. Only by such superhuman efforts was the plague staid.

The following quotation from John Ker ("History of Preaching," p. 150) will be read with pleasure: "It is remarkable that Luther was at first unwilling to preach. Like Moses, he did not recognize his work. He distrusted himself, or he had not yet the impelling fire of Jeremiah and Paul. It was at the command of his superior,

under the vow of obedience, that he first preached in the refectory or dining-room of the cloister at Erfurt, and afterward in the little cloister church at Wittenberg. But when he once began the spirit of preaching grew upon him, and he agreed to preach in the town church of Wittenberg, which afterward became so famous, and in which he lies buried side by side with Melanchthon. . . . By and by came his breach with the papal system through his opposition to indulgences, and this led him to the simplicity of the gospel, and to the central truth of his preaching—justification by faith. He now found firm footing, and his preaching gained a power which roused all Germany and shook the souls of men. There had been nothing like it since the Day of Pentecost. On his way to Worms, to meet the Diet, he could not escape from the crowds. At Erfurt where he had commenced in the little refectory, the great church was so crowded that they feared it would fall. At Zwickau the market-place was thronged by 25,000 eager listeners, and Luther had to preach to them from the window. . . . Luther had always pressing work—the care of the Church and all the controversies, the training of preachers, translating the Bible, writing pamphlets and volumes, giving counsel to princes and people; but nothing could keep him from preaching, at home and wherever he went, on Sabbath-days and during the week. He continued to preach all his life long, though broken in health, and so enfeebled that he often fainted from exhaustion. But to the end he retained his wonderful power. The last time

he ascended the pulpit was in February, 1546, a few days before he died."

What has just been said of Luther may be said, with some modification, of almost all the other leaders of the Reformation. John Calvin was to Geneva what Luther was to Wittenberg. No man ever led a busier life. He was practically the head of the civil government of the city ; he lectured constantly to his hundreds of students ; he conducted an extensive correspondence with the great men of the Protestants throughout all Europe ; he was virtually the leader of the Reformed Church in France ; he wrote commentaries, histories, etc.; and yet it was long his custom to preach on every day of alternate weeks. Time would fail me were I to tell of Zwingle, of John Knox, of Hugh Latimer, and of the other notable preachers of the Reformation, who shine like stars through the mists of time.

It is hardly necessary, moreover, to refer to John Wesley and the great revival of the last century. There is, however, one erroneous opinion concerning Wesley which ought to be corrected. It is admitted on all hands that he had consummate genius for organization ; and this fact has overshadowed his fame as a surpassingly great pulpit orator. It is a common belief that in this respect he was far inferior to Whitefield. But there was never a greater mistake. The immediate effects that followed his field preaching were beyond any phenomena that were produced by Whitefield's ministrations. For a substantial confirmation of this statement, the reader is re-

ferred to Dr. John H. Rigg's interesting and instructive little book entitled "The Living Wesley." In the course of his life he preached more than 40,000 sermons. The men who were his associates and successors caught the contagion of his spirit. It was this chiefly that gave them such success as they achieved in the world. Pastors they were not, and, in the ordinary sense of the term, could not be. To this day, the official designation of a Methodist minister is not *pastor*, but *preacher in charge*.

We are sometimes told nowadays that preaching, as a chief means of instructing and moving men, has had its day, and must fall back into a lower place; that in proportion as men become more cultivated they eschew the exciting methods of the pulpit, and prefer the more placid and quiet culture that comes from books; and that the Church ought to re-adjust her plans to suit this alleged fact. All such talk is empty and idle; or, at least, the only truth in it is this: that the general increase of intelligence makes the task of the pulpit one of increasing care and difficulty. Yet the day will never dawn when preaching, in the sense of expounding and enforcing the word of God, will not be the mightiest of all instrumentalities for converting men from sin and building them up in the faith of the gospel. Other things—as, for example, the religious press—may be brought into co-operation with it; but none of them can take its place. There is a power and a vitality in spoken truth that can never be transferred to the printed page. Edward Irving declared

that the pulpit was "the ancient throne of power" in the British realm. To make it such in every realm is the manifest duty of the Christian ministry.

No other accomplishment in a minister can compensate for the lack of preaching ability. It is far more important to be like Apollos, "mighty in the Scriptures," than to be able to manipulate a Church fair, or organize a reading-club, or engineer a "praise service," or shine in literary circles. It is the bounden duty of every one that is called of God to try to be not only a good preacher, but the best possible preacher. The mere desire to appear well before men, to win popular applause, to reach a high place in the Church, is, of course, all wrong; but even this is not much worse than the contemptible laziness which puts on airs of humility, and converts its indifference to duty and its neglect of manifest obligations into a Christian virtue. And, moreover, it is not to glorify ourselves, but to glorify Christ, not to promote our own ends and aims, but to do good to our fellow-men, that we should cultivate to the utmost limit the gift of luminous and orderly thought, and of convincing, impassioned, and moving speech.

Let us hope that the history of the pulpit which is yet to be written will be even more glorious than that which has already gone to record. With such themes as the Bible affords, and such opportunities for unfolding and deelaring them as we now have, we ought to begin a new epoch. The ideal preacher has not yet appeared. Somewhere in the future he will make his advent, and do his

work. The world will hail him when he comes. He will be as full of faith as Abraham, as courageous as Elijah, as lofty as Isaiah, as ardent as Peter, as gentle as John, and as wide-minded as Paul. Learned in all the learning of the schools, but modest as a woman ; trained in the art of oratory, yet simple and unaffected in his utterance as a child ; equipped with all human resources, but relying solely on the power of God ; living himself a life of the loftiest and most stainless piety, and at the same time moved with the tenderest compassion for the faults and the follies of his fellow-men ; an absolute Christian, and a real man ; God's message-bearer, God's prophet—when shall he come ?

THE FAITH OF THE ANTEDILUVIAN PATRIARCHS,

According to the Hebrew Narrative in Genesis.

LECTURE II.

THE faiths presented hereafter will be those which were learned anew under other conditions, or else faiths newborn. There are three. Of the first, Abel furnishes the historical illustration; of the second, Cain and Lamech; of the third, Enoch and Noah.

Fifth Faith.—The just Jehovah God accepts offering only as it mirrors the well-doing of the offerer.

And it came to pass, that Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering unto Jehovah. And Abel, he also brought of the firstlings of the flock and of the fat thereof. And Jehovah had respect unto Abel and to his offering; but unto Cain and his offering he had not respect.

And Cain was very wroth and his countenance fell. And Jehovah said unto him :

“Why art thou wroth,
And why is thy countenance fallen ?
If thou doest well,
Shalt thou not be accepted ?
And if thou doest not well,
Sin lieth at the door.
And for thee shall be his desire,
But thou mayest rule over him.”

Man knew that every offering unto Jehovah must be

choice. Selection must enter into each offering. Hence he chose, if a tiller of the ground, to offer its first fruits; if a keeper of the flock, to offer its firstlings. Man's daily employment should yield his gifts to Jehovah. Man should select from its products offerings for Jehovah. Such are just inferences from the narrative. Yet in this respect man might obey the law of offering, and remain unpossessed of Jehovah's favor. Both Cain and Abel brought to Jehovah the offering which had outward conformity to the law respecting the nature of offering. Nevertheless, "Jehovah looked kindly upon Abel and his offering; but upon Cain and his offering he looked not kindly." In the narrative the person is placed before the offering. Ever is this true. When Jehovah "looks kindly" on a person, the offering of such a person must be acceptable. Also it is a corollary that such a person will conform to law as respects the choice quality of the offering.

"Cain was very wroth." He knew there was a difference in character between him and Abel, also between the way Jehovah regarded his offering and the offering of Abel. This knowledge angered him greatly. Then we are told that Jehovah came to Cain and spoke to him when he was wroth. This is in accordance with the nature of Jehovah. Ever he comes to man with helping words in the time of crisis. Cain was in peril. He cherished a feeling as destructive to human life as that "enmity" which was in the spirit of the serpent. This wrath of Cain, unless laid aside, must result in

murder. His wrath arose because Jehovah "regarded not his offering." This same Jehovah comes lovingly to Cain and reveals the reason for the unacceptableness of himself, and so of his offering. "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?" The question is grounded on a fundamental religious axiom. "Well-doing" makes the doer acceptable to God. The human heart believes this truth. But one answer could be returned. It is, Yes. Faith is ever on the side of well-doing. Actions which are not well done in the sight of Jehovah have sin at their core. "If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door."

The remainder of the words of Jehovah is but the manifestation of his love. "And unto thee is its desire, but thou mayest rule over it." Sin is personified in the passage. The ever-alertness of sin to seize him who opens the door, if at that door sin is lying in wait, becomes portrayed in these words. There is warning as to the fell purpose of sin, yet the words of Jehovah come with promise: "But thou mayest rule over it." Here is a repetition of the Protoevangelium, of the first gospel: "It shall wound thy heel, but thou shalt wound its head." Cain has here a promise that with him was the advantage. He might rule over sin. There was no power in sin to rule over him, unless he so chose.

The second view given of Cain is awful. He becomes the murderer of his brother. This act was the culmination of that wrong-doing which had made his offering unacceptable. The fact of murder is simply stated. No comment is made upon it to enforce its awful character,

The third view has as its background not an unaccepted offering, but a murder. Jehovah again converses with Cain. The question of Jehovah is: "Where is Abel, thy brother?" Here is chance for confession. But the wicked Cain replies: "Am I my brother's keeper?" Contrast this response with the ingenuous confession of both Adam and Eve. Cain's reply is tantamount to a denial of the whereabouts of Abel. Jehovah convicts him by the words: "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth from the ground unto me."

Jehovah again pronounces a curse. The first curse pronounced by Jehovah was upon the serpent. There was no mitigating circumstance to modify the hellish purpose which prompted him to deceive the woman. Hence Jehovah pronounces a curse without mitigation upon him. Adam sinned in that he hearkened, under a motive worthy of respect, to the voice of the woman rather than to the voice of Jehovah. Still he showed in disobedience the evidence of a nobility of spirit, which must have commended him somewhat to Jehovah. Hence no curse was pronounced on him, but on the ground. The third curse was pronounced on Cain. His denial of his deed placed him in the same defiant attitude as that of the serpent. Hence a curse is pronounced on him. The essentially new element in this curse is that Cain should be a fugitive and a wanderer in the earth. It was this new element which forced the heart-despairing cry from Cain. This cry phrased itself in the words: "My punishment is greater than I can bear." The sorrow in this

utterance is deepest. It is expanded by Cain, thus showing he understood its import. He beheld himself a wanderer and a fugitive, and such a one as each would wish to kill; also he would be hidden from the face of Jehovah. Here was punishment above bearing. Shut out from earth, from man, from Jehovah. If Jehovah heard the first cry of the human heart as it was forced out by the consciousness that awful loss had ensued through a deed whose motive power was rooted in the wish to be like God, it is no surprise to learn that Jehovah again hears the cry of the human heart, as it proceeds from Cain when he faces the awful consequence of his wicked deed, although it was due to the wickedness of his evil heart. Jehovah hears the cry of agony which Cain utters. He does not remove the penalty. Complete vengeance was taken on Cain. He must be a wanderer and a fugitive. His deed was such that he could not dwell among men. To murder a man was to place a barrier between the murderer and other men, so that they might not dwell together. But Jehovah did pity Cain. What this murderer mostly feared was the vengeance unto death, which every man would take upon him, and the banishment from God. This thought rendered his punishment greater than he could bear. When Cain realized that his wicked deed made him an object of dread to mankind, made him fit only to be killed, and also thrust him out from Jehovah's presence, he came near drinking the cup of repentance; and when sin makes us conscious of our worthlessness, and leads us to tell it to

Jehovah, we may expect some promise from him. To Cain help came, a promise: "Therefore whoever slayeth Cain vengeance shall be taken on him seven-fold." The sign placed upon him was protection from mankind, and also evidence that Jehovah had shown him mercy.

This Fifth Faith is related to Adam, Eve, and Cain alike, in so far as they were doers of wrong. Punishment was meted out to each. Hence Jehovah declared his justice. Also when repentance was found in each, promise was given to them. Adam and Eve had the promise that they should be superior, stronger than the serpent. Cain, although his evil conduct led him to be unacceptable to Jehovah, yet Jehovah, while declaring that he had done evil and sin was at the door, repeated also the first promise, that Cain might rule over sin. Cain, however, increased in wickedness, which culminated in murder. Jehovah metes out punishment for this wrong-doing; but, when the heart of Cain fails him, and he says: "My punishment is greater than I can bear," then Jehovah gives him promise. Thus early we are taught that a heart-cry unto Jehovah is ever heard, and that the answer is always promise.

Lamech is the second murderer; at least he is the second murderer recorded in revelation. The crime of Cain is given with some detail. Step by step we can trace the approach to the awful deed. But otherwise is it with Lamech. We know not whom he murdered. We know simply that their number was two, that they were a man and a boy. As little also is given us respecting the in-

centive to the crimes as is given us respecting the names of the murdered ones. Revelation seeks not the tragic. It is not concerned with those harrowing details which ever feed a morbid mind or else excite a morbid craving. It is a matter of surprise to learn that this account of Lamech is in poetry. The deed probably was first recorded in a kind of penitential poem. The overburdened conscience utters itself in secret shelter of the home, the agonized husband pours out his penitent lament to his two wives :

“Adah and Zillah,
Hear my voice,
Wives of Lamech,
Give ear to my saying.”

Such are the words of the sorrow-stricken man. The impartation was to be momentous. Household words, names of loving associations, are first employed in the announcement. “Adah and Zillah” were words precious through home-memories to Lamech. Nor can love alone be appealed to in this appeal for listeners. “Wives of Lamech” are added. The duty of wifhood is ever to hearken and not turn away in the critical moments of husbands. Love and duty are addressed with petition in this awful time of sorrow for Lamech. This is all that revelation cares to record. We know not how Adah and Zillah received the words of their husband. Such record would be only the statement of attendant circumstances. The significant fact is that crime produces unrest, and that murder will out. “Adah and Zillah” must

hear Lamech. But it is more than the mere fact of murder that they must hear. The next two lines of this fragment of poetry give us the additional something. Mankind is interested to know it. It is the first uttered confession of the effect of sin upon the sinner. Adam and Eve sinned, but they fled from Jehovah. Cain committed sin, but he faced Jehovah, listened to his sentence, and when he learned the full import of the sentence he broke forth in the despairing cry that his punishment was greater than he could bear. Lamech sinned, and he says to his wives :

“I have slain a man to my wounding,
And a youth to my hurt.”

“Wound” and “hurt” are the fulcrum words of the passage. Crime wounds, crime hurts. Revelation will record this fact. It records all the great ethical truths of human life. Measure the wound, measure the hurt, then estimate the need Lamech had that “Adah and Zillah” should hear. It is as if the greatly troubled heart of the man was laid open for us to behold, and thus warning given to us. But two lines remain. They are :

“If Cain shall be avenged seven-fold,
Truly Lamech seventy and seven fold.”

Cain knew that every one finding him “would slay” him. Much more did Lamech know the same fact, yet the promise of mercy given to Cain was one assured to him ; and he could threaten a vengeance greater on the one slaying him than would be taken upon the slayer of Cain. Such is the assurance of Lamech. Cain and La-

meech are alike in the kind of crime. Both alike bear witness to the fact that Jehovah God punishes crime justly. Both declare that promise is given, where crime and its punishment force out the heart's despairing cry or the heart's confession of the "wound" and the "hurt." Both testify to this Fifth Faith.

Sixth Faith.—Wickedness brings destruction, righteousness saves.

And Jehovah said :

" My spirit does not rule in man,
Forever through their erring he is flesh,
And so his days shall become one hundred and twenty years."

And Jehovah saw that the evil of man was great in the earth, and every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil all his days, and Jehovah repented that he made man in the earth, and it grieved his heart, and Jehovah said :

" I will blot out the man
Whom I have created
From the face of the earth,
Yes, man and beast,
The creeping thing and the bird of heaven,
For I repent that I made them."

And Enoeh walked with The-God,
And he was not, for God took him.

Noah found favor in the sight of Jehovah,
Noah, the righteous man, was perfect in his generations,
Noah walked with The-God.

And Jehovah said to Noah :

" Come thou and all thy house into the ark,
For I have seen thee
Righteous before me in this generation."

Carnality became characteristic of the conduct of the children of The-God. It was then that Jehovah spoke. The inference is fair, from the close connection of these two facts, that The-God and Jehovah were synonyms in these earliest narratives. Other reasons for this assumption will be given later on. The words of Jehovah, "My Spirit does not rule in man," reflect the account of man's creation as given in the second chapter. Man there as flesh was linked to the whole animal creation, but as spirit was like Jehovah. Alone in man, among all created things, might the spirit of Jehovah rule. Yet, in sorrow, Jehovah said: "My Spirit does not rule in man." New discipline must therefore be exercised to better man. The former promises, the former mercies, the former curses upon him for his sin did not hold man in allegiance to Jehovah. One only estimate is given of him. Jehovah says: "He is flesh." Here first appears in revelation that contrast of flesh and spirit, of the carnal and the spiritual, which has had its completest development in the Pauline theology. The right to this definition of man as carnal is given by the word of Jehovah. The new discipline, introduced by Jehovah when man had become flesh, was to shorten the period of human life. "His days shall become one hundred and twenty years." This is the new *regime*. The progress of man then in carnality became the reason for the abridgment of his days.

Another picture still of man's wickedness is drawn in blacker colors. Jehovah saw "that the evil of man was

great in the earth." Man's imagination, his heart, became evil. Jehovah again speaks. His words are :

"I will blot out the man
Whom I have created
From the face of the earth.
Yes, man and beast,
The creeping thing and the bird of heaven,
For I repent that I made them."

Such then was the awful outcome of man's wickedness. Many questions arise while contemplating these words of Jehovah. Yet these we may not suggest now, much less answer. Their great teaching is that Jehovah will not tolerate evil. He will not look upon it with the least degree of allowance. He will destroy evil, all who are evil—yes, all which hath a nature like the evil man : all flesh, man, beast, bird, and creeping thing shall be blotted out. Such is the fruit of man's wickedness.

But Enoch breaks in on this dark picture.

Enoch walked with The-God. And he was not; for God took him.

His companionship was not with men. Peace with him was not attained through sacrifice. By communion he had peace. Beautiful must have been his daily walk. His life was the first temple of The-God. His fellows beheld his worship therein, and handed down to the coming generations his great fame. Enoch was the first who walked with The-God. The loving heart is as much the possession of the Hebrew God as his unlimited power. Adam, Eve, Cain, Lamech—all had experienced his loving

pity and encouragement, when they were repentant in transgression. How then shall Enoch, who walked with The-God, receive signal proof of his love? Simple is the record: "And he was not, for God took him." There is mystery in the words "God took him." It is not to the Hebrew mind identical with the thought of death. The Christian mind has accepted a distinction and has uttered it in the words "Enoch was translated." God's love of Enoch distinguished him by making his departure from life different from other men. He walked with God, he was God's, and God took his own. Such is the first definition of salvation for the good, as found in the Hebrew Scriptures. Material prosperity, temporal good have no place in this first allotment of God to his faithful servant. Enoch first found his life in communion with his Maker. God permitted no man to see that communion broken by death.

Noah is type of a salvation different from that of Enoch. Yet, although the salvation of each is different in mode, the type of character which merits salvation is the same in each case. In these words Noah is described:

Noah found favor in the sight of Jehovah

Noah, the righteous man, was perfect in his generation.

Noah walked with The-God.

These passages teach us first that Jehovah and The-God are names interchangeable in this time as in that of Enoch. Noah, it must be admitted, could find favor alone with that God who received his worship. It is here stated that Noah walked with The-God. He, like

Enoch, communes with The-God. He also finds favor with Jehovah. The inference is then well founded that The-God is also Jehovah.

Another teaching is that the righteous man in the earliest times was he who walked with God. At first the very soul of righteousness was communion with God. Then righteousness was the character wrought in man by communion with God. In a deep sense communion with God is always the heart of righteousness.

The third teaching is, that at this time a man was perfect in his generation only as he was righteous and so had communion with God. The perfection of the Old Testament was then a life of communion with God. Enoch and Noah were the first perfect men according to the Hebrew Scriptures. This essential element of perfection must ever be present in all definitions of perfection, which have their warrant in the sacred Scriptures. A man with perfection of this type has ever favor in the sight of Jehovah. Perfect and righteous are here but different phases of the same work, accomplished in man by communion with God, and so we find these words interchanged in this period.

And Jehovah said to Noah :

“Come thou and all thy house into the Ark.

For I have seen thee

Righteous before me in this generation.”

These words tell the salvation of Noah, which Jehovah accomplished, because Noah was righteous. This salvation extended to his family. Salvation here is simply

rescue. It has no reference to a salvation from the world, achieved through communion with God. It stands in contrast with the salvation which Enoch experienced.

These words also hold in bud all the Hebrew faith, so far as it bears upon the special care of Jehovah over the righteous. The unfolding of this bud gives us the manifold beauty of the Old Testament, so far as it relates to the watchful care of Jehovah over those who commune with him. "Thou and thy house," Noah and his family, the righteous man and those who were most intimately associated with him, these are they whom Jehovah will choose for a new departure in the development of man in righteousness, in communion with him. The message is the word "Come;" ever a word freighted with loving, attractive power when spoken by Jehovah to those that commune with him. The ark is ever a symbol of that salvation from physical dangers which Jehovah vouchsafes to the righteous in time of universal danger. Special deliverances must ever be predicated as possible in this form of religious faith, which cherishes Noah as one of its earliest and brightest lights.

Enoch and Noah walked with Jehovah; they had companionship not with men, but with The-God. The universe held for these two patriarchs more than what the eyes could see, the ears hear, the hands handle, the nose smell, and the tongue taste. These sense-realities all were subsidiary. These two believers declared other realities. They knew another world than that of sense. They therefore communed with Jehovah.

We have studied the Six Faiths which the Hebrew Scriptures record as the first faiths the world knew. The First Faith has two parts. One is that Jehovah God is Creator. Hence the silent stars of the night, innumerable in number, immeasurable in distance, were made by God. The vast waters, swarming with countless forms of life, rising in their rage into resistless, sublime powers, were made by God. The fruitful earth, declaring plan and purpose in every plant, and dazzling the mind with its infinite variety of life, was made by God. Such is the God of the Hebrew Scriptures from the first. Alone he stands in the midst of his works, and their glory declare the incomprehensible majesty of their Creator. The fact of the universe is the basal fact, according to the Hebrews, for belief in God. The unspeakable worthiness of what he hath made manifests the exalted worthfulness of the Maker.

The second part of this first and fundamental faith is that man is the creature likest Jehovah God. Hence beautiful are the reciprocal relations between God and man. All that God hath made become incentives to call forth the activities of man. God calls into life the luxuriant beauty of the flowers. Man cannot produce them alive save from the seed. But he may cut out their shape in stone, and may even give their colors and form on canvas, creating with their aid beautiful independent works of his own. The works of God become hints to man, guides to him in his own personal creative activity. Again, God in blessing becomes an object of man's imita-

tion. The impartiality of God in conferring the necessary gifts on all alike finds in man one who follows his footsteps. The divine law is impartial; so human law is meant to be. Divine government recognizes no distinction in persons; so human government, in theory at least, is designed to be. In many realms the likeness of this creature man to God is clearly manifest. Such is the faith concerning man which the Hebrew Scriptures present. Would we know God? then truly know man. Would we know man? then truly know God. Advance of reliable knowledge in either realm assures advance in the other.

The Second Faith appoints man to his rank in the universe. He alone receives commandment from God. Yet not a commandment which exhibits simply the arbitrary will of the Creator, nor a senseless commandment imposed upon man in order to remind him constantly of his subordination in rank. Not a glance could have been thrown by man at his surroundings but that it would have taught him his place as respects the Creator of all things. The love of God for the creature likest himself necessitated this commandment of obedience. Man's weal or woe depended on the knowledge given in the commandment. The greatest calamity that could befall man was the knowledge of good and evil. Such knowledge God forbid him to obtain. The first law, the law given in Eden, was simply protection against evil.

The Third and Fourth Faiths are witnesses to the fact that it is difficult to dethrone the innocence and goodness

of man whom God made. Beguilement alone was the effective means. Man chose to break the law, that thereby he might become completely like God who made him. Under beguilement man, thinking to choose the method to bring him in closest resemblance to God, in reality chose that path which led him away from God and made him most unlike his Creator. This third faith gives the power in us and the way of its coming, which ever works unlikeness to God. This power is evil. The person influencing man through this power to ways of conduct which produced in him unlikeness to God is Satan.

The Fifth Faith reveals the justice of Jehovah God. In the Hebrew Scriptures the first portrayal of God as just does not present him as concerned only in beholding offenses against himself and punishing the culprit. This side of justice is present, and in its fullest and strictest aspect. But, as just, Jehovah God also looks at the influences leading to the offenses and the feelings of the offenders after the offenses had been committed. Punishment was not mitigated by the ameliorating circumstances, but loving pity was excited thereby. Sorrow for the disaster to which his deed had brought man did not wipe out the disaster, but it did secure promise that in the end the seed of the woman should obtain triumph. Jehovah God's justice is no less conspicuous by the sure sequence of punishment upon man for his transgression than by the equally sure sequence of promise upon the presence of sorrow in the heart of man for his sin and its ruin.

The Sixth Faith respects character, and not acts of man. Wickedness brings destruction, righteousness saves. It is the fullest expression of what might have been deduced from the fourth faith. The essence of righteousness is walking with God. Its effect is to restore man into likeness to him with whom he walks. The end of one of the world-epochs culminates with this fundamental faith. The next departure in the world's best religious development commences with the man whose life was a life of communion with Jehovah God. The brightest light in the firmament of the heart after the flood was the faith that righteous walking with Jehovah God saved. Enoch translated was witness to the reward of a salvation that eye had not seen nor ear heard. Noah was witness to a salvation that the senses might take cognizance of. Both walked with Jehovah God. Both had righteousness. Both were saved.

In most brief compass we have studied the six great earliest faiths of mankind, as revelation imparts them. The antediluvian patriarchs possessed them. They reveal the high estate of man. They tell of his fall. The subsequent darkness becomes illuminated by the light of promise. The inexorable character of evil is proclaimed. It bringeth destruction. The intrinsic worth of righteousness is made known. It is the condition of salvation. Subsequent revelation may unfold the fuller meaning of these six faiths, but it can never abrogate one of them. They stand fixed stars in the firmament of man's religious knowledge. They constitute the greatest im-

port to us of the first chapters of Genesis. They are the granite rock, on which is builded the magnificent Christian temple. Step by step has the staircase been raised, stone after stone has been placed in its mighty walls, throughout the Old Testament. The chief corner-stone in all its beauty and strength was set in its place through the New Testament, while the roof above is the glory of the Lord. Herein we may enter in safety, blending our songs of praise with the unceasing music which thankful burdened human hearts have made since first it was revealed that Jehovah God forgives sin on account of repentance, and saves all who by communion with him possess righteousness.



FUTURE AND ETERNAL PUNISHMENT.

I PROPOSE to discuss in this paper the subject of future and eternal punishment, with especial reference to the rational grounds upon which the Scripture doctrine rests. The argument here given assumes the truth of the Christian Scriptures, and, as a consequence, the doctrine of the immortality of the human soul. From time to time individuals have appeared who have tried to reconcile the doctrine of the annihilation of the souls of the wicked at death with the teachings of the Scriptures, but this cannot be done. If there is any future existence and state of happiness for the good, there is a future existence and state of misery for the wicked. These two doctrines are so presented in Scripture, are so interwoven and contrasted, that to deny the one necessitates the denial of the other, and to affirm the one necessitates the affirmation of the other. Our purpose, therefore, is, assuming the truth of Scripture concerning the immortality of human souls, to show that the future and eternal punishment of the finally impenitent and incorrigibly wicked is not only a reasonable but a necessary feature of the Divine government.

The teachings of Scripture concerning man in his relation to time and eternity may be summed up in the

following proposition: This life is a state of probation, of limited duration, in which man, a free moral agent, is, with full knowledge of the fact, undergoing a trial that is to determine his happiness or misery in that future and eternal life that begins at death. That man's free conduct in this life should fix irrevocably his destiny in the world to come, is the most momentous fact connected with human existence. It invests this life with an infinite importance.

The trial of a free being in a state of probation, issuing in a fixed and eternal state, involves five steps, or stages, that may be indicated by the following words: volitions, acts, habits, character, destiny. Volitions, put forth, result in acts; acts, often repeated, fix habits; habits, long continued in, make character; character, when fixed, determines destiny. Let us consider these things in themselves and in their relations to each other.

Volitions are the expression of our freedom. They are the decisions of our wills acting freely and uncontrolled by any thing outside of themselves. Our moral accountability is based upon the fact that we are free moral agents; and our freedom consists not so much in the fact that we do what we will to do as in the power to control our own wills and to determine our own volitions. A sin lies rather in a volition of the will than in the external act resulting from that volition. Our volitions are just what we make them and just as we make them—holy or unholy, virtuous or vicious. Our moral free agency consists in the conscious possession of the power to do right

or wrong just as we choose. Our volitions, the decisions of our wills, are freer than thought; they are freedom itself. Destiny, on the other hand, is a state or condition irrevocably fixed and eternally unalterable. Yet such is the nature of moral probation and free agency that that which is volition in its origin becomes destiny in its end. Let us see how this comes about.

Volitions make acts. We control our volitions at will, but when volitions have been put into execution and have become acts, they have gone beyond our power of control. We cannot undo an act that is done. Not even the omnipotent God can undo an act that is done or unsay a word that is said, although He may by His omnipotence make the act, so far as its results are concerned, as though it had never been done, and the word as though it had never been said. But while we cannot undo an act that is done, we need not repeat the act unless we choose. If, however, the act be repeated, we find ourselves in the presence of a new law, viz., that each repetition of an act begets a rapidly increasing and powerful tendency toward future repetitions. That is, acts often repeated create habits, something more fixed and powerful than themselves. But still a man may, such is the power of the human will, break his habits, even though they be like chains of iron. But habits long continued in fix something stronger and more unalterable than themselves, namely, character, and no man can change his character. Man may change his habits, but only God can change character. And when character has

been so long continued in that it becomes fixed, it passes into destiny, and not even God ever changes destiny. Indeed we may say that, in keeping with the laws of His moral government, God cannot change destiny.

When does a sinner pass the invisible dead-line that separates alterable character from unalterable destiny? Before death, or only at death? We believe that, while all must pass it at death, some may and do pass it before death. We believe that some sinners become so fixed in their evil character that they reach a point beyond which it is morally certain that they will never and can never be saved—not a point beyond which God cannot and will not save them if they fulfill the conditions of salvation (indeed that point is never reached beyond death or throughout eternity), but a point beyond which their sin-bound wills will never have the moral power to respond to the wooings of divine grace. So Dr. J. A. Alexander sung in his memorable lines:

"There is a time, we know not when,
A place, we know not where,
That seals the destiny of man
For glory or despair."

Nor is this contradicted by the no less familiar lines of Dr. Isaac Watts:

"Life is the time to serve the Lord,
The time t' insure the great reward;
And while the lamp holds out to burn,
The vilest sinner may return."

This is true, so far as God is concerned, and not only true

“while the lamp holds out to burn,” but, as we shall presently show, is true throughout eternity. The sinner never reaches the point, either in this life or in the life to come, where the reason of his not being saved is in God and not in himself; but he does reach a point in the development of his moral character and destiny, beyond which it is morally certain that he will never thereafter repent and believe; and at that point the dividing line may be drawn which distinguishes character that may be changed from character that is fixed in its unalterable destiny. While, in the formation of character, free will and volitions are the cause and character is the result, yet, when character is formed, then it becomes the cause and volitions the result. As a moral free agent, man becomes bad, and attains to evil character, only because he freely chooses and freely does that which is wrong; but evil character, when once formed, in turn accounts for and produces necessarily evil volitions and evil acts. A man becomes bad because of his evil volitions, but a bad man puts forth evil volitions because he is bad. So that while it is true in the formation of character under moral probation that free volitions make acts, and acts make habits, and habits make character, and character makes destiny; yet when destiny is reached the reverse relation exists, viz., that destiny fixes character, and character determines the habits, the acts, and the volitions of the moral agent. Hence it is that probation comes at length to an end by its own laws, and good character is made permanent and is secured in goodness

forever, and vicious character is made permanent and is secured in evil forever.

That there has been a change in the way the Scripture doctrine of future and eternal punishment is presented by the Christian Church, may be freely admitted. Many passages that were once interpreted literally are now interpreted figuratively. "Devouring fire," "everlasting burnings," "unquenchable fire," "lake of fire burning with brimstone," "where their worm dieth not and their fire is not quenched," "weeping and gnashing of teeth," "chains of darkness," "bottomless pit," "smoke of torment"—the time was when these passages may have been presented so literally that a ground was laid for intelligent and reasonable criticism of the Scripture doctrine. But, although these passages are purely figurative, they set forth a stern and awful reality. The reality of a place of punishment for the wicked is taught by language not only figurative, but the most literal. There may be no literal "fire and brimstone" and no literal "worm that dieth not" in the abode of the lost; but there is nevertheless a real fire there that is not quenched and a real worm that dieth not. The guilty conscience of the lost is a worm that dieth not, a fire that is not quenched.

Suppose there be no positive pain inflicted upon the souls of the lost and their only torment be such as grows out of their own character and their necessary environments, would this rob future punishment of its most awful attributes? Nay, it would not affect in the least

the awfulness of the condition of the lost. The next to the worst penalty attached to human crime and known to human law involves the infliction of no positive pain, viz., imprisonment for life in the penitentiary. Indeed we would infinitely prefer to be innocent, and the victims of constant and painful disease, and be outside of the prison, than to be the healthiest persons on the face of the earth, and hopelessly confined for our guilt within penitentiary walls. This shows plainly that sin, with its attendant evils and terrible consequences, is far more awful than mere physical pain. It is a very low and vulgar idea of punishment that makes it synonymous with the suffering of physical pain externally inflicted. If the future punishment of the wicked be nothing more than the remorse of a guilty conscience and hopeless self-confinement in the penitentiary of the lost, it has in it every element of horror that can appeal to a rational soul.

Nor does God need to build the walls of this penitentiary of the lost. It is character that makes hell, not God. It is character that puts a man in hell and keeps him there, not God. That death shall forever separate the good from the bad, the holy from the unholy, is everywhere taught in Scripture, but the ground and cause of discrimination and separation is in human character and not in the will of God. At death those who believe in and love God will go to their own place; and those who do not believe in and love Him will go to their place. The lost are the outcasts of this world. A wicked man could be made no happier by being admitted into

the presence of the pure and holy God—it is more probable that his misery would thereby be increased. A sinner cannot endure the presence of God. Does the vicious and confirmed criminal in this world seek out and enjoy the companionship of the holy and saintly man of God, and find his happiness therein? or does he rather avoid such company? Would it increase the happiness of a lost soul, confirmed in evil character, to be admitted into the presence of God to spend eternity? Nay, it would add to his torment. For aught we know, then, hell is a less miserable place to lost souls than heaven would be, for heaven is the place where that holy God is whose awful presence sinners cannot endure.

Too many teachers of Christian truth have encouraged the idea that God makes hell, that God determines its torments by an act of his will, and that these pains and torments are externally inflicted by God. It is not so. Sin, a guilty conscience, evil character—these are the things which make hell. People this earth with saints, with those whose characters are pure and holy, and you make a heaven of it. People it with the incorrigibly wicked, those whose characters are vicious and criminal, and you make a hell, a pandemonium, of it. It is not the place that makes hell, it is the people there, it is the wicked character of those who are there. The future punishment of the sinner, therefore, does not mean confinement in a certain place of misery from which if he could escape he would be happy, but it means a state of misery inseparable from his wicked character, which misery

would not be diminished but rather increased if the sinner were in the immediate presence of God and the holy saints and angels. The vulgar idea of heaven and hell is, that the one is a place of happiness and the other a place of torment—and that if perchance a sinner should get into heaven he would be happy, and that if a saint should get into hell, he would be miserable—in short that it is the place and not character that determines future weal and woe. We affirm, on the other hand, that it is character that makes heaven and character that makes hell. Holiness—the holy God, holy saints, holy angels—these make heaven. Sin—Satan, evil angels, guilty sinners—these make hell. The sinner's misery is determined by his guilty character, and is inseparable from it. He can no more escape from his misery by changing his place than he can escape from himself and his sinful character by changing his place.

There is throughout God's creation the reign of universal law. God governs the universe in all its departments according to certain fixed and uniform laws. This universe may be subdivided into the material or physical, the mental or intellectual, and the moral or spiritual. That the material universe is governed by or according to law is universally recognized. Men understand that if they violate these laws they suffer the consequences. They understand, moreover, that the sin of a moment may be followed by an unending penalty. If a man foolishly or thoughtlessly puts his limb under the wheel of the coming locomotive, it is but a moment until his

limb is gone and he is lame for life. He does not blame the author of nature and its laws because the violation of law is here followed by penalty, or because the sin of a moment may be followed by a life-long penalty. He recognizes that he is responsible for what he suffers. And so, too, the mental or intellectual world is governed according to certain laws that are well defined and easily discoverable, and all systems of education are designed to develop the human mind in accordance with these laws. Here, also, the violation of law is inevitably followed by its penalty. Nor does he who violates the laws of mind say that it is God punishing him when he suffers the consequences of his own violation of law.

In like manner the moral or spiritual world is governed uniformly by certain fixed and unalterable laws. These laws are plainly revealed, well defined, and easily discoverable. If we violate these laws we must here as elsewhere suffer the consequences and pay the penalty. Not always do we suffer the full consequences of violated moral law at once—the infliction of penalty in part or in whole may be reserved to a future state. “Because sentence against an evil work is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil.” But while men who violate the laws of the material world and the laws of mind, and then suffer the inevitable consequences of violated law, do not say that it is God that is punishing them, but recognize the fact that they are virtually punishing themselves; yet, strangely enough, when they come to suffer the conse-

quences of violated moral law, they speak as if it was God that was punishing them, as if their punishment was now taken from without the realm of uniform and inevitable law and made to depend entirely upon the arbitrary will of God. It is not so; but the moral world is under the reign of universal law in identically the same sense as are the material and mental worlds, and the future and eternal punishment of the wicked is as infallibly determined by the laws of moral character and of the moral world, as are the penalties that follow the violation of law in the world of mind or the world of matter. Every man is his own punisher.

Among the laws that are to be found alike in the physical, the intellectual, and the moral world is one of sowing and reaping. And the law of sowing and reaping is this: (1) that we reap what we sow, and (2) we reap more than we sow. As certain as he who sows wheat reaps wheat, or who sows thorns and briars reaps the same—as certain as he whose mind in youth is rightly trained and filled with pure and ennobling thoughts will reap the fruit thereof in mature and later life, or if poisoned with corrupting thoughts and vicious influences must reap the terrible and vicious harvest thereof—just so certain is it in the moral and spiritual world that whatsoever a man soweth in this life, that shall he also reap in the life to come; “he that soweth to the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption; he that soweth to the Spirit shall of the Spirit reap life everlasting.” And as the physical and mental harvest is, or may be, a hundred-

fold greater than the sowing, so it will be in perfect keeping with God's universal law if the harvest in eternity shall be far greater than the sowing in time. This life is the seed time; eternity is the harvest. The sinner in eternity will reap nothing but the fruit of his own sowing here. He makes his own character and fixes his own destiny, and reaps his own sowing.

The ground of the sinner's punishment, therefore, should not be made to rest upon the arbitrary will of God, but rather upon his own willful violation of moral law, by virtue of which he becomes his own punisher, reaping only what he has sown. The time was when God was not only represented as Himself punishing the sinner, but this punishment was represented as if it were vindictive—as if God were punishing sinners simply or chiefly because they were His enemies and He was angry with them and now had them in His power. Such a presentation of the character of the Divine Being could but excite repulsion in rational minds. The punishment of the sinner is in no sense vindictive, but it is retributive and vindicatory. It is only such as moral government demands and such as is necessary to maintain moral law and to uphold the authority of God, the moral Governor of the universe. Punishment is vindictive when it is inflicted as a matter of personal revenge; it is vindicatory when it is inflicted by a Governor in the interests of law and government, and such alone is God's punishment of the sinners.

But it is objected that eternal punishment is too severe a penalty for the sins of this short life. To this we re-

ply, first, that eternity, the time-element, is not an attribute of punishment but of the life of the person punished. If a man is placed in the penitentiary for life, and lives but ten minutes, he has paid the penalty in full; if he lives a year, ten years, fifty years, a hundred years, indeed forever, he does nothing more than pay the penalty—that is, the time-element is not, strictly speaking, an attribute of punishment but of life. Nor is this a distinction without a difference. For if it be said that it amounts to the same thing in the end, we reply that it is nowhere said in the Bible that the sins of this short life merit an eternity of punishment. It may be true for aught we know, but if it is, the Scriptures do not affirm it—that temporal sinning deserves eternal punishment. Continued sin is the ground of continued punishment; eternal sin and eternal sinning are alone the ground of eternal punishment. The sinner is punished eternally not because the sins of this short life merit an eternity of punishment, but because he is an immortal being and continues to be a sinner and to sin eternally.

But, it may be replied, although it be admitted that a sinner's punishment is eternal only because he remains eternally a sinner, yet it amounts to the same thing in the end, seeing that his being a sinner throughout this short life virtually necessitates his being a sinner forever, since it will be impossible for him ever to change his character after life's probation has ended. To meet this objection we must ask and answer this question: Is it reconcilable with infinite justice to make the *eternal* des-

tiny of an *immortal* soul to depend upon a *limited* probation? It is, we reply, if the conditions of the probation are favorable, and if the destiny is determined by character and proportioned to guilt. If there is to be any such thing as creaturely holiness in God's universe, there must be a moral probation; and if there is to be any moral probation at all, it must (1) be limited, (2) must involve the possibility of sinning, (3) must have two final issues, and (4) must be confirmed by rewards and punishments. A probation that should issue in another probation would be no probation at all. To make holiness possible necessitates making sin possible—to make sin impossible would be to make holiness impossible. If holiness has no reward and sin no punishment, there can be no incentive to righteousness. The only holiness possible without a moral probation would be a necessitated holiness, a holiness divinely produced by the power of God without the co-operation of the moral free agent; and such holiness as this could have no moral virtue in it. All creatures would then be necessarily holy. This would turn men into mere machines, would make divine government to be merely manipulating moral machines, and this would be to rob God's moral universe of its chief glory, of all that dignifies and ennobles it. Probationary holiness is the only holiness that can really glorify God; and this cannot be developed except under conditions that involve the possibility of sinning, the rewarding of holiness, and the punishing of guilt.

But surely the Divine glory cannot be promoted

by any thing that involves injustice to the creature. Are the conditions surrounding human probation, then, favorable to a happy issue? Are they such as render it easily possible for every one to do right and to be saved who desires to do so? We answer, Yes. Such was the probation of Adam, and such also is the probation of fallen men; for, though fallen men are by nature possessed of a bias to sin, yet this bias to evil is so counterbalanced by the effects of the atonement that it makes their probation just as favorable to a happy issue as the original probation of Adam, which, while it was without original sin, was yet also without those special motives and helpful influences that come from the atonement of Christ. So that a fallen man has altogether just as favorable conditions and just as fair opportunities for salvation as the unfallen Adam had.

But this objection, that eternal punishment is too severe a penalty, is based on a false conception of sin and a false view of the ground of punishment. It is based on the idea that sinful acts are the whole of sin and sinful character is nothing—on the idea that the sinner who is undergoing punishment is, apart from so many actual sins recorded against him, a perfectly pure and holy being. It is based on the supposition that the sinner is sent to the abode of the lost wholly because he has committed so many actual sins, and in no sense because he is a sinner. But we will see that this is an entirely erroneous view of sin. An illustration will best serve to show what is meant.

Not long since a convict in a neighboring State who had served a term of years in the penitentiary for stealing some money, upon being discharged, went openly and digged up his stolen treasure. He made no secret of the fact that it was the money for the stealing of which he had been imprisoned. The owner came and claimed the money. The convict refused to give it up, saying he had paid the penalty for his theft and it was his money. Whose money was it? Why plainly the property of the man from whom it had been stolen. But, be this as it may, one thing is certain—that convict was as guilty a sinner, and as much a thief at heart, the day he came out of the penitentiary as he was the day he went in. The serving of penalty in itself alone does not take away guilt; it does not even touch it. The convict in question spent three years in the penitentiary and came out as guilty in character as he went in. Had he remained there ten years, or fifty, or a hundred—or forever, so far as that matter may be—it would have been the same way. The enduring of punishment and the serving of penalty leaves a criminal as guilty in person and character as it found him. Had the paying of penalty wiped out the stain and guilt of sin from this criminal's character, it would have left him an honest man, and he would in that case have voluntarily restored the money that was not his own. Instead, however, of its leaving him an honest man, his character had rather been increasing in sin and criminality while he was paying the penalty of his act of theft, and he came out a worse man than he went in.

If such a discharged convict does not repeat his former act of theft it will be because no opportunity to do so presents itself, or because he is afraid of punishment, and not because he is not a thief at heart and a criminal in character.

This whole objection, therefore, against the Scripture doctrine of future punishment in view of its duration, is based on the idea that a limited amount of punishment such as would be the proper penalty for certain sins, would leave the individual no longer a sinner but sinless and holy in character. And this grows out of a superficial and erroneous view of sin, viz., that sin is a voluntary and actual transgression and never has any other meaning—that actual sin is the whole of sin. We say, nay, it is not the half of sin. Acts of sin are one thing—they may be numbered and recorded against a man. But an act of sin, voluntarily committed, does not end in itself, but leaves behind it guilt, or personal criminality, that inheres to the character of the wrong-doer. Repeated acts of sin leave behind them the *habitus* of sin. This creates sinful character. Sin is not simply an act, it is an attribute of character. Acts of sin there are which must be taken into account and dealt with; but there is also the guilt of sin, the *habitus*, the power, the dominion of sin, sinful character—these are the features of sin that make the punishment of sinners to be something more than merely dealing with actual sins. Acts of sin are one thing, and sinful character is another, and a far more serious result, or feature, of sin. Human law deals

with man chiefly as an actual transgressor—it deals with acts of sin more than with sinful character. But when we remember that all criminals who have served a penalty for crime under law are forever thereafter disfranchised and denied recognition as citizens, we see that in an important sense even human law says that there is sinful character back of sinful acts and that when the sinful act has been punished sinful character remains—and it virtually makes the punishment of sinful or criminal character life-long, which is, so far as human law is concerned, eternal. Divine law and government in the same way, and for a stronger reason, must deal not simply with acts of sin, but with sinful character. It punishes not sins merely, but the sinner. Nor does this mean that we are separating sin from sinful acts, as if there could be sinful character without antecedent sinful acts. We have already shown how sinful character grows out of antecedent sinful acts and volitions.

Is it said, therefore, that ten, fifty, a hundred years of existence in the abode of the lost, is sufficient punishment for the sins of this short life? Sufficient in what sense? we ask. Sufficient to atone for the sins committed? Sufficient to pay the price of the crimes, as the convict thought he had justly paid for his stolen money? Sufficient to wipe out the stains of sin, thus leaving those just discharged sinless and holy in character? If serving penalty and enduring punishment has this effect, then they will be ready for heaven at once, and no obstacle would be in the way of God's transporting to

heaven at once these discharged convicts of hell whose entire sanctification had been accomplished so effectually by purgatorial fires, though in this fair world of moral probation they lived and died confirmed sinners! If, however, serving penalty does not touch moral character, but leaves the criminal at the end of any period, long or short, as guilty and sinful in character as when he died and went to the abode of the lost—if this be the case, what is to be done with such a one when he has “served his time” out among the lost? He cannot be carried to heaven, because he is as much a sinner as he ever was.

If now he was sent to hell because he was a sinner, and possessed a sinful character, and not simply and only because he had committed so many specific acts of sin, then there is the same reason for his continuing there that there was for his going there in the first instance; because, as we have seen, he is as guilty in character, if not more confirmed in guilt, at the end of any given period than he was when he first entered the abode of the lost. If this life is a probation, and the future and eternal life its final issue, then, if there is any reason for a lost soul being sent to perdition, there is the same reason that he should continue there as long as his existence shall last. I know it has been affirmed by teachers of Christian doctrine that so exceedingly sinful is any and all sin against an infinitely holy God that it merits an infinite punishment, and for this reason the punishment of sin is eternal. But I do not find this given in the Holy Scriptures as the reason of the eternity of future

punishment. Hence I do not believe it the proper way to meet the objection to the Scripture doctrine now under consideration. The sinner at death goes to the abode of the lost, because he is a sinner and because his sinful character properly places him there. He is an immortal being. His punishment is eternal because, probation being over, he remains, and must remain, eternally a sinner. When and how and by what means could he cease to become a sinner? Can he by any possible means become a saint in perdition? If so, God will not only do nothing to keep him from it, but will take him out of there and transport him to heaven the very moment he becomes free from sin and holy in character—and that regardless of whether he has “served his time out” or not. But how absurd and preposterous the idea! And yet the position of him who argues against the future and eternal punishment of the wicked, necessarily involves this very absurdity if it be clearly analyzed.

If sin, therefore, be nothing but an act of transgression and not also an attribute of character, and if the serving of penalty discharges the sinner entirely from his debt of sin and leaves him sinless and holy, then I say they are right who affirm that it is unjust to punish a sinner eternally for the sins of this short life—he should in justice be punished only to the extent of the demerit or ill desert of his sin and then discharged—and being then sinless (and that means holy) he should be sent to heaven where all holy beings are and properly belong. But if, on the other hand, sin be not simply an act but

also an attribute of character, and if moral government must deal not merely with punishing sins but with guilty sinners as subjects—and if the serving of a limited penalty leaves sinners just as guilty as they were when their penalty began—then the Scripture doctrine must be right so far as human reason can pronounce on its justness, and the sinner's punishment must be co-extensive with his continued existence as a sinner.

Again we remark that the very existence of moral government demands the future and eternal punishment of the wicked. There can be neither a moral Governor nor moral government unless sin be punished. There are five things that necessarily stand or fall together—viz., a governor, government, laws, punishment for the violation of law, and adequate punishment for violated law. There can be no governor without a government, and no government without laws, and laws mean nothing unless their violation be punished, and punishment fails unless it is adequate. Punishment is said to be adequate when it secures the maintenance of law and government, and this is the chief object had in view by legislative bodies in affixing penalties to crime. If punishment be found to be inadequate, its severity is increased. Supreme wisdom would attach such a penalty to each violation of law, no greater and no less, as is at once perfectly adequate and infallibly just. No punishment, in order to be adequate, needs to be unjustly severe; but unless it be adequate, government cannot exist. Suppose the penalty attached to murder, theft, and arson, were a day's im-

prisonment, or a fine of a few cents, it would be inadequate, and government would be turned into anarchy.

There are those who treat the subject of the future and eternal punishment of the wicked as if it might be modified to any degree or entirely abolished by the arbitrary will of God, if he so chose, without thereby affecting in the least the nature and security of moral government. It is not so; for punishment, if inadequate, utterly fails of its end, and if there is no punishment there can be no law, and if no law, then no government, and if no government, then no governor and no God. God's very existence as a moral Governor, therefore, depends not only upon the existence of moral laws, but also upon the adequate punishment of all violated moral law. For the same reason there could exist no moral government, with its rewards for the good, unless there should be punishment of the wicked. So far then from the future punishment of the wicked being a thing that could be modified or obliterated by the arbitrary will of God, we see that the existence of God as a Governor, and the existence of moral government with its heaven for the good and holy, necessarily involves the punishment of the wicked.

The real design of punishment in the organization of government, both human and divine, is the prevention of crime, and not primarily the punishing of it. The prison is one institution in the economy of government which serves its highest end when it has no one in it, or rather when no one is found worthy to go in it. But a

probationary system which should have no punishment for sin in it would be far less favorable to the production of holiness than one that should have future punishment in it. Indeed a probationary system devoid of all punishment for sin would be utterly powerless to prevent sin and to secure righteousness. If, then, under moral probation as it now exists, involving the future and eternal punishment of the wicked, so many are found who fail to do right and to become holy, what would be the effect on the development of holy character in the race, to abolish punishment entirely from the moral system, or even materially to modify it? Would it not be to make sinners of all men? Such would be the unfailing tendency, if not the inevitable result. We see then that not only is punishment absolutely necessary to the existence of all government, but both the design and the result of punishment in the economy of moral government is to produce the minimum of sin and the maximum of holiness.

We have said that punishment, in order to be adequate, need never be, and will never be, unjustly severe. We go further and affirm that the future punishment of the wicked will be *absolutely just*. No lost soul, from the most wicked to the least wicked, will be punished one iota more than it justly deserves. Our faith in the absolute justice of God is as great as our faith in his existence. If God be not absolutely just, I have no God at all—there is no God. I can more easily be an atheist than I can believe God to be unjust. I would sooner be-

lieve the whole Christian Church to be in error in its interpretation of the Bible concerning this and all other doctrines, than to think that God could be unjust—than to think it possible for Him to punish, or to allow to be punished, one single soul more than it justly deserved. Does any man, therefore, pronouncing the Church doctrine concerning future punishment unjust, say that he is willing to meet the issues of eternity and receive his just rewards for the deeds done in this life, I say to him unhesitatingly he may be assured that he is going to receive in the future life no greater punishment than is absolutely just. But I also say to him: “Be not deceived, God is not mocked ; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap.” Suppose such a one, with a view to the future life, were to begin to shape his character and conduct here so that by receiving his just deserts at the judgment day his future lot would be a happy one—he proposing to demand justice, not mercy or grace—what would his life here be ? Would it not be very much what the Bible defines a Christian life to be ? We say it would have to be not only this, but even more unblamable and holy, as no Christian hopes to get to heaven on the ground of justice but only through the great grace and mercy of God. And what does this fact signify ? Why, plainly that this argument of the unregenerate world, directed against the doctrine of future punishment, is presented not in the interest of holy living in this life or of justice in the life to come, nor yet to rescue the true doctrine from the misrepresentations of a false theology, but

rather in the interests of a life of sin, to furnish some pretext and ground for indulging the carnal appetites, and to ease a guilty conscience, by making it to appear that the whole doctrine is unjust and therefore without foundation. It is simply this and nothing more. But still we meet the charge that the future and eternal punishment of the wicked is unjust, by saying that if it is, God will certainly not inflict it; for nothing that is unjust in any degree can possibly occur in his administration.

But who is to determine what is just and what is unjust in the matter of punishment? The sinner? or the theologian? Neither. But God. Absolute justice is surely located somewhere—and at the judgment day there will be no disagreement about what is just. Sinners and theologians will alike then see light in God's light. The sinner will then, stripped of all selfish reasons for a warped and biased judgment, pronounce just whatever God says is just, and when his soul is sent to hell, his own judgment, as well as God's righteous law, will approve it well; and the theologian, if he finds that he has erred in interpreting God's revealed will, will rejoice in any mitigation of the sinner's doom. But there is not the slightest probability that the Christian Church universal is wrong in its interpretation of the Bible, and the sinner who spends his time and energy criticising the doctrine of eternal punishment, rather than in trying to live so that he may inherit eternal life, and in trying to do what he ought to do whether there is any hereafter or not, is certainly guilty of a folly that hard-

ly justifies his appealing to reason and justice in all things.

Again, we believe the doctrine of the future punishment of the wicked has been subjected to needless criticism in that, as sometimes presented, all the lost are made to be punished alike and to be equally miserable. If hell be a place whose torment and misery comes from simply being there, and not from a guilty conscience and from evil character, then it follows that all who are consigned to the abode of the lost are equally miserable—the youth who dies impenitent six months after he reaches an age of moral accountability, and the sinner who lives for threescore and ten years and has a thousand opportunities to repent, but rejects them all and dies hardened and impenitent, one of the worst of criminals. But if this view of hell be erroneous—if the true doctrine be that the miseries and torments of the lost grow out of their guilt and not simply out of their being in the abode of the lost, and that the misery of each soul is exactly proportioned to its guilt—then there will be as many degrees in misery represented among the lost as there will be degrees in sin and guilt. This life is the seed-time of which eternity is the harvest, and every lost sinner will simply reap in the future life the fruit of his own sowing in this life.

But it is said that justice demands that the lost should have a second probation. Let us consider this matter. Suppose our allotted threescore years and ten be divided into seven successive decades, or periods of ten years

each. The first ten years, let us say, is the period of irresponsible childhood. The remaining sixty years, instead of constituting one long probation, may be divided into six successive probations of ten years each. This is perfectly legitimate. Now let us see how moral free agents stand these successive probations, the last of which brings them to their end. Antecedently we would say that during the first probation, from ten to twenty, few if any will repent, because the pleasures of sin are fascinating and death is very far off; during the second probation, from twenty to thirty years of age, a few of the wise and prudent will make their calling and election sure by repentance and faith; during the third, from thirty to forty years of age, a goodly number will seek salvation; during the fourth, a still larger number; during the fifth, from fifty to sixty, a yet larger number; and during the sixth and last, from sixty to seventy, every remaining soul that believes in moral probation and in a future life, would without fail make sure of his salvation, knowing that his probation would now end. This is the way we would think antecedently that human nature and moral free agents would act under such circumstances. But do we find that the facts confirm this? By no means. They rather confirm the opposite. From one-half to two-thirds of all those who are saved, are saved during the first probation, from ten to twenty, the period during which we would naturally think very few would be saved. From one-half to two-thirds of the remainder of the saved, are saved between twenty and

thirty ; and from one-half to two-thirds of the remainder from thirty to forty. From forty to fifty years of age, it is rare for men to profess faith in Christ ; from fifty to sixty, during the fifth probation, not one in a hundred is ever saved ; and from sixty to seventy, the last probation, the period during which we had a right to think that every sane moral free agent who believed in a future life and was unsaved, would most surely repent and believe, not one in a thousand is ever saved ! Statistics will corroborate these facts.

Now suppose we grant another period of ten years for a seventh probation, from seventy to eighty, how many additional ones think you would be saved ? Not one in ten thousand. But suppose we place this last probation beyond the grave, will it change the result ? Not at all, even though God should himself impose no impediment in the way of the sinner's repentance. God may justly, however, and will, give no positive and supernatural aid in that future probation, His special supernatural influences being limited to this life. But if in this life where the Holy Spirit was wooing, and ministers were preaching and friends were pleading and Christians were praying—*influences without which no man would ever be saved even in this world*—if in this life with all these aids to repentance the sinner remained impenitent to the last, is it not perfectly gratuitous to suppose that such a one would repent and be saved in the other world even if probation continued there. For, remember, there could be no churches there, no Bible there, no pleading preach-

ers and praying friends there, no wooing Spirit there—simply continued probation, with its further opportunity to repent and be saved.

But, some one perchance interposes and says, after a sinner has tasted the pains and torments of the lost, then he will certainly, if another probation be allowed, repent and be saved. So indeed we would reason. And on exactly the same grounds we would say that a man who has once served a term in the penitentiary would of all men be certain so to live in the future that he would never get there again. But here again, as a matter of fact, human nature does not do as we would antecedently suppose, but quite the opposite. Facts prove that if a man has once served a term in the penitentiary the chances are about two out of three that he will get back there if he has a chance to repeat his crime or commit a new one. A larger proportion of ex-convicts are arrested for crime than of any other class in society. That is, serving a penalty for crime not only does not make one a good man, but it rather seems to confirm in vicious character, and certain it is that it does not prepare one to stand successfully any future moral probation.

We say therefore that even if God should grant the lost a second probation, it would not change the result, because: (1) The tendency of human nature under probation is, as we have seen, to embrace first and early opportunities for salvation, and to reject later probations; (2) the environments of the lost, the absence of all those special influences towards salvation without which no

one is saved in this world, would render a second probation of no avail; (3) experience in enduring punishment and serving penalty for crime seems rather to unfit than to fit a man for standing successfully a future probation—seems to have a tendency to confirm in crime rather than to remove or diminish guilt.

Having now shown that a future probation could not possibly change the sinner's doom, we are ready to say that we not only believe in the doctrine of a second probation, but *we believe in an eternal probation, so far as God is concerned*—that is, God is going to do nothing to keep a lost sinner from becoming a good and holy being. It is to be feared that preachers have too often opposed this doctrine of a future probation in such a manner as to make it appear that God arbitrarily, by an act of his sovereign will, makes human probation to end at death, and that, but for this, sinners might repent and become holy in perdition—in other words, that it is God who is keeping sinners in their guilt, and that but for the fact that He forbids their further probation they might all become holy. How absurd is such an idea, and how utterly incapable of defense is such a view of the doctrine of future punishment! We repeat that so far as God is concerned probation lasts forever, in that He is not going to forbid, or do any thing to prevent, a lost sinner from becoming holy. As a matter of fact the sinner's destiny is fixed and irretrievable beyond the grave; but it makes a vast difference, so far as Christian truth is concerned, whether we place the cause of his continuance in sin and

in the abode of the lost, in the sovereign will of God or in the sinner's own guilty nature and sinful character. The reason why a lost sinner will not and cannot become holy is in himself, in his own sinful character, and not in the will of God. And we may not only say that God is going to do nothing to keep a lost sinner from becoming holy, but if he should by any chance become holy (which is the most gratuitous of suppositions) God will take him out of the abode of the lost. Indeed, if our doctrine be true, he will not need to be taken out by sovereign power; he will come out himself, for there is nothing but guilt and sin that retains him there, and if these be gone, he can no longer remain among the guilty, but will seek his proper place among sinless and holy beings. It is sin, and nothing but sin, that makes hell, that puts a man in hell, and keeps him in hell.

We therefore conclude that "as the tree falls, so it must forever lie." And not only so, but "as the tree leans, so it will fall"—whether it be high or low, whether it be great or small, it is all the same—as it leans, so it will fall. Immortal being, who may chance to read these lines, which way are you *leaning* to-day?

THE INVENTION OF MATERIAL FOR PREACHING.

SOME years ago a prominent teacher of elocution and gesture was giving a course of lessons in one of our colleges, and had awakened much enthusiasm among the students. One of them who had mastered the system, and that of gesticulation in particular, and had acquired marked grace in action, on one occasion, while practicing the new and fascinating art, was encountered by a fellow-student, and said: "Wouldn't I make a splendid orator, McTyeiro, if I only had something to say?" This same want of something to say is the only thing in the way of many a man's becoming an excellent preacher. But alas! this want is fundamental and fatal. There is nothing that can substitute the lack of something to say. On the other hand, if a man has abundance of matter, that makes atonement for many faults and supplies many defects of other kinds. Some rough and ready rustic of an Englishman, with greater shrewdness of insight than beauty of expression, embodied this thought in a sententious bit of advice to a young preacher when he said: "Get chock full of your subject, knock out the bung, and let nature caper." That great and quaint preacher, Mr. Spurgeon, turned this harsh and homely saying to good account as the text of a quaint and curious but excellent

lecture to his students. And what is here meant is usually true. When a man really has something to say, the saying it will somehow take care of itself. The how is important, but the what is indispensable; and yet, though indispensable, it is a far higher and more difficult thing. Of making books on homiletics there is no end, and the chief end of those that are made is really not to teach men how to preach, but to put them in the way of inventing suitable and effective matter for preaching.* It is this power of invention, this fecundity of thought that far more than any thing else distinguishes preachers from each other, and determines the character and success of a man's ministry. Moreover, it determines whether preaching shall be a dull and intolerable task, as it is to some men, or the highest and freest and gladdest privilege and exercise in the world, as it is to others. The man is not to be envied who is too conscientious or too weak to give up the ministry, and yet too lazy or too busy to furnish his mind with great and abundant thought for preaching.

In this lecture we shall consider first the process, and secondly the condition of invention, thirdly helps to invention, and lastly the Bible as a source of material.

I. The process of invention in general. And though our terms may not be used with technical exactness, it

* "Invention, strictly speaking, expands itself over the whole field of rhetoric. The same faculty is applied to every thing. It is the whole talent, it is the whole art." (Vinet, "Homiletics," p. 49.)

is sufficient if the meaning be made clear. If we examine the works of those who have been considered original thinkers, discoverers, producers, we shall find that they have presented us with views of the relations of things. In some instances these views are true and new; in some they are true and not new; and in some they are new and not true. The relations that have been discovered so far by men may be reduced to a fairly definite classification, and grouped under a few general heads. The law that makes this classification and grouping possible, and at the same time determines it, is that general and familiar one known as the association of ideas. And this we shall find to be the basis of the invention of thought. If, for example, the process be the analysis of a subject or term, this is simply the resolution of a whole into its parts, and the discovery and statement of the various relations of these. So that when the mind proposes to itself the analysis of any term or subject, the idea of the whole will suggest the parts of which it is composed, and this is in accordance with a recognized law of the association of ideas, or rather is an instance of that law. Again, great originality is often displayed in the grouping of facts in nature, or events in history, or truths in morals. This is an example of the operation of the associative faculty according to another well-known law that things that are in any respect similar suggest each other in the mind or occur to the mind in connection. This law is the ground of classification in nature, in morals,

among men, and likewise of exemplification, which is an effective form of thought and feature of style. It is in accordance with this principle also that there occur to the mind those similarities which are the ground of similes, metaphors, parables, and of illustration in general, which makes up or ought to make up a large part of the material of preaching. The opposite relation of contrast or contrariety is the ground of that fine and effective form of expression called antithesis, which is so large and striking a feature in the thought and style of the great orators, secular and sacred, and especially of Paul and Augustine and Chrysostom. If the process be narration, whether of external events or mental experiences, this consists of the observation and statement of these events and experiences in their consecutive or chronological order and depends upon the law of succession in time; while if it be description, this is according to the law of contiguity in space; or lastly, if the process be that of reasoning, this is putting the mind upon the task of observing or inquiring the relation of cause and effect, as, for example, what is the cause of any given fact, phenomenon, or event; or what is *probably* the cause of it; or, on the other hand, what is the effect of any given cause or what is likely to *be* the effect of it; or yet again, what is the *design* or so-called *final* cause of any given act, procedure, institution; or, in the last place, what conclusion may be involved in any known position or general principle. But all preaching consists of *analysis*, which includes definition and

explanation ; or of *reasoning* in one form or another ; or of new *groupings* of facts or events according to the principle of similarity or contrast ; or of *illustration*, which depends on the principle of similarity ; or of *narration* or *description*.

The process of invention (in preaching), then, is either reproducing what is already in the mind in (new) groupings according to the order and relations suggested by the few and well-known laws governing the association of ideas ; or it is advancing from what is already known to those hitherto unapprehended truths which are related to the known according to the laws of the association of ideas, and which form the complement, so to speak, of truths already known ; as the apprehension of an unknown cause from a known effect, or of a more or less probable effect from a known cause, or of a new conclusion from a known premise. In each of these processes the imagination has a necessary part ; in the first the part of composition or putting together in new groupings things which are already known to the mind ; in the last it has the much higher function of advancing beyond the jumping-off place of the known, and carrying its possessor over into the possession of truth hitherto unperceived, unknown, unthought of. Sometimes this process is so short and swift that it is no longer recognized as reasoning, but is called *intuition* or *inspiration*, and distinguishes its achiever as a man of *genius*.

II. Now when no effort is made to control the succession of ideas in the mind they do not always or gen-

erally relate to one subject even, but follow each other often by very slight links of connection, and sometimes in very capricious and grotesque order. But it is possible by a continuous effort of the will to hold the mind upon one subject and even upon a single aspect of any given subject till all irrelevant thoughts cease to intrude, and the succession of thoughts, thus confined to one subject, no longer proceeds by slight and capricious connections, but according to truth and the real relations of the subject.

Moreover, when by this effort of the will the mind is withdrawn from other subjects, and the succession of irrelevant ideas is excluded, then we are surprised and delighted to find that relevant thoughts abundantly multiply, and the mind becomes wonderfully productive. As we say, the mind gets full of the subject, and relevant and just thoughts suggest themselves with surprising facility and rapidity. The condition of invention, then, is close and continuous attention, and we may change the old proverb a little and say in this connection that attention is the mother of invention.

We experience this same thought-productiveness when our attention, instead of being directed by an effort of the will, is involuntarily drawn to and fixed upon any subject by the inherent attractiveness of the subject itself. It is perfectly wonderful, for example, how productive his mind becomes when "in the spring a young man's fancy lightly turns to thoughts of" — some interesting friend, and he daily throws off page after page

of the most relevant matter without exhausting the source or diminishing the supply. This explains also how it is that when we are deeply *interested* in any subject we find it easy to talk about it. It is because we fix our attention upon it closely and continuously, or rather because it attracts and fixes our attention upon itself.

Sometimes the attention is semi-voluntary, as in the case of the preacher who has let the week pass by without preparing his sermon, but on Saturday night finds necessity is upon him. And now the thoughts that would not come when he did not fix his attention on his subject do come when he is forced to do so. And thoughts come to men when engaged in the act of preaching, and a delightful quickening of the mind is experienced, due no doubt to the intense fixing of the attention upon the subject. Often this mental fructification and thought-production continue after the sermon is over, and sometimes in a heightened degree. What preacher has not sometimes in his life sat up on Sunday night to write down the good thoughts that did not come to him while preaching? One of the greatest speakers of the English Parliament said he always lost two nights' sleep over every important speech he had made—the night before in thinking of what he was going to say, and the night after in thinking of the good things he might have said.

Though the production of thought in these cases seems to be automatic and involuntary, it is not so. For it is due to the continued momentum of the mental energy

which was in the first instance set in motion and directed to the subject in hand by the determined and vigorous concentration of the attention upon it. If, then, in every case the condition of thought-production is close and continuous attention, and if attention is subject to the will or may be made so by persistent and patient effort and practice, it follows that any of us who are endowed with ordinary powers may become thought-producers. And to this agree the words of the philosophers. One of the greatest of them does not hesitate to declare that the power of fixing and holding the attention upon any given subject determines more than any thing else the differences among men in respect to intellectual ability. The passage is so exceptionally good that I am sure I shall be excused for quoting it at length:

All commencement is difficult; and this is more especially true of intellectual effort. When we turn our views for the first time on any given object, a hundred other things still retain possession of our thoughts. Even when a resolute determination or the attraction of a new object has smoothed the way, still the mind is continually perplexed by the glimmer of intrusive and distracting thoughts which prevent it from placing that which should exclusively occupy its view in the full clearness of an undivided light. Helvetius justly observes that the very feeblest intellect is capable of comprehending the inference of one mathematical position from another and even of making such an inference itself. . . . The most difficult and complicate demonstrations in the works of a Newton or a Laplace are all made up of such immediate inferences. They are like houses composed of single bricks. No greater exertion of intellect is required to make a thousand such inferences than is requisite to make one,

as the effort of laying a single brick is the maximum of any individual effort in the construction of a house. Thus the difference between an ordinary mind and the mind of a Newton consists principally in this, that the one is capable of the application of a more *continuous attention* than the other, that a Newton is able to connect inference with inference in one long series toward a determinate end, while the other is soon obliged to break off or let fall the thread which he had begun to spin. This is, in fact, what Sir Isaac, with equal shrewdness and modesty, himself admitted. To one who complimented him on his genius he replied that if he had made any discoveries, it was owing more to *patient attention* than to any other talent. . . . If what Alcibiades in the Symposium of Plato narrates of Socrates be true, the father of Greek philosophy must have possessed this faculty of continuous attention in the highest degree. According to this report, in a military expedition which Socrates made along with Alcibiades, the philosopher was seen by the Athenian army to stand for a whole day and a night until the breaking of the second morning, motionless, with a fixed gaze—thus showing that he was uninterruptedly engrossed with the consideration of a single subject. “And thus,” says Alcibiades, “Socrates is ever wont to do when his mind is occupied with inquiries in which there are difficulties to be overcome. He then never interrupts his meditation, he forgets to eat and drink and sleep (among the last things, by the way, that many preachers forget to do)—every thing, in short, until his inquiry has reached its termination, or at least until he has seen some light in it.” In this account of Alcibiades there may be some exaggeration, but still the truth of the principle is undeniable.

Like Newton, Descartes arrogated nothing to the superiority of his mind. What he accomplished more than other men, that he attributed to the superiority of his *method*. And Bacon in like manner eulogizes his method—in that it places all men *with equal*

attention upon a level and leaves little or nothing to the prerogatives of genius. Nay, genius itself has been analyzed by the shrewdest observers into a higher capacity of attention. "Genius," says Helvetius, "is nothing but a continued attention" (*une attention suivie*). I have dwelt at greater length upon the practical bearings of attention, not only because *this principle constitutes the better half of all intellectual power*, but because it is of consequence that you should be fully aware of the incalculable importance of acquiring, by early and continued exercise, the habit of attention.*

III. If attention thus bears so vital a relation to the production of thought, it is important to know if the power of attention may be cultivated, and how. It has already been said, and it is true, that when one is interested, attention is not difficult. But it is otherwise, when one is not interested. In what way, then, may the power of attention be subjected to the control of the will? Perhaps few men have succeeded in accomplishing perfectly this difficult task. We read amusing accounts of the methods which some great men have adopted for assisting concentration. That great German thinker and preacher, Schleiermacher, in order to facilitate mental application used to lean out of a window for hours together, or in general to assume some constrained posture.† Daniel Webster could compose his best while engaged in fishing. Whether he got the hint from Walton, "the angling optimist whose pleasant thoughts were intuitions

* Sir William Hamilton, "Metaphysics," Ed. Bowen, pp. 171-174.

† Compare Broadus, "Preparation and Delivery of Sermons," p. 408.

that came to him while engaged in his favorite pastime," I do not know. Milton thought out much of his "Paradise Lost" while lying awake in bed at night. Addison used to pace up and down the long hall at Holland House while composing. Burns composed often while walking or riding, and wrote it down afterward. Wordsworth used to compose aloud while walking in the woods and fields. Balzac used to lock himself up for weeks at a time, and then come forth into the world with a new book. Kant, in order to preserve his mental energy and clearness, took for breakfast only a cup of tea and a pipe of tobacco, on which he worked for eight hours. He dined at one, and ate no supper, that he might work till late at night. Lord Jeffrey engaged in conversation to stimulate his mind for writing a new article. I have read or heard that Macaulay never wrote without the immediate stimulus of reading. Sainte-Beuve never spoke about any character or doctrine that he had not bottomed, as far as he was able; and before beginning actual composition his mind had been disciplined into a state of the most complete readiness like the fingers of a musician.*

These examples show that close mental application never ceased to be difficult for these great writers. And this fact, so far from being a discouraging one, should really have the opposite effect by inducing us to consent to admit that the mental effort involved in thought and

* See "The Intellectual Life," by Haimerton, a very pleasant book, and Harper's *Young People* for October 23, 1888.

thought-production is difficult. If we could forever rid ourselves of the false and fatal impression that preaching is easy, we should then be willing to give ourselves to labor, to toil, to agony, if need be, in order to preach well. And to be willing to toil and suffer for it is already half the battle. When we come to know the lives of great preachers we find they were great toilers. Take the case of two of opposite types: Frederick W. Robertson, of England, and an eminent but not scholarly Baptist minister in the United States. The former in one of his letters incidentally gives an account of his method of composing. He says: "I should say that the word *ex tempore* does not exactly describe the way I preach. I first make copious notes. Then I draw out a form. Afterward I write the thoughts copiously into a connected whole, sometimes twice or thrice, in order to disentangle them. Then I make a syllabus, and lastly a skeleton." It is no wonder he was a great preacher. The Baptist minister, whose preaching is described as uniformly powerful, when asked by one who had heard him, what his method of preparation was, replied: "After having prepared my sermon in my study to the best of my ability, by thought and prayer, I go over it from five to twenty times while walking or riding alone in the woods, in order to change it, reconstruct it, add to it, and fix it in my mind." It is no wonder he was a great preacher. Those who think Bishop Pierce preached without labor will find they are mistaken if they will read page 96 of his "Life" by George G. Smith.

“Preaching made easy” is a delusion and a snare—that is, good preaching made easy. The power of directing and holding the attention is not of easy acquisition. Let this be received and *believed* at the outset, and the way is open to success; otherwise not.

In general, the most effective means of cultivating the capacity of attention is to subject one’s self to a long and severe training under a clear-headed, painstaking, critical, exacting teacher.* When this is impracticable, the next best thing is the close study and thorough mastery of books that are difficult enough to require close application,† but not so difficult as to baffle and discourage the student. Howbeit, you had better read five books with your understanding than ten thousand books without your understanding. F. W. Robertson said to a friend that he could count the religious books he had read on the fingers of his hands; but he had made them his own, and they had passed into his being like the iron atoms of the blood. But in these days of multiplied methods it is not necessary for an earnest, ambitious young man to study without a teacher. If he cannot have a teacher in person, he may have one by correspondence. There are such teachers and such schools, though these can never supply the place of the living teacher. It would be a good thing if the young preachers who are

* Vinet says: “The most reliable means of invention is a truly philosophical culture.” (“Homiletics,” p. 53.)

† Sir W. Hamilton’s “Metaphysics” (Bowen) is strong in thought and beautifully clear in style.

pursuing our Conference Course of Study could recite to their examiners regularly by correspondence and receive from them direction and correction and instruction, instead of studying all through the year without guidance or help and then trying to go through five or six great subjects at Conference in two days. This method would require some labor and self-denial on the part of the examiners, but would result in personal advantage to themselves sufficient to compensate for it all, besides the satisfaction of helping their younger brethren.

In the next place *practice* invention. Select a subject or text and set yourself to compose an essay or a sermon, and when you start at it *stick to it* in all moods and tenses and weathers, if it takes all summer—and all winter. Make a promise, enter into an engagement, put yourself under obligation to write—to write a paper for a Christian Endeavor Society, or a literary club, or an article for a newspaper or review. Promise an article to be furnished at a certain definite time, an article that you know will be seen or heard by those who will appreciate it, if it is good, or criticise it, if it is not. Lay a necessity upon yourself, and do it again and again.

As a special help at the time for awakening interest in the subject and so fixing the attention upon it in order to promote invention, I would put among the first, conversation with some intelligent and thoughtful friend or friends of inquiring and independent habits of mind. Some of the clearest and most satisfactory views I have gotten of the Scriptures have been those brought out in

free and earnest conversation with my students in the University classes and with another friend who is a help-meet in all the affairs of life. These, in many instances, I am free to say, have, by their questions, objections, suggestions, given quite as much help as they have received, and possibly more. There is perhaps nothing in the world that so rouses the mind and gives it such a productive and delightful activity as free conversation with well-informed or inquiring persons of quick, incisive intellect and independent habits of thinking. Other things being equal, no debating society is comparable to it. Conversation not only imparts this delightful mental glow of healthful activity, it likewise gives definiteness and reality to views already half-possessed and urges the mind forth to the grasp of views entirely new. It will be quite as well or better if you will hold your conversations with friends who are known to differ with you in their views of the subject in hand, or at least who are not afraid to differ with you.

In the next place comes reading, the object of which is not that you may gather together what others have said about the subject—far from it—but that you may get *interested* in it, and so facilitate the application of your mind to it. And here again, as the design is to awaken your mind and stimulate your thought, it is better to read those authors who are known to have original and independent views, and views that differ from the traditional. We all need to be jostled out of the ruts. Among preachers, Horace Bushnell and F. W. Robertson are

original, vigorous, stimulating, suggestive. In exegesis, with the exception of Meyer, whose works are too difficult for the English reader, Lightfoot stands easily at the head. But you will find it very hard not to agree with him. His comments are on the Greek text, but a well-trained, wide-awake English reader can follow them, for the most part. Try one volume (that on Philippians), and you will want more. The advantage of reading will be greatly heightened if, before reading, the subject be as thoroughly studied as there is time and capacity for. Another special help to invention is to have a definite object in every sermon, to know just what that object is, and to aim at it throughout. John Foster thinks this one of the secrets of Robert Hall's power. Some one has called it the power behind the throne.

But before all and in the midst of all and above all, yet never to be separated from them, the chief and highest preparation for and aid to invention is prayer.

By these means conscientiously and persistently applied, one may cultivate the power of attention to an indefinite degree. As acquired virtues are the finest, acquired powers are the best, and a man who is singularly deficient in a certain respect may bestow such persevering effort in that direction as to surpass others in that very thing. So that often one's weakness becomes one's strength. Demosthenes was by nature less fitted than any of his contemporaries for the stormy arena of Athenian oratory, but the realization of his unfitness impelled him to an industry which enabled him to outstrip them all.

IV. But before the process of thought can be applied, material must be gathered in great abundance. The sources of materials are many, but we can consider here only one, that divine-human and myriad-sided book, the Bible.

A man of sound and profound training, in easy command of the contents of the Book, would make a great preacher if he confined himself to the materials furnished there. The Bible is as great and wonderful as the world, and more so. It is as high as the stars, and higher. It is as deep as the seas, and deeper. It is as manifold and multitudinous and as minute as nature. It is as various and complex as man, and more so. It exhausts man and brings into view beings higher and beings lower than man. It is as high and difficult as God; it is as simple as a little child. It is broader than all literature; it stretches farther than all history; it is higher than all philosophy. As we must study nature with various interpreters so must we the Bible. When we look upon the face of nature in a general way, we get a general impression of its wonderfulness, but no definite appreciation of its endless variegatedness, its minute and delicate beauties, its complete and perfect order. To understand these we must study trees and flowers with the specialist in botany, the structure and classification of the rocks with the specialist in geology, the mysteries of light and sound and motion with the specialist in physics, the wonders of water from the dew-drop to the glacier with the specialist in physical geography, the number and path-

ways of the stars with the specialist in astronomy. And yet these are not the highest high-priests of nature's mysteries. It is the province of the poet to lead us into nature's holy of holies and interpret for us her higher meanings. So that while we study nature with Dana and Gray and Agassiz and Tyndall and the scientists, we enter into her higher courts with Wordsworth and Tennyson and Ruskin and Browning and Shakespeare. And so it is necessary to study the Bible. We shall find the largest advantage if we study it minutely and microscopically with the scientific specialist in exact grammatical and historical exegesis, as Lightfoot, Ellicott, Westcott, Godet, Meyer, Delitzsch, Pusey; with the specialists in doctrinal and systematic statement, as Pope, Martensen, Luthardt, and Summers; and at the same time study it prayerfully and profoundly under the guidance of the Holy Spirit and of men who have risen to the higher and broader spiritual meaning of the sacred Word, as John Wesley, Fletcher, Payson, Spurgeon, and Moody.

Combining these three methods of studying the Bible, we shall find it is a store-house of materials. If we have an easy familiarity with the contents of the Bible, its facts, its history, its poetry, its laws, its characters, its examples, its doctrines, its system, we shall find that upon condition of close and patient study of any given text or subject, the other parts that are relevant or in any way vitally associated with the matter in hand, will, in accordance with the law discussed in the first part of this paper, come filing in and offer themselves for service.

All preaching should be expository. Our standard of preaching ought to be no longer the oration, but the exposition. Even if it be a subject-sermon, the definitions, the analysis, and largely the argument, will be drawn from the Bible, and much of the illustration as well. Much more is this true of text-sermons and expository sermons, technically so called. If this be true, the man who has large command of the contents of the Bible will be amply furnished for his great work—"All Scripture is given that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto every good word."

But some one asks: "How can a man be fresh and original, if he only expounds the Bible?" In the first place, he may have original views of Scripture. "But isn't the proper interpretation of Scripture for the most part already discovered, agreed upon, and settled?" No. The Scriptures bearing upon great doctrinal points are fairly agreed upon, but of particular passages *this is not at all true*. Indeed, so far as most people are concerned, an *exact* interpretation of almost any scripture passage will be new and in most cases surprising and delightful. A strictly *contextual* interpretation of most passages would also be fresh and entertaining to most people. So inexact and vague is the knowledge of the Scriptures on the part of most people that it is safe to say a true interpretation will, as a rule, be a new interpretation. The thing, then, is to find out by close study the interpretation that is exactly true.

In the second place, one may attain a decided origi-

nality by putting the materials of the Scripture in new groupings. Green had no new materials, and yet he has made a fresh and original History of the English People. Goodwin had no new materials, but by a grouping of his own he made a new and most excellent Greek Grammar. Pope had no new materials, and yet he has made a work on Systematic Theology that is original and new, a wonderfully entertaining book. This originality is due partly to his exact interpretation of Scripture and partly to his new grouping of passages and of doctrines.

In the third place, presenting old truth as felt and seen by *you* will be *new* truth. Some men see what others have said about the truth, and some see the truth itself. They who see the truth itself, see it apart from any form which it may have taken before, and seeing it apart from and without any form of expression, they give it a form of their own, and an old truth in a new form will strike as new. The forms which many truths have in the Bible itself have become so familiar that they have ceased to strike or impress. Take these truths into your mind and heart, realize them in their naked reality, and then clothe them in a form of your own, and you will be an original preacher. Personality in preaching will impart originality to preaching. Truth and personality are the two elements of preaching, and if a man is to avoid "dealing in the wretched traffic of unfelt truth" he must realize the truth for himself.

CHRISTIANITY AND ART.

The Iconoclastic Controversy.

IN the Christian Church of the first century there was unquestionably a strong feeling of dislike for all the forms of fine art. This feeling was partly an inheritance from Judaism, which utterly lacked the artistic spirit, and was partly derived from an exaggerated interpretation of such passages of the New Testament as John iv. 24: "God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth." Other facts also may help to account for it. In the first place, art had been for many ages the obedient servant of heathenism, and had found one of its chief employments in the building, furnishing, and decorating of heathen temples. So complete, in fact, was the alliance between the two that it was easy to confound the one with the other. This alone would have been sufficient to raise an unfriendly suspicion. "The religious consciousness easily took an opposite direction to the æsthetic principle in the ancient world, and the holy disdained the beautiful form which had been allied to the unholy." Then, too, the great majority of the early Christians were a simple-minded and uneducated people, so entirely engrossed with the hard tasks of daily life as to have little time or opportunity for the cultivation of their æsthetic faculties; and there was, moreover, an al-

most universal expectation among them of the speedy return of Christ to destroy all the vain works of man and to burn up the solid globe itself. We may easily infer what must have been the feelings of the multitude of less intelligent Christians, if we consider the state of mind with which so liberal a man as St. Paul looked upon the magnificence of Athens. Instead of being moved to wonder and admiration by its vast display of beauty, "his spirit was stirred in him, when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry." The countless products of human genius that met his eye stood to him simply as the embodiments of a dominant and aggressive idolatry —of an idolatry which sanctioned and aggravated instead of rebuking and relieving the inherent and awful depravity of human nature. What could he do under such circumstances but utter words of indignant protest?

But manifestly this state of things could not be permanent. "The same law of Christian development," says Neander, "which required that the abrupt opposition to the world characterizing its first period should give place to the Christian appropriation of the world is to be applied also to the relation of Christianity to art." The ultimate design of our holy religion is not to withdraw itself in cynical contempt from the ordinary walks of human life, but to penetrate and sanctify them all by its presence. "All things are yours," writes St. Paul himself to the Corinthians. In this declaration there is wrapped up a general truth, the full significance of which

has not yet been apprehended. All things belong to the Christian man in such sense that he may use them all for the broadening and deepening of his intellectual and moral being. Nothing is to be refused if it can be received with thanksgiving and enjoyed with moderation. Literature, science, art—all the good and true and beautiful things that our brother men have thought and said and done—are a part of our inheritance as the children of God. For prudential reasons and as a temporary expediency, it may sometimes be best that we should abstain from the use of this inheritance; but there is no sufficient reason why we should be permanently excluded from its oeeupaney.

As might have been expected, it came to pass when Christianity had spread itself widely among the Greeks, who were of all the people that ever lived upon the earth the most artistic, that there was a gradual but radieal change in the temper with which objects of art were viewed—a change which did not stop within reasonable and scriptural boundaries, but went to the last limit of superstitious folly. “After the middle or close of the second century,” says Dr. Schaff, “we find the rude beginnings of Christian art in the form of significant symbols in the private and social life of the Christians and afterward in public worship.” Among the commonest of these symbols was the *monogram* of the name of Christ made by an intertwining of the letters *X* and *P*. Very often the letter *X* ended in an anchor, and the letter *P* was encompassed by the letters *α* and *ω*. We also meet with

figures of a ship, of a dove, of an anchor, of a fisherman, of a crown, of a palm-tree, of a lamb, of a cock (in allusion to John xviii. 27), and of a phenix (as a symbol of the resurrection). “By and by these *symbols* led to the use of *types*. Old Testament histories were now depicted. From that it required only another step to delineate New Testament events.” “Among the rich and noble men and women in the Byzantine Empire Christianity was affected even in the mode of dress. When it was the fashion for men and women of rank to wear garments on which the whole representation of a chase was embroidered in gold and silver threads, they who made pretension to piety, on the other hand, chose the representation of the marriage-feast at Cana, of the blind man restored to sight, of the man sick of the palsy who took up his bed and walked, of the woman with the issue of blood, of the Magdalene who embraccd the feet of Jesus, of the resurrection of Lazarus. Bedizened with such figures, they supposed that their dress must be well approved in the sight of God.” (Neander’s “Church History,” Vol. II., p. 324.)

It was not until the close of the third century, however, that artistic representations of holy things, which had hitherto been confined to private houses and the catacombs, were carried into the churches. Even then it was not done without much and violent opposition. The Spanish Council of Elvira, which met in the year 306, and which had so far declined from the purity of apostolic doctrine as to demand a celibate clergy, nevertheless

showed some vivid apprehensions of religious truth by prohibiting pictures of any sort in the churches, for fear the "objects of veneration and worship should be painted on the walls." But this prohibition did little good. The custom was already beginning to be a general one. It fell in with the current beliefs of the age, and was powerfully re-enforced by the excessive reverence which had long been felt for the names and memories of the saints. The popular religion was in fact already half paganized by the incorporation of alien principles and practices. By the close of the fourth century nearly every one who built a church wished it to be set out "with all the embellishments of art and with the rich ornament of pictures."

But we must not suppose that all those who acceded to such arrangements were image-worshipers in the coarse and gross sense of the term. Among the ignorant and the thoughtless many no doubt went even to this extreme, utterly failing to apprehend the fine and airy distinctions between images as instruments of devotion and as objects of worship. But with many others the case was different. By them the images were prized simply as remembrances of the glorified, or as memorials of great transactions in the history of the Church. Even as late as the beginning of the seventh century we find Gregory the Great, the last of the four great doctors of the Latin Church, entering a caution against possible abuses. A famous hermit had sent to him for images of Christ and some of the saints. The request was granted,

but with an accompanying letter which, while it praised the pious wish for these holy symbols, warned the hermit against setting too much store by them. "I am well aware," wrote Gregory, "that thou desirest not the image of the Saviour that thou mayest worship it as God, but to enkindle in thee the love of him whose image thou wouldest see. Neither do we prostrate ourselves before the image as before a deity, but we adore him whom the symbol represents to our memory as born, as suffering, or as seated on the throne; and, according to the representations, the correspondent feelings of joyful elevation or of painful sympathy are excited in our breasts."

By the eighth century such conservative views as these, though they still lingered in the West, and especially in the Gallican Church, had almost entirely gone out of fashion in the Eastern empire. Milman says ("Latin Christianity," Book IV., Chap. 7): "Image-worship in the mass of the people, of the whole monkhood at this time, was undeniably the worship of the actual, material, present image rather than that of the remote, formless, or spiritual power of which it was the emblem or the representative. The whole tendency of popular belief was to localize, to embody in the material thing the supernatural or divine power." It is difficult for us who live in the nineteenth century to believe the actual facts in regard to the extent to which at that time the abuse had gone. Images were used as godparents in preference to living men and women. A part of the coloring-matter with which they had been painted was scratched

off and mixed with the sacramental wine to enhance the efficiency of that life-giving fluid. The bread of the Lord's Supper was likewise laid upon their holy hands before being distributed to the faithful. Unnumbered stories of the miracles which they had wrought were circulated and believed.

In the year 716 the Emperor Leo III., called the Isaurian from the place of his birth, ascended the throne of the Byzantine Empire. He was of the humblest origin, and had pushed his way to eminence solely by his unquestioned abilities as a soldier. Soon after his ascension he gained a complete victory over the Saracens, who for the second time had invested Constantinople. So far-reaching were the results of this victory as to postpone for seven centuries the Mohammedan supremacy in South-eastern Europe. Some ten years later, in the year 726, Leo began a crusade against image-worship —a crusade which was carried on with varying success for more than one hundred years, and whose remote consequences were of the most important character. What were the exact motives that prompted him it is at this distance of time hard to tell. His enemies are his only historians, and we are obliged by every consideration of fairness to receive with a large discount what they may say concerning him. Whether he had a genuine appreciation of spiritual religion and sincerely believed that the existing forms of worship were no better than idolatry, or whether he was anxious so far to modify the prevailing principles and practices of the Christians as to

take away the chief hinderances to the successful proselyting of the Mohammedans from the faith of the prophet, or whether some yet lower consideration constrained him, it is not possible for us to determine. This much at least, however, may be affirmed, that his policy was the product of no mere spasmotic impulse, but rather of a fixed and definite purpose.

In the outset Leo proceeded with some caution, not at once commanding the destruction of the images, but simply prohibiting their worship, and especially requiring them to be placed higher up on the walls of the churches, where they could not be kissed by the superstitious multitudes. In 730, goaded by the opposition which these tentative measures had encountered, he issued a second edict of much greater severity, decreeing the entire removal of images from every church, and requiring them to be destroyed. This raised a terrible storm. The populace of Constantinople became furious, and when an imperial officer undertook to throw down a much revered image of Christ that stood over one of the city gates a mob of pious women jerked the ladder from under his feet and beat him to death with clubs. So great indeed was the hatred that Leo incurred by what was regarded as his sacrilegious conduct that a formidable rebellion broke out in Greece and in the islands of the *Ægean* Sea, and a certain Cosmos was set up as a rival emperor. It did not take Leo long to put down this rebellion, nor did he hesitate to make an example of its chief leaders by cutting off their heads. There were other antago-

nists not so easily handled. First among these we may reckon Germanus, the venerable Bishop of Constantinople, now in his ninety-fifth year. In spite of his great age he withstood all the blandishments and all the threats of the emperor, and remained steadfast in the possession of his beliefs and courageous in the expression of them. He was finally deposed from his bishopric, and his secretary, Anastasius—a contemptible creature of whom we shall hear more by and by—was put into his place. Ranged with Germanus was Gregory II., the Bishop of Rome, who, though likewise a subject of the emperor, was too far removed to feel the pressure of his authority. This prelate, one of the narrowest and most bigoted of his class, wrote to Leo two most arrogant and insolent letters, lecturing him as if he had been the merest schoolboy, and defying him to show any sign of resentment. In the far East, John of Damascus, a subject and officer of the Sultan, but at the same time the most eminent living theologian of the Greek Church, followed the example of Gregory and Germanus; and in three formal orations exhausted all the arguments, great and small, that could be adduced in favor of image-worship. To these great names must be added, with the rarest exceptions, the whole fraternity of monks, and, in the beginning of the controversy, the immense majority of the higher and the lower clergy. The army, on the other hand, indorsed and sustained the policy of their beloved commander. As time went on an increasing number of bishops, led by various motives, took the same course.

The most prominent of these were Constantine, Bishop of Nacolia in Phrygia, and Theodosius, Bishop of Ephesus.

For twelve years Leo labored to root out the great superstition from his dominions. That he was only partially successful is shown by the fact that when he died the image-worshipers rose *en masse* and essayed to place Artabasdos on the throne instead of Constantine IV., the son and rightful heir of Leo. But this attempt ended in failure.

Constantine (nicknamed Copronymus by his monkish enemies because he was said to have defiled the font at his baptism) inherited both his father's military genius and his iconoclastic temper. In 744 he became absolute master of the empire. To follow the winding course of affairs during his reign is beyond my space. Let it be sufficient to say that he convened in 754 what aspired to be the Seventh Ecumenical Council of the Church, for the purpose of securing a deliberate and formal judgment on the matters at issue. This body, which met in the city of Constantinople, was composed of three hundred and forty-eight bishops, the most of whom were of recent appointment and pliable to the authority that had elevated them. The Bishop of Rome sent no representative; nor did the Bishops of Jerusalem, Antioch, and Alexandria. As they were under the rule of the Saracens, they could not have done so even if they had wished. Anastasius, who as we have before said had succeeded Germanus in the See of Constantinople, was now in the

deepest disgrace. Having become, for the sake of unmerited promotion, the obedient slave of Leo, he had afterward abjured the cause of his patron, and had taken a conspicuous part in the rebellion of Artabasdos. In accordance with the customs of the times, a terrible penalty was inflicted upon him. By the order of his most Christian sovereign his eyes were put out; he was then placed upon an ass with his face to the tail, and led in this ridiculous posture through the most public streets of the city. As therefore neither one of the five great patriarchs was present, either in person or by his delegates, it fell to the lot of Theodosius of Ephesus to preside. Of an assembly so constituted only one thing could be expected—that it would reach a conclusion in harmony with the opinions of the emperor; and so it did, winding up its sessions, moreover, with the usual ecclesiastical anathemas against all who dared to differ from it.

At this point it may be well enough to give a brief but formal statement of the principal arguments used by the opposing parties in the controversy. The Iconoclasts, as the adherents of the emperor were called, appealed primarily to the prohibition contained in the second of the ten commandments. They also adduced the saying of Paul: "Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now know we him no more." They asserted that image-worship had not been known in the apostolic Church, and that it had been condemned by the early Fathers. They alleged that it involved almost all the heresies of every sort that had been condemned by the

six General Councils. "If the painters," said they, "only represented the humanity of Christ, they were Nestorians; if they attempted to mingle it with the divinity, they were Eutychians, circumscribing the Infinite and confounding the two substances. It was impiety to represent Christ without his divinity, Arianism to despoil him of his godhead." Not even with such strong statements as these were the Iconoclasts satisfied. They even went so far as to proscribe the art of painting itself, calling it an impious art, and forbidding its cultivation.

To all this the image-worshippers gave quick and angry response. The second commandment, so they insisted, was aimed only at the idolatrous images of the heathen. That Moses did not proscribe all images was evident from the fact that even the tabernacle contained the golden cherubim, and that Bezaleel and Aholiab had been inspired to design curiously-wrought figures for its curtains. The partial vision of God to Moses was pressed into service to support the same view. It was further argued that since Christ had actually appeared in the flesh it could not be wrong to represent him in that guise. Nay, it was affirmed that he himself had sent one of his pictures to Abgarus, King of Edessa, and that a statue of him had been set up at Pancas in Palestine by the woman whom he had cured of the issue of blood. To crown all this, marvelous stories were solemnly told of the miracles that had been wrought by the numerous images of the saints throughout the Christian world. The picture of St. Euphemia at Chrysopolis in Pisidia

had been known, so the legend ran, to distill a healing balsam from its right hand, though it was reluctantly admitted that the phenomenon had ceased to be visible.

We have already alluded to the fact that the monks were solidly in favor of image-worship. It is hard to overestimate the influence of such an ignorant and fanatical band of men when they are once thoroughly aroused. With unanimous voice they now refused to submit to the decrees of the Constantinopolitan Council. Chief among them was a certain Stephen, who had his residence in a rocky grotto on the Bythinian sea-shore. Drawn by that subtle instinct which recognizes the qualities of leadership, great companies of monks flocked to him for encouragement and counsel, and were inspired by him to continue the most vigorous resistance. Constantine sought by all possible means, but to no purpose, to conciliate his good-will and to purchase his silence. An imperial officer of high rank, with a substantial present of figs, dates, and other fruits, was sent to reason with him. He not only remained deaf to the officer's appeal, but also refused to receive the present, saying that he could take nothing from the hands of a heretic. At a later date he was brought into the presence of the emperor himself. Even there his proud and stubborn spirit displayed itself. Taking a coin from under his robe, he said: "Of what penalty shall I be thought worthy if I trample under foot the image of the emperor which is stamped upon this piece of money? Judge, then, how much greater punishment I should deserve if I were to

despise the image of Christ." Suiting the action to the word, he threw down the coin, and contemptuously trod upon it. That this dramatic scene was followed by nothing more serious than his imprisonment is one of the surprises of the time. We should naturally have expected him to be put to death. "The monks unanimously persisted in their opposition to the Iconoclasts. Violence became a necessity, and the most cruel tortures were employed. Such as refused to subscribe the decrees of the Council were publicly scourged without mercy, were deprived of their noses, ears, or hands, or had their eyes bored out. Three hundred and forty-two monks, collected together from different districts and thrown together into one prison in Constantinople, were tortured in this manner." The opprobrious terms which they used concerning the emperor, characterizing him as a renegade from the faith, afforded at least some pretext for this treatment. It was not their religious opinions solely nor chiefly, but their disloyalty, to which these severe measures were meted out.

At the end of his reign of thirty years Constantine thought that he had put an end to image-worship; and, as far as outward appearances were concerned, his judgment seemed to be confirmed by the facts. But another turn was now to come. Leo IV., surnamed Chazarus, succeeded his father in the year 775. His wife Irene, an Athenian lady, was of an image-worshiping family, but on the occasion of her marriage she had sworn to give up the practice. To describe her as one of the most odi-

ous characters in history is to put the matter very mildly. Neither Jezebel nor Agrippina nor Catharine de Medici nor Catharine of Russia surpassed her in the extent and depth of her wickedness. Like many other persons in high places and in low places, she looked upon religion not as an inspiration to noble living, but as a substitute for it. Nothing appeared to her more certain than that she could atone for her frequent and flagrant immoralities by an excessive display of superstitious piety. She resolved to win the favor of Heaven by bringing back the images, but it was necessary for her to act with sagacity and prudence. Her husband, though a weak and good-natured man, was tenderly attached to the memory of his father, and would not have tolerated any open attempts to undo his work. So the profligate queen bided her time, and did what she could. Through her influence the monks were brought back from their hiding-places. Many of them were promoted to the vacant bishoprics, and by every possible device the way was gradually paved for the accomplishment of her purposes. In 740 Leo died, having reigned only five years. This was the signal for decisive action. Securing the regency of the empire during the minority of her son, Constantine V., who was then just ten years old, she lost thenceforth no opportunity to carry out her designs.

The Bishop of Constantinople at this time was a certain Paul. He was the fourth who had occupied the office since Germanus, and was a very old man. It was

suddenly announced that he had laid aside his dignities and retired to a monastic cell ; and it was officially given out that he had done so because of the fact that his conscience troubled him for having taken part in the unholy schemes of the late emperor against the images. It is easy to see that an influence originating with Irene had really brought about the abdication of the patriarch ; and without much delay her chief counselor of state, Tarasias, who was still a layman, was appointed to the vacant place. With well-dissembled reluctance he declined to accept the advancement, stating that he could not consent to occupy a See that was cut off by its heresies from the rest of the Christian world. But at last, upon the promise that a new General Council should be called to re-open the matter and give it a final adjudication, he was prevailed upon to waive his scruples and receive consecration. These events took place in 783-4. In 786 the Council met in Constantinople. Over three hundred members were in attendance, including representatives from the Bishop of Rome and pretended proxies from the Eastern patriarchs. Before the assembly got fairly to work a band of soldiers, still loyal to the faith and memory of Constantine Copronymus, broke up its deliberations. This rendered some delay a necessity ; but in the next year the bishops re-assembled in Nicea, on the other side of the Hellespont, a city already famous and sacred as the place where the first great Council had been held. With an amazing unanimity they decreed the rightfulness of image-worship. Many who had been known as

avowed Iconoclasts professed a sudden change of mind, and with the most cowardly alacrity joined in anathemas against the doctrines which they had so lately defended. With one voice they broke out into a long acclamation: "We all believe, we all assent, we all subscribe. This is the faith of the apostles, this is the faith of the Church, this is the faith of the orthodox, this is the faith of all the world. We who adore the Trinity worship images. Whoever does not the like, anathema upon him! Anathema on all who call images idols! Anathema on all who communicate with them who do not worship images! Anathema upon Theodosius, falsely called Bishop of Ephesus!" We have not time to go farther with the curses of these holy fathers, or with the acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council.

As Constantine V. approached manhood he grew restive under the control of his mother, and tried hard to throw it off; but Irene had consummate tact, and held the reins with a tightening grasp. At last, after long continued reriminations, there came an open rupture. Constantine, aware of the fact that he was really a prisoner in his own capital, tried to flee, and did actually reach the Asiatic shore; but he was arrested, brought back to Constantinople, and by his mother's express orders, and in the very porphyry chamber in which he had been born, was blinded with such circumstances of horrible brutality as endangered his life. Well may Dean Milman say: "Among the few instances in the annals of mankind in which ambition and the love of sway have

quenched the maternal feeling, that strongest and purest impulse of human nature, is this crime committed against her son by the Empress Irene." This wretched woman now had undisputed sovereignty, and for five years ruled the empire without a rival.

During the reigns of Nicephorus (802-811) and of Michael Rhangabe (811-813) the controversy was in abeyance. It broke out again when Leo VI., the Armenian (813-821), came to the throne, continued during the reign of Michael the Stammerer (821-829), and reached the very height of its virulence under his son and successor, Theophilus (829). This last-named monarch shares with Constantine Copronymus the fate of being the best-abused man in history. He is denounced by his monkish historians as the very embodiment of all that is base and vile. Upon his death his widow, Theodora, repeated the part of Irene, being enabled to do it by the fact that her son Michael the Drunkard, in whose name she ruled, was yet very young. Though devotedly attached to the memory of her husband, who she avowed had recanted his heresies on his death-bed, she yet threw her whole soul into the work of restoring the objects which it had been the supreme aim of his life to destroy; and she succeeded. At a synod held in 842 the images were again ordered to be introduced into the churches. The day on which this decree was enacted, February 19, has ever since been celebrated in the Eastern Church as the "Feast of Orthodoxy."

It is to be noted as a peculiar phenomenon that while

the Popes of Rome, the recognized heads of the Western Church, were throughout the whole long and tedious controversy on the side of the image-worshipers, yet the Frankish Church, in the Frankfort Synod of 794, and in the *libri Carolini*, which are with almost certainty ascribed to Charlemagne himself, took up the opposite position, though not going as far as the Eastern Iconoclasts; and it was nearly two centuries before it fell into line with the prevailing belief.

If now we ask for the reasons why this crusade against image-worship failed, various answers may be given. In the first place, the Iconoclasts were themselves inconsistent. While opposing images of the saints, they yet allowed and encouraged the worship of the saints themselves, and especially of the Virgin Mary. They also contradicted their own fundamental principle by paying special reverence to the symbol of the cross. Secondly, they were premature. It was impossible to spiritualize at once, and in an age of general darkness, a worship that had been debased by centuries of false teaching and wrong practice. Thirdly, their efforts were of a purely negative character. They wished to take away something that was most highly prized, and to put nothing in its place. They had no grand doctrine of justification by faith, as the Reformers of the sixteenth century had, to substitute for the mummeries of the Church. Fourthly, they were in ignorance of the truth that great and permanent religious reformation must have a popular character, must proceed from below upward, and not

from above downward. This was true even in the English reformation, for the movements of Henry VIII. would never have been successful if they had not been in line with the national feeling.

The consequences of this Iconoclastic controversy were twofold. Without a doubt it so separated the Eastern empire into parties and robbed it of its natural strength as to disqualify it for successfully resisting the advancees of the Mohammedans. On the other hand, by alienating the Bishop of Rome from the Emperors of Constantinople it led to the introduction of Pepin and Charlemagne into Italy and to the alliance between the Church and the Teutons. These are mere hints. They may be followed out to most interesting conclusions, for events in this world are not single and alone. They are interlaced with one another in the invisible but none the less real bonds of cause and effect; and it is scarcely saying too much to affirm that the whole course of mediæval and modern politics has been affected more or less by these schemes and counter schemes of the more than half-heathen rulers of the Eastern Roman Empire.

THE CHRIST-PAINTINGS OF MUNKACSY.

OUR artist toiled for years in obscurity. He wrested power to portray with color from most adverse circumstances. He ever thought, while he was employing his hands, to obtain mastery of the artist's brush. His great aim was to express mighty truths with fidelity and power. He triumphed. This biography of the artist is definite enough for our purpose. Dropping out the details of birth, parents, place, time, education, and end, his biography is not materially different from that of most masters.

Munkacsy's two Christ-paintings are "Christ before Pilate" and "Christ on the Cross." The subjects are great subjects. It was daring for an obscure artist to undertake to give the theme a treatment. Only one conscious of genius would have had courage to try. Munkacsy's success was as remarkable as his courage. Our study will be directed first to his painting,

"CHRIST BEFORE PILATE."

Simply with the persons in the painting will we be concerned. Yet that bit of deep-blue sky, seen through one of the open archways of the Prætorium and the one-storied, one-roomed house on the hill, will tell to the observer that the artist understood the philosophy of con-

trast. The blue of sky and the dull light of the Praetorium, the calm of the home and the clamor of the court-room are in this manner revealed. Moreover, that view through this archway gives a perfect picture of the life of the common people of Palestine to-day.

The picture has in it seven groups, each containing three persons. Our study will be an unfolding of these groups.

GROUP 1.—*Christ, Pilate, Caiaphas.* (“Whom ye obey.”)

The figure of Christ departs from all previous types which artists have employed. There is not a single conventional sign, not any symbol present. He is simply a man. Yet how unlike other men! He is a man in absolute calm. A seething storm of hateful passions is behind him. It dashes against him as on an immovable rock. His quiet, erect attitude expresses a noble, intelligent resignation. Gethsemane had witnessed the struggle and the victory. Thereafter, he would be unmoved by what man could do. This resignation is no yielding to a necessity. Christ has not braced himself to meet his doom. His resignation is intelligent, for he knows what must come to pass. It is noble, for he is undisturbed by the vulgar hate of his foes. One emotion alone is portrayed in this reposeful man. It lights up his face. It is an emotion of loving pity. His searching eye is on Pilate. That look reveals the struggle of the Roman governor who was “willing to release Jesus;” he was also “willing to content the people.” There was no doubt

about its issue. Yet this struggle of truth, in a heart too weak for victory, awakened the tenderest sympathy and love in the Christ. This emotion at such a time and toward such a one is divine. Its presence on the face of Christ is a truer symbol of his divinity than all the conventional symbols ever employed to indicate divinity. Tender pity for a struggling man is the only feeling portrayed in the Christ of Munkacsy. All else is a noble, intelligent resignation.

Pilate is no weak, fickle man. He is a man of decision. The words of the high-priests do not move him. The case before him, he knows, is one urged simply for "envy." He himself "can find no fault" in the accused. But as governor he must avoid a civil uprising. He well knew the fanatical fury of a Jewish rabble, when excited to violence. Such a result must be avoided. The death of an innocent man would restore peace. It was true that he quailed at the calm gravity and unmoved courage of this man. He "marveled" at the answers given to his questions. The message of his wife troubled him. So on his fingers he seems to weigh the arguments of the case. His alert eye, looking now not at men but at reasons which must influence his judgment, indicate the Roman prudence in political crises. He is altogether indifferent to the justice of what is pressed upon his attention in the Praetorium. The moment of decision has arrived. There sounds in his ear the unrelenting cry: "Crucify him." Policy, not justice, rules the Roman governor in his decision.

Caiaphas stands before Pilate in the attitude of triumph, his right hand pointing to the clamorous people, and his left hand extended in front and below, while his face indicates almost intolerance of delay before such proof. The oft-repeated words of the governor, "I find no fault in him," seemed at first to promise a refuge for the Christ. Hope, however, came when Pilate asked: "Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you?" Here the judge made concession. He could not retract. This is the moment seized by the artist. Pilate has asked the question. The people in the background answer. The high-priest triumphantly points to the response. The case at that moment was adjudged.

The personages of this group are representatives of highest authority. Pilate is the representative of a military power; Caiaphas is the head of a most absolute hierarchical power; Christ is the King of the kingdom of heaven. The strength of the first power is the sword and the spear; of the second, a fanatical, blind, degrading devotion to religious forms; of the third, a vital, courageous, self-sacrificing manhood, devoted to such truth as exalts all human life. The Christ in the presence of both powers, arrayed in simple garments, strong in a noble, intelligent resignation to their present supremacy, touched into a tender, pitying sympathy for the struggle of Pilate, becomes with each following year the conqueror; while Caiaphas, in priestly robes of gorgeous splendor, surrounded by his fanatical adherents, and Pilate, in the simple toga of the Roman people, and with the irresistible

soldier before him to do his bidding, are being forgotten, or only remembered as mighty powers which have crumbled. The unity of this group is found in the representative character of the persons of which it is composed.

GROUP 2.—*The Shouting Rabble.* (“Crucify him.”)

Three within the Praetorium illustrate this crowd. One stands in front of the soldier. He has both arms extended upward, and is shouting vociferously: “Crucify him.” Far back in the crowd appear another pair of arms, thrown out in the same manner, and the head between them is that of one who makes the same outcry: “Crucify him.” A figure, rising above the others, standing apparently on one of the wall seats of this judgment-hall, stretches out his arm, and, with the index finger pointing scornfully to the Christ, seems to say: “Away with this fellow.” These are the witnesses that the high-priest triumphantly refers to, in order to show Pilate the wish of the people.

GROUP 3.—*The Whispering Mockers.* (“They mock him.”)

They are the three immediately behind Christ. The one just back of the Christ is the common Pharisee, and his face and his hand seem to unite in expressing a sneer. His words might almost be: “This fellow here is the one who said, ‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’” The bald-headed man to the right is the one who gloats over another’s misfortune. He stands by, listening to every utterance, and chuckles over every adverse saying. This character is always worse than a

sneerer. To the right is one vile fellow, leaning over the barrier and seeking to see the effect of the trial on the Christ. He is a scoffer. His soul is not large enough to behold any excellency, unless it be arrayed in the garments of power. The idea of a man, who claimed to be King of the Jews, with hands bound and a face which seemed to his coarse mind like a woman's, was a matter of scoffing. Those nearest to Christ in the time of his public trial are mocking him.

GROUP 4.—*The Perplexed Beholders.* (“So there was a division among them.”)

The three representing this group are widely separate. One stands bolt upright against the wall, “his uplifted face expressing a commingling of curiosity and contempt.” Another is the man of the common people, to the left of the soldier. On the face of this one is a look of inquiry, as if he would know the Christ. The woman holding the child is the third, who “is looking compassionately, almost believably, on Christ.” She may perhaps be the wife of Pilate, who said to him: “Have thou nothing to do with this just man.” It seems as if she had stepped into the Praetorium, coming out of the door of the palace behind her, in order to view the Christ.

Groups 2, 3, and 4 are groups of the people. They indicate the state of the divided public opinion concerning the Christ. These groups are all back of the accused, and reflect as in a mirror the sentiment awakened by his works and claims. There are three remaining groups, and these are in front of the Christ.

GROUP 5.—*The Debating Doctors.* (“Who is this which speaketh blasphemies?”)

These three are apart in heated discussion. The vehement eloquence of Caiaphas does not attract them. The importance of the decision of Pilate cannot hold their attention. They will quibble over points and speculate over the rightness or wrongness of tenets or whatever conflicts with them, even when a decision is impending, that writes a death-warrant to all their little but much spun out doctrines. The face of one is turned Christ-ward. His left hand rests on the partition which shuts them in from the rest. It is partly closed, and has the position which the hand takes in moments of indecision. The one opposite him is in earnest debate. The bony, unnourished hand of this reasoner, with the first finger protruded, tells of the irrefutable conclusions of its owner. The hand and the face of this learned man are warning sufficient, for all who behold them, to teach the folly and the danger of such erudition as has its greatest merit in disputing and establishing, after this fashion, religious beliefs. The third one of this group is far back; he is negative, his beliefs are those of his compeers. He learned them in the schools; there is nothing in heaven or earth that can now unsettle them. Still a discussion of doctors is more to him than the anxiety of the high-priest to secure the condemnation of the Christ.

GROUP 6.—*The Fanatical Priests.* (“But the chief priests moved the people that he should rather release Barabbas unto them.”)

This group sit on the steps of the bema, one on the left and two on the right of Pilate. The one farthest from Pilate and next to the scornful Pharisee, who stands high and looks down in scorn upon the Christ, is lost in deep thought. He lets the whole scene pass by without his observing the course of events. The life of the Christ had impressed him. He was concerned with its import. He seems to be one who constantly inquired of himself: "What if this man be the Messiah?" The priest nearest to this one, and so to the right of Pilate, looks into the face of the Roman governor. The priest on the other side of Pilate is looking at Caiaphas. The faces of this pair reflect the curse resting on every priesthood which forgets that its function is to inspire religious character in men rather than a blind devotion in them to religious forms. A priesthood, shell-bound in creeds and forms, is the priesthood of which these two priests are representatives. There is not a kindly line in either face. The one on the right has a face directed toward him who holds the power of decision, and on it is painted an anxious fear. The other is almost wolfish in his attitude; he sees the evident triumph of the high-priest, and he is ready now to pounce out and add new abuse to the Christ, for whose blood he thirsts.

GROUP 7.—*The Soldier, the Pharisee, the Sadducee.*
("His servants are ye.")

This group is to be taken with the first group. The six figures in the two groups display the highest art of the artist. They form a kind of circle. (The soldier is

not in the circumference; still his spear-head indicates his place.) They display the secret of power. Christ is bound. The one with divinest authority is Christ, yet he is without a servant. Nevertheless, alone of all who are clad with authority stands Christ, unmoved, confident, strong. Pilate, vicar of the Roman power, has his servant in the Roman soldier. Strength and courage are revealed in this servant. As a Hercules he stands, perfectly unmoved by the roar of the rabble. He is the check upon that wild, shouting mob. His master, Pilate, is in perplexity. Yet he has at his beck this force, which he could employ to sweep clear of the presence of this crowd the whole Prætorium. Pilate is not disturbed by the uproar; he is simply weighing the gravity of the present case. Shall he put to death a man in whom he can find no fault, and thus prevent a religious riot; or banish the rabble and all from his presence, and save the innocent? Prudence, not justice, will rule him; his soldier shall not be employed to establish justice. Between Christ and the high-priest sits the Pharisee. He is nearest the high-priest. He looks with scornful contempt at Christ. This Pharisee is the servant of the high-priest. He has wealth and religious position. He will not quibble over points of the law or any doctrine which conflicts with his faith. Such desiccating discussions he will leave to the doctors. He will not be bound by customs, except as to outward conformance. Bigoted adherence to them he leaves to the priests. The luxurious ease of his life shall not be encroached upon by such fanatical servi-

tude. He has a deadly hatred of the Galilean who dares say: "Thou blind Pharisee, cleanse first that which is within the cup." Wealth and an outward observance of religious forms are the strength of the servant of the high-priest. The Sadducee is a type of the Hellenized Jew. He has a religious faith, but it is a kind of Hebrew Platonism. The refinements of life procured by wealth and the imaginative pleasures of thought are all consistent with his creed. Such a one is free of the bigotry of a Pharisee and has closest kinship with Pilate. Thus we find him sitting near the Roman governor, apart from all the rest. He is a servant to religion, so far as it may please his taste; he is also servant to the civil power, so far as it may contribute to security and pleasure. This seventh group is characterized by the most expensive robes and uniforms. They are arrayed in the livery of the powers they serve. The meanest face of them all, if we may imagine how the face of the soldier looks, is this Pharisee, who holds in thought a noble creed, but only outwardly conforms to it. He is the most contemptible character.

The picture concentrates a whole epoch of Jewish history and what is contemporary to it in one assemblage. It grades correctly the worthfulness of the religious faith in men. It declares, in unmistakable language, that the only conquering power in a religion is not its doctors, nor its priests, but simply the man whose only authority is his faith in his words and a worthy life wrought out under the power of his faith. Such a religion—the

Christ religion—is calm and kind in the presence of all opposition. Surprise and admiration take hold of us at beholding in a painting all this complex truth vividly portrayed. Great surprise and nobler admiration fill us when we see that not symbolical figures are employed, but living men, to utter this truth. A work created under such insight, and with such fidelity to eternal fact, must place the author among the greatest of artists.

We now turn to consider the second great painting,

“CHRIST ON THE CROSS.”

This picture has in it seven groups, and in each group there are three persons.

GROUP 1.—*Christ and the Two Thieves.* (“And with him they crucified two thieves.”)

The Christ is a dead man on the cross. Two other crosses stand erected near his—one on his left and one on his right. On each is nailed a man still alive. These are the two thieves. The absence of all signs of muscular life in the Christ is proof positive that he is dead. Already have been spoken the words: “Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit.” The knitted brow and protruded, compressed lips of the thief on the left hand indicate life. His face indicates hardened, desperate character meeting doggedly its just reward. He must hang until death. As the world disowns him, he disowns it. A dying Christ does not move his stolid indifference. The thief on the right holds his head turned toward the Christ. This muscular effort bespeaks life. His face has not a tender line in it; all its signs are as foreboding

as the threatening sky above; still on it, as on the sky, some light seems breaking. This man with his face darkened by a vicious life, yet with a glimmer of hope breaking through the shadows of evil which obscure his countenance, is the penitent thief. At least his face is now in the right direction.

The Christ on the cross is a dead man. The head is thrown back and to the left, the lips parted. The final muscular effort was to raise the head toward heaven to breathe the prayer which committed his spirit to the Father. Life ended with that prayer. This dead body of the Christ is aglow with light. Through the dark, pall-like clouds bursts light, and it falls on him who has just died. It is a double symbol: it signifies that the prayer has been answered. The Father has received the spirit of his well-beloved Son. It signifies also that the death of Christ is light-bringing to the earth all enveloped in darkness. We may forget for a moment these greater truths, and attend to a lesser one, yet one of momentous importance. Our eyes see three human bodies exposed to view. If our bodies be "temples of God," we may behold in these bodies the transforming power of the worship within. We shudder at the coarseness of the bodies of the thieves. They were temples of dissipation, of ignoble thought, base feelings, and vile deeds. But the fineness of the lines of the body of Christ impresses us. The worship within this temple was moderation and obedience to Nature's laws; while holy, noble thought and holy feeling had wrought their sweetness

on every line of the face. Death has no power to destroy them.

GROUP 2.—*Mary the Mother, Mary the Magdalene, John the Disciple.* (“Let not your hearts be troubled.”)

The group which we have just considered is a group of three, the only common tie being outward simply and expressed by the crosses. All else is different. The second group of three is placed about the cross: it is Mary the mother, Mary the Magdalene, John the disciple. The uniting bond is a grief too deep to be moved. When the Christ “cried with a loud voice” it aroused others; it left these three undisturbed. Mary the mother kneels prostrate upon the cross with her hands clasped, touching the feet of Jesus; she hangs her weight on the cross. The right side of her face alone is seen. Helplessly her head falls on her left fore-arm. Death had suspended all muscular action in the body of her son above her; grief now staid all muscular action within her. The mother love suffers helpless grief through loss of the son. Or if it has any help, it is only in the support of the cross, which keeps her from falling prostrate upon the ground. Mary the Magdalene is to her left. Her figure is that of a young woman. Streaming golden hair falls down her back. She is kneeling, but with the body thrown backward. Her face is covered with her agitated hands. A moment before grief had convulsed her frame. It passed, and left as if petrified the signs of its violence. One might almost feel justified in concluding, from the position of the head of the Christ and the attitude of the

Magdalene, that the loving Master in his last moments had cast a kind, encouraging look to the woman whose past was filled with such unspeakable sorrow, then raised his head and commended his spirit to the Father; that at the moment when he raised his head toward the heavens the Magdalene, deprived of its sweet encouragement, convulsively threw her hands over her face and became motionless through her sorrow. John the disciple stands as lifeless as a cross, his head inclined downward, as if looking at Mary the mother. No sign of grief save its awful stillness. The type of the head chosen for John portrays his character. It has great depth, and from it descends over the shoulders and neck abundant, wavy hair. The face, as it is seen in profile, has the tenderness of a woman, which because of his manly force is not obscured by the fullness of his sorrow. He in his grief is still mindful of the last charge given him by his Master. One almost suspects that the coloring of this group has in it a secret. The dark robe of the mother suggests a sorrow that well-nigh robs of life. The sword has entered her heart. The blue robe of the Magdalene, deep as the heaven's blue, rightly clothes her whose love is founded on deepest gratitude, and so must be as true as the beatings of her heart. John is clad in a long cloak, a deep, warm red, rightly suggesting a nature whose every thought was love for the Christ.

GROUP 3.—*Mary, Wife of Cleophas, the Converted Centurion, and the Lad.* (“I am the light of the world.”)

A group of three is now to be considered, who are

widely separated in the picture. It is composed of Mary, wife of Cleophas, the converted centurion, and the lad in the foreground of the picture. The outward signs which bind these three in a group are physical attitudes. "Jesus had cried with a loud voice." Mary, wife of Cleophas, rises, leans her head backward to gain a view of the Christ, extends her arms upward, and holds supine her hands. This attitude is natural to those in devotion. An authority on gesture gives such elements as making up the physical action for the expression of the words, "Hail, universal Lord!" This Mary had followed her sorrowing sister, led by feelings of kinship. The lofty claims of the one, being led to the cross, had not been acknowledged through such experience as made the mother see in her son also her God; by such revelation of love through close friendship as taught John that his friend was also his God; by such compassionate love and divine encouragement as made the Magdalene see in her Saviour even her God. Mary, wife of Cleophas, was one of the many good ones of that time who waited for light. She was true-hearted, so she hesitated not to follow her nephew to a disgrace which he had not merited. She had assumed the attitude of sorrow. She had been kneeling. The final words of the dying relative were heard. But the last words, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," uttered in a loud voice, opened the mystery of his life to her. "My Father" alone justified the claims of the Christ. In an instant, like a lightning flash, the Messiah, the Hope of Israel, is revealed. She has found

the Christ, and joy and worship animate her face and form. The converted centurion has his left arm extended and his hand vertical, the position of awe. His right hand is by his ear, to catch the words, and is indicative of joy. Those final words, uttered with a loud voice, have reached him ; suddenly their meaning flashes upon him, and awe and joy possesses him. He says: "Truly this was the Son of God." The lad is the final figure in this group. A vulgar curiosity has led him out of the city to see the sight of men crucified. He acted under the same motive as leads many to-day to see a "hanging." It was all over. Most were moving away, he with them. When that loud voice met his ear, he turned and became the embodiment of surprise. Here, too, we trace the secret of the color, if we pause. The dress of this group is a shade of gray, each different in tone, but all illuminated by the light which broke through the darkness and falls chiefly on the body of the Christ. It is the gray of dawn. The untrained, undisciplined lad is met by a surprise in the "loud voice" from the cross, which will ever abide with him, and bring day to much that must later come to his mind. The thoughtful and faithful centurion—thoughtful and faithful in his calling—becomes through this "loud voice" the possessor of a sudden and joyful faith, that voices itself in the words: "Truly this was the Son of God." The good and sympathetic Mary, wife of Cleophas, sees revealed in this "loud voice" as in a moment all the meaning in the Messianic hopes of her people. The dawn of a new day throws its light on

this group. This is the power which binds together the group.

GROUP 4.—*The Roman Soldier Youth, the Merchant Jew, the Perplexed Scribe.* (“He that is not with me is against me.”)

The fourth group is composed of the Roman soldier sitting on the rock to the right of the cross, of the merchant Jew to the left of the high-priest, and of the thoughtful, perplexed scribe, to whom the Pharisee is talking. The thoughtful seriousness on their faces binds this group together. The youthful soldier is at a loss to know the meaning of this complex scene. Scenes of carnage he had met; death was not new to him. But the rumors about this man who is called in derision the “King of the Jews;” his followers, women weeping, and a quiet, calm, grief-full man—these rumors and these followers, not the fact of death with which he was well acquainted, were the powers which had made serious his face. The merchant, apparently, was walking with the high-priest when the “loud voice” was heard. He turns full around. Accustomed to decide on the quality of goods by test, of the worth of money by trial, he had an instinctive habit of finding out the worth of things by considering them not from prejudice, but from experience. This “loud voice” came as new to him, and seriously he will attend to its meaning. The last figure in this group is the aged scribe. His brows are knit, his eyes directed to the ground. There is almost a resentment at the fluent words of the Pharisee, who would

reason away easily the facts which had been witnessed within the last few hours. The question of the identity of Him who died on the cross is uppermost. A whole system stands or falls with the answer. A "loud voice" from the cross cannot arouse him from the intensity of his reflection. The life, the teachings, the works of this crucified man are louder in their voices to him than His final voice on the cross. But he passes away from the cross unsettled, but not unimpressed. Were we to venture to name this perplexed, thoughtful scribe, we would call him the Pharisee Gamaliel—that one who said later concerning the work of the disciples of Christ: "If it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it."

GROUP 5.—*The High-priest, the Sadducee, the Roman Commander.* ("By what authority dost thou these things?")

We may now turn to antithetic groups. These are three. The first we will consider contains the high-priest, the Sadducee (falsely called the "purse-proud Pharisee"), and the Roman commander. Authority is the binding tie. The "loud voice" from the cross comes to each. Alone the Roman commander hears it unmoved. His visage is that of one hardened by the pleasures which are always within the reach of absolute power. He is present at this time only as an act of duty, that the rabble may arouse no civil commotion. The anger on the one side and the pathetic suffering on the other had no power even to elicit any recognition. Absolute fidelity to Rome, and afterward slave to every brutal passion which could

be enjoyed through the prestige of Roman power—such is this commander. The high-priest had been moving away. The "loud voice" reaches him. He turns, with every sign of astonishment. A moment ago he was passing away from the scene with the look of triumph on his face; it still rests there, but the upraised face and the raised hands suggest that perhaps yet this Crucified One may be the real conqueror. The authority of the high-priest crumbles if this one be really the Christ. Any sign, therefore, which might indicate that he was not yet destroyed would disturb Caiaphas. His power was not as unassailable by the Christ as that of the Roman commander. So the "loud voice" painted, for the instant, astonishment on his features. The Sadducee remains of this group. Our reason for regarding this figure not as a Pharisee is grounded on the history of the time. There can be no doubt that this figure is to represent one with great wealth. The fine horse richly caparisoned, the costly-wrought robe which he wears settle this fact beyond a doubt. But possession of wealth does not argue a Pharisee. The color of his garment, however, argues beyond doubt that the man is a Sadducee. This garment is white. Sadducee means a "righteous one," one unspotted, one whose symbol is the color white. An eminent historian of this time writes respecting this sect that its name signifies "righteous," and its members "constituted in fact the wealthy and aristocratic portions of society." The figure of the artist and the description of the historian point to but one sect, and

that the Sadducees. The face of this Sadducee is also turned toward the cross. He will not even stop his horse, but will support himself in motion as he looks back by placing his left hand on the back of his steed. His authority was no more affected by the Christ than that of the Roman commander; hence he simply and haughtily looks back. A wealthy, self-contained self-righteousness is as hardening as the coarse deeds of a Roman commander. The fanaticism of Caiaphas is consistent with noble lines in the face. But the coarse sensuality of the Roman commander and the refined dissipations of the outwardly righteous Sadducee rob the human countenance of every noble character-line.

GROUP 6.—*The Group of Strangers.* (“Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews.”)

The second of the antithetic groups is found in the extreme left of the painting, behind the Sadducee. They are all strangers, drawn together by the sight of the crowd. One, looking like a garrulous Bedouin, is pointing to the cross and telling the others the scraps of information he had picked up. The group is negative; the faces seem to bespeak simply a listening to an idle tale.

GROUP 7.—*The Executioner, the Pharisee, the Judas.* (“Whom ye have crucified.”)

The third one in these antithetic groups is made up of the executioner, the fleeing Judas, and, midway between these, the Pharisee, who talks so confidently to the perplexed scribe. Their falseness unites them. The executioner is simply a butcher. Blood is not sacred to him.

Authority decrees death. He thereupon executes the decree. A shriek, a groan, a sob, a tear must not deter him nor touch him. Such work, although sanctioned by civilized law, imbrutes the doer. Awful irony is employed by the artist in this person. Laws thirsting for blood may rid the world of criminals, yet at the same time they leave in the world characters as dead to every tender emotion as the dead who have been executed. Such is the awful penalty upon the executioner who must carry out laws demanding blood. The retreating figure is Judas. A horror fills his heart, paints itself on his face, shows itself in the clinched hands pressed against his throbbing breast, and compels a running away from the place where the horror took possession of him. He knew whom he had betrayed. This knowledge awoke a hell of suffering within him. If but for a moment the executioner could have known whom he had nailed to the cross, a horror would have seized him, and he too would have taken flight. Still, the flight of the executioner would be under a horror immeasurably less sorrow-bringing than the horror of Judas. To betray love for money or any value leads to an awful horror as soon as the deed has been brought home to conscience. The only figure remaining unconsidered now in this group is the Pharisee. He is talking to the thoughtful, perplexed scribe, likewise a Pharisee. His gesture with his hands is that of emphatic assertion. All his conclusions have been reached. He is as undisturbed by the "loud voice" as the Roman commander. The great enemy to the teach-

ings of the Pharisees he sees impaled upon the cross. All the declarations of the Christ die with him. Pharisaism is safe. The final shout of the pretended Messiah to the Father is only in line with that blasphemous boasting which led this deceiver of the people to announce himself while living the Son of God. His works in life could not move a Pharisee, nor can his "loud voice" in the time of death produce that effect. One knows that the artist loved John. No heart but a loving heart could so powerfully depict the loving disciple; hence we are not surprised that the Johannean account of the last days of the Christ should be the favorite one with the artist. These are John's words: "Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees." John couples Judas and the Pharisees together; so does our artist. Judas and the Pharisees are in the same group. The secret of color will also confirm us in our opinion. The dress of the executioner is a blue, which has become pale through long washing. It is a blue that has lost its color, just like his face, which has lost its character. The dress of Judas is likewise a blue, but a blue that is traitor to itself. A blue it is that seems ready to change into a black. The dress of the Pharisee is also a blue, but not deep like the heavens above, nor warm like friendship below. It is a blue like a house-painter might mix—not like the blue which God makes in the flowers. Blue is a symbol of the true; but it should deck an executioner only when it is faded, a Judas only when it threatens to turn black, a Pharisee

only when it is a mixture and no natural color, since each of these characters is untrue through a degrading trade, or a shameful betrayal, or a distorted religious faith.

There are seven groups. Three of these groups are under the influence of the power of the cross; three are hostile or indifferent to the cross. The cross group is central, and, in itself, represents all the other groups, since Christ, even on the cross, divides those who are crucified with him.

The picture is the work of a genius, who is not alone master of the brush, but also of the passions which move in men. He is also a master-genius, since in a painting with about forty faces he can bring in review the conflicting age in which the Christ came as the Saviour of mankind. The whole period is before us. We behold its hope. We behold likewise its despair. It was an age with a dark sky, broken into by the Light from heaven. The picture makes us see how sublime a thing it is to suffer for the cross, how hateful a thing it is to be indifferent to the cross. All sorrow and weakness in those with faith in the cross beautifies, and all strength and power in those who disbelieve in the cross make ugly. The truth is eternal—the exhibition of it grand and masterly, its author one of the master-painters of the world.

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